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Abstract 
 
 
  This thesis explores the tensions between the underpinnings of Normative Power 
Europe (NPE) and the use of the military as a way of norm diffusion, with a focus on Somalia. 
It is specifically concerned with the impact of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), on the evolution of the EU 
as a ‘normative power’. By focusing on this particular interrelation of normative and military 
power, this project will illustrate the importance of actorness as a constructive element of the 
EU’s normative identity in its external action. 
This thesis’ contribution stems from critiques of NPE, particularly with reference to its 
discursive nature. Simultaneously, it emphasises symbolic manifestation as key in addressing 
the tension between “military” and “normative” power. Whilst it contributes to the literature 
on CSDP, this thesis is concerned with demonstrating the catalytic role of the establishment of 
the EEAS in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. 
  Through the exploration of the EU’s military operations in Somalia - EUTM and 
EUNAVFOR - this research establishes the compatibility between normative power and 
military means. This is achieved through content analysis and subsequent critical frame 
analysis of official EU documentation. The critical frames of ‘comprehensive approach’, 
‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’ are applied to the strategic 
documentation, sub-strategies and EU documents relating to Somalia and the Horn of Africa 
in order to demonstrate the normative elements of the EU’s external action as well as how they 
have altered since the establishment of the EEAS. By examining the consistent 
operationalisation of the EU’s demonstrated intents and subsequent impact in Somalia, this 
thesis ultimately provides an evaluation of the Union’s overall power in normative terms. Most 
importantly, it makes the case for NPE’s pertinence in the study of external action. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The introduction of a multifaceted new Agency, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), in the EU framework on external action together with the increasing global turn 
towards the complex agency of normative power, are the two intellectual puzzles that underpin 
this research. Although the mechanisms underpinning the function of this new structure are 
essential to comprehending the role of the Service, the need to understand its impact in the 
evolution of EU external action is imperative. With consideration to the identity of the EU and 
how that has evolved through its operational activity, this thesis will focus on the normative 
elements and how they have been operationalised in view of the EEAS’ establishment. I will 
thus be approaching the normative power paradigm from the perspective of the EU but will 
also be accounting for the reverse course of diffusion1 (that from the receiver-Somalia) as part 
of a discursive flow of power. The theoretical contribution will therefore stem from the work 
of Kavalski (2013), Diez (2005, 2007, 2012), Whitman (2002) and Lenz (2013) as far as the 
discursive nature of ‘normative power’ is concerned, while taking Manners’ (2000) emphasis 
on symbolic manifestation as a point of departure. Additionally, this thesis will demonstrate 
that ‘military’ and ‘normative’ power are not mutually exclusive by looking at ‘symbolic 
manifestations’ and will illustrate this through a critical frame analysis of the military 
operations it is carrying out in Somalia. Therefore, the main concern will be to demonstrate the 
                                                 
1 The growing assertiveness of certain actors (particularly the ‘BRICS’) has demonstrated the global shift toward 
a new normative order. Therefore, the operationalization of the ‘normative power’ of a more traditional 
international foreign actor such as the EU, examined through the receptive lens of ‘others’ (in this case Somalia) 
is directly linked to the peaceful transition pointed out by academics (Hurrell 2006; Ikenberry 2008; Barma et al. 
2009; Zhang 2011; Kupchan 2012) as potentially one of the greatest global challenges of our time. 
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normative impact of the EU’s operationalisation of external action both on its global actorness 
as well as its own identity. 
  The nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its role in the 
process of European integration has been widely debated. This thesis is less concerned with 
CSDP per se, although it will add to the literature on the operationalisation of the EU’s external 
action within a military context (as demonstrated in Chapters 3,6 and 7). It will determine, 
however, the impact of the EEAS in the evolution of the Union as a ‘normative power’ and the 
potential repercussions on the character and the identity of the Union. Equally important, and 
accompanying this, is the de-codification of the normative core of the Union. This will be 
achieved through the frames of ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘multilateralism’ and the 
‘partnership-ownership binary’, thus enabling the identification of the normative strand which 
runs through EU security and defence policy initiatives and which will form the nature of the 
future endeavours of the Union as a ‘normative power’ internationally. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis explores issues of normative power, from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective.  Specifically, the thesis will unpack the tension between the normative 
underpinnings of NPE framework and the use of military means as a way of norm diffusion. 
By focusing on this particular interrelation of normative and military power, I will be able to 
determine the importance of actorness as a constructive element of the EU’s normative identity 
in its external action. 
 The main research question underpinning this project is: Has the establishment of the 
EEAS in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) contributed to the evolution of the Union as 
a ‘normative power’? Informing this analysis are two main theoretical questions: 1) Is the EU 
 15 
a normative actor judging from its external action? and 2) Are military means compatible with 
the NPE framework and, more generally, can they be used in normative diffusion? 
 The first question will be approached through an investigation of how the EU’s normative 
actorness within CSDP is evolving in the context of EEAS’ creation. This will draw on the 
theoretical elaboration of NPE (Chapter 2) and the discussion of the changes that occurred as 
a result of the EEAS’ establishment as well as the unresolved issues that have been identified 
in the literature as far as its role and function are concerned (see Chapter 4). The 
operationalisation of the EU’s normative standing within its military operations will be 
achieved through the critical frame analysis of EU documentation (see Chapters 3, 6 and 7), 
thus completing the portrait of its normative identity and ‘power’.  
The second question further examines the operationalization of military initiatives. The 
analysis conducted will concentrate on the EU’s two military operations in Somalia as they 
provide useful insights into the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and the role of the 
EEAS’s establishment in operationalizing it. The analysis of the EU’s military operations in 
Somalia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the European Union Military Training Mission in Somalia 
(EUTM), provide a unique example upon which the research questions can be explored. 
Because Atalanta (2008) was launched before the establishment of the EEAS (2010) and is still 
ongoing, it enables the exploration of the EU’s identity and actorness before and after the 
creation of the Service. Furthermore, as a military operation, it allows the exploration of the 
‘normative’- ‘military’ power tension which lies at the core of this research. Additionally, 
EUTM (2010) adds a second strand to the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia, this time 
focusing more on military training rather than providing security, thus allowing for a more 
comprehensive examination of the Union’s ‘normative power’. Seeing that both operations are 
identified as military initiatives, yet serve different functions within the same host country 
(Somalia), they constitute an uncommon combination of in-case case studies, suitable for the 
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exploration of the military-normative power tension. Therefore, the analysis of the EU’s 
operations in Somalia tests the compatibility of military operations and normative power, as 
well as how the core normative values of EU security and defence policy have been framed 
within the official documentation and what this means with respect to its argued evolving 
‘normative power’. The civilian operations in the region will be referred to only as a means of 
providing context for the subsequent analysis.  
 
1.3 Research Rationale 
The evolution of the EU has been a constant and dynamic process since its conception. 
The multilevel development of policy and the range of the repercussions that have resulted 
from each stage of its transformations are indicative of the continuous changes taking place on 
a political and social level within and outside the geographic limits of Europe. In an effort to 
evolve together with its international environment and adapt its function to better address the 
complex and interconnected nature of the challenges it faces as a global actor, the EU has 
engaged in a series of efforts to ameliorate its ability to respond. These changes have affected 
the identity of the EU and have ultimately been portrayed in the institutional infrastructure 
which has been adapting to the needs of the actor known as the EU. It is these needs that the 
creation of the EEAS stems from. As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, the EEAS provides 
the potential for the EU to become an actor that is able to comprehensively address the threats 
it faces while creating internally a coherent mechanism that supports such an endeavour. 
Nevertheless, it appears that it has still fallen short in meeting its goals, especially when 
examining its operations. Therefore, the investigation of the EU’s actions together with its 
intended goals emerges as an essential requirement for the current research. The actorness of 
the EU has been an issue of discussion not only in its internal projection but also in its global 
standing. As globalisation becomes more of an issue of definitions and complex procedures, 
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particularly when dealing with questions pertinent to actorness and the forms of power 
employed, the role and identity of the EU becomes all the more intricate. This results in the 
debate on the normative character of its actions, given that it encompasses more facets of the 
‘identity’ question than other approaches.  
Keukeleire and Delreux (2014:140) argue that the problem in labelling the EU as a 
normative power stems from the fact that “action and success vary across countries”. The 
Council conclusions on Somalia (2014) underline three prominent normative objectives that 
should be safeguarded: state building; combating violations of human rights; fight against 
terrorism (Al-Shabaab) and insurgency (Ehrhart, Petretto, 2014). By jointly examining the 
aforementioned objectives and the way they were operationalized, a conclusion can be drawn 
as to whether the EU can be considered a normative power. The level of ‘success’ can be 
evaluated from the accomplishment of the proclaimed objectives and the alignment of their 
normative justification with the selected operationalization. 
The most apparent link from an operational standpoint between these three core norms 
is reliance on military means. The most common understanding is grounded on the tautology 
between military means and the use of coercion. Within a normative power framework, 
Manners (2006, 2010, 2013) proposes an alternative interpretation of the military aspect. He 
argues that it can be viewed as symbolic presence, which may actually enable the diffusion of 
norms. The caveat to this is that coercion cannot be utilised (or, at least, not heavily resorted to 
according to the critiques discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). That is to say that the mere presence 
of a military force can be beneficial for the diffusion of norms as long as it does not actively 
resort to imposing those norms on the subject. The element of internalisation-acceptance, 
which is an inherent characteristic of normative power, would be weakened if this caveat were 
ignored. Therefore, by re-evaluating the normative power equation and reconciling the notion 
of military operations by viewing them as a symbolic presence and not another form of 
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imposition, the normative paradigm can become relevant again. If the military aspect is 
approached as a contributing factor to the instillation of normative values rather than one that 
reduces their prominence, the reconfiguration of the power balance could be reviewed.  
The pertinence of the symbolic element to this research and its critical approach to the 
normative framework approach can be summarised in three points: a) it is directly provided for 
in Manners’ theoretical framework; b) it includes the discursive element highlighted by other 
academics such as Whitman (2002), Diez (2005, 2007, 2012), Kavalski (2013) and Lenz 
(2013); c) it results in the change of expectations (initially contradictory to the prominence of 
normative power because of the employment of military means) which would significantly 
alter and potentially reverse the existing analysis on the issue.  
The manifestation of normative power becomes apparent by looking at the actions and 
proclamations of the two parties: the EU and Somalia. As far as the former is concerned: 
treaties, action plans, declarations and operational follow up are all important elements to 
consider. The treaties will act as a broader framework of interpretation for the more specified 
documents (strategies, sub-strategies, institutional conclusions, reports and decisions) that 
follow. The Lisbon Treaty specifically foresees the establishment of the EEAS and sets out its 
role within CSDP. Strategies, sub-strategies and mandates will provide the details pertaining 
to the deployment of the military operations in Somalia, thus demonstrating not only the 
rhetoric intent of the EU but also how it appears in the objectives it sets. The declarations made 
throughout the operations, from their proposal to their completion, are also important in order 
to comprehensively approach the rhetoric of the military operations. As far as the operational 
follow-up is concerned, this will indicate the level to which the intents or purported goals of 
the operations were ultimately accomplished. This follow-up will comprise of factsheets, 
reports from EU institutions as well as other official material which further complete the 
understanding of the EU’s ‘normative power’, particularly in terms of its efficiency as well as 
 19 
its impact. This will be demonstrated as part of the critical frame analysis, thus completing the 
understanding of the EU’s actorness. In terms of ‘normative power’, the convergence of its 
intents, as demonstrated within the ‘strategies’ and action plans, with the reports on its impact, 
will allow the better evaluation of its current normative potency as well as a global actor (see 
Chapter 3). 
Therefore, from the Somali perspective of norm diffusion the following will be sought: 
a) cooperation and involvement in the operationalisation of promoted initiatives, which proves 
acceptance and adherence to their normative underpinnings, b) imitation of language, which 
should focus on disentangling EU rhetoric from that of other multilateral or international 
partners, c) potential impact on subsequent EU rhetoric, which means that the dominant 
narrative may change in order to accommodate the needs of the partners. This final point would 
prove the discursive nature of normative power, as Kavalski (2013) has argued (see Chapter 
2). 
The question of intent and its separation from purposes is another point of concern. 
Intent can be viewed directly from the proclamation. Conversely, purpose is more covert. In 
the example of the naval operations in Somalia the intent was securing the naval passage for 
the provision of food by the World Health Organisation to the affected areas. Nevertheless, one 
could argue that the purpose of this operation was securing the mercantile lanes. Therefore, 
intent and purpose may not always coincide. They might even function to the detriment of each 
other. 
Drawing on Nunes (2011), EU normative actorness can be seen as a dual analysis: while 
creating a normative internal actorness of consensus between the Member States’ normative 
identities, externally the EU has a separate actorness more inclined towards a globalist UN 
type. Therefore, theoretically, the problematic consequences of internal normative identities do 
not spill over into the external actorness of the EU due to its separate orientation. Even though 
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the interests of certain states may appear more prominently within EU external policy in certain 
situations, the fact remains that they are then promoted as EU ones. This is a case of a peculiar 
internalisation one may say of the Member States’ interests by the EU. As Kratochvíl et al 
(2011:395) assert, “the ‘exported’ norms are always attributed to the EU as a whole and are 
thus directly linked to the question of actorness”. 
 
1.4 The NPE framework: outlining the puzzle 
According to Manners (2006), much of the current focus in the literature on EU policies 
towards the rest of the world is misplaced. The EU's normative role can be better determined 
through its symbolic manifestation and subsequently the political reality of its international 
identity can be more aptly evaluated. An important part in this theoretical framework (see 
Chapter 2) is played by 'norm diffusion'. Manners (2006:76) argues that six factors contribute 
to norm diffusion: contagion, information, procedure, transference, overt presence and culture 
filter (Textbox 1), and will later be addressed in relation to their operationalisation within 
CSDP. Procedural diffusion, which is accomplished through the institutionalization of 
relationships), transference diffusion, which refers to the transmission of norms through the 
transfer of material and immaterial assets, as well as overt diffusion - physical EU presence in 
third party countries or organizations, can be identified and related to CSDP operations as well 
as foreign policy initiatives that fall in the realm of duties of the EEAS. The final type of 
cultural diffusion (the way that the process of creating a social and political identity by the 
subjects shapes and transforms the diffusion of EU norms) (Kinnvall 1995) will be illustrated 
through the case study of Somalia. 
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Textbox 1: Manners’ (2013) six forms of norm diffusion  
Contagion diffusion This is the diffusion of ideas between the EU and other 
global actor, i.e. the way ideas and means of regional 
integration have diffused between continents. Such ideas as 
‘common high authority’, ‘four freedoms’ and ‘single 
currency’ are seen in other regions as being worthy of 
imitation (Manners, 2013:315). This form employs 
mechanisms such as imitation, emulation and 
mimicry/mimétisme including the persuasive attraction of 
ideas, as well as the prestige and status associated with 
regional integration organizations. 
Informational diffusion It takes place through references to a range of strategic 
communications (policy initiative by the EU, including 
declaratory communications such as initiatives from the 
Presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission). 
This type of diffusion is encountered in cases such as the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) (with reference to 
‘complex causes’ of terrorism, ‘pressures of modernisation, 
cultural, social and political crises and the alienation of 
young people living in foreign societies’ (Solana, 2003:3)). 
The mechanisms that appear are initiation, declaration and 
communication including persuasive attraction and 
argumentative promotion of ideas (Manners, 2013: 316).  
Procedural diffusion This form appears through the institutionalisation of 
relationships between the EU and third parties, including 
political partnerships as seen in inter-regional cooperation 
agreements, membership of an international organisation, 
association agreements or enlargement of the EU itself. It 
relies on mechanisms such as partnership, cooperation, 
association and membership, includes persuasive attraction 
and argumentative promotion of ideas, the possible prestige 
and status of associating with the EU and other 
international organisations. Within this category Manners 
(2013:317) includes the EEAS.  
Transference diffusion This occurs when the EU is involved in the transfer of 
material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and 
technical assistance. It may be the result of exportation 
through ‘conditionality clauses’, but equally of more basic 
engagement of EU agencies and support for NGOs on the 
ground without such conditions. It relies on mechanisms of 
aid and assistance, engagement and support, dialogue on 
and transference of ideas (Manners, 2013: 317). 
Overt diffusion This is the result of the physical presence of the EU in third 
states and international organisations, such as EEAS 
delegation and embassies of MS, may involve the presence 
of one of the presidents of EU institutions, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy or peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations. 
It employs mechanisms of presence, diplomacy or actions 
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including dialogue, transference or enforcement of ideas 
(Manners, 2013: 318) 
Cultural filter This is founded on the interaction between the construction 
of knowledge and the creation of social and political 
identity by the subjects of norm diffusion (Kinnvall, 1995: 
67-71). It involves mechanisms of identity, domestic 
salience and the construction of knowledge, including the 
persuasive engagement, venues for dialogue and argument, 
and the transference and status of ideas. Two prominent 
examples of the EU’s engagement globally in the areas of 
biodiversity and climate change negotiations. It also 
appears in the cases of landmines, R2P and the 
International Criminal Court (the latter suggests that the 
construction of sovereignty acts as a potent cultural filter to 
norm diffusion) (Manners, 2013: 318). 
 
This thesis will emphasise the importance of 'symbolic manifestation' in determining 
the EU's normative role in international politics. This element focuses on the EU’s military role 
in safeguarding the continuity of norms in the causes of a conflict (not confined to the narrow 
meaning of an armed conflict) rather than in its eventual outcome (Manners 2006). On a 
theoretical level it is possible to envisage conditions under which ‘military operations’ 
(normally associated with coercion) and ‘normative power’ (normally based on consensual 
internalisation), can be combined in an effort to increase an actor’s global presence. Manners’ 
(2000) initial aim was to refocus the emphasis of current analysis away from an empirical study 
of European institutions or policies, and towards a more detailed understanding of cognitive 
processes. For Manners (2000) this shift needs to include both substantive and symbolic 
components.  The two last characteristics can be covered by a military presence, without the 
need for coercion. Manners (2002) rejects the idea that the EU can or should use force 
instrumentally. He emphasizes the unique character of the EU as an international organisation 
highlighting how this trait shapes the way it is seen by third parties/countries. Specifically, he 
sees the Union as pre-inclined to act in a normative way (Manners 2002). This thesis will thus 
break away from Manners’ argument about NPE in as far as it is not the identity of the EU that 
shapes its role as a ‘normative power’ so much as the way it behaves as an international actor.  
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1.5 How CSDP and the EEAS fit into the puzzle 
According to Whitman “the TEU (Treaty on European Union 1991) had signalled the 
intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to 
develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union” (1998:135-136). As 
CSDP evolves and comes to encompass more areas of policy, particularly on the nexus of 
security and development (see Chapter 4) it should create a ‘bridge’ in the “capabilities-
expectations gap” identified by Hill (1993) in the early days of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Given that the military means are far from sufficient for the operations 
it carries out worldwide (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7), the EU has managed to become an 
acknowledged actor by employing means more akin to soft-power competencies, such as 
diplomatic means. The EEAS was established as part of the intergovernmental CSDP in order 
to provide a unified EU front in external action. This initiative acts as a precursor to the new 
‘comprehensive approach’ in intervention: one that efficiently combines and implements 
military as well as diplomatic/non-forceful means in accomplishing the goals it sets. Howorth 
(2007:205) points out that the new attributes set out by the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
(2003) suggest the surfacing of a new normative approach to international relations. He goes 
even further and argues that the EU is attempting to systematically implement a new normative 
approach to international relations (Howorth 2007:205). Within my research I will be 
investigating the role of the EEAS and the way its introduction in CSDP has contributed to the 
EU evolving as a 'normative power'. This will be achieved through the examination of the 
critical frames (Chapter 3) through an NPE lens. In identifying the responsibilities allocated to 
the EEAS within the operational setting, as well as how they were incorporated in the mandates 
of the military operations, the normative importance of these changes will be evaluated in terms 
of an NPE understanding. Therefore, in analysing the normativity of the mandate prescriptions 
as well as how they reflect the incorporation of the EEAS in the CSDP structure, this thesis 
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will illustrate: firstly, that the way military operations were carried out are mostly compatible 
with NPE; secondly, that the creation of the EEAS acted catalytically in the inclusion of a 
normative understanding of military operations; thirdly, that the EU maintains and diffuses 
‘normative power’ through its military operations to a certain extent (see Chapter 8).  
Nevertheless, the aforementioned turn to a more comprehensive approach as far as 
means are concerned is not unproblematic. Literature ranging back from the immediate post-
Cold War period expresses a clear concern about the ability of a new organisation, such as the 
EU in 1992, to function and develop an external policy that is independent and separate from 
any influential international pressures. Member States’ interests and internal power politics 
within the European Council were clearly played out throughout the 1990s and shaped 
decision-making processes associated with the development of CSDP (Bickerton 2010, 
Howorth 2003/2004, Cornish and Edwards 2001). Similar considerations are articulated in 
various theoretical critiques of the NPE (Whitman 2002; Haukalla 2008). They concern 
whether the EU’s actorness is distinct from that of its Member States. Furthermore, they touch 
upon its normative identity and whether it is separate from or the result of the cumulative 
normative power of the Member States. These points of inquiry will be addressed in this thesis, 
using the case of Somalia to explore the identity of the EU’s normative power and how it is 
reflected in its operations. This is particularly important with reference to the EU’s actorness 
in external action. Thus, this thesis argues that the employment of the selected critical frames 
highlights the EU’s turn towards a hybrid actorness, one that bridges a civilian identity with 
the use of military means in order to establish itself as a global actor. This is accomplished by 
the construction of a normative power that relies heavily on reference to the EU’s norms and 
further operationalised through the repetition of its commitments to its partners within the 
operations. The critical frames demonstrate its three-fold normative foundation: a) the 
comprehensive approach: demonstrates the willingness to retain traits of a civilian actor with 
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the employment of military means, b) effective multilateralism: the EU’s attempt to create an 
autonomous presence through its cooperation with other actors within the operations, c) 
partnership-ownership: the actorness it is promoting hinges upon the empowerment of self 
normatively via the empowerment of the other (Somalia and regional actors) thus further 
supporting its separation from any form of coercion.   
The question of identity which ensues from the above discussion, remains to be 
researched and determined. As Smith (2000:27) underlined “the normative dimension is 
important because the ‘debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the 
EU’s international identity’”.  The question of whether NPE, when put into action, presupposes 
that the EU is a normative actor rather than an actor administrating normative power, is 
complex and requires a detailed assessment of institutional structures and politics, and policy 
implementation. On this point, the EU’s commitment to normative intents must also come 
under scrutiny. If the EU proves not to be a distinguishable single normative actor but a 
construction that externalises the cumulative normative intent of its Member States, then the 
state remains the central concern. In this case an issue of multiple representations from within 
would arise. This could further translate into a mismatch with the unified front the EU is 
attempting to create in external relations. Particularly cases of initiative-taking on behalf of the 
member states, as well as the dual obligations stemming from participation in other regional 
organisations, can be cause for separatist behaviour, hence disrupting the unified attempts of 
the EU to promote and carry out its aspirations in external action. Nevertheless, this research 
does not focus on the dynamic created between the EU and the Members States. Echoing Nunes 
(2011), this thesis sees the EU as having a separate actorness externally and it is a defining 
element of the EU’s identity in external action (see Chapter 2).  
The causes of EU inconsistency in its foreign action are not created solely by its external 
representation. The horizontal relations on the level of EU institutions are also an area which 
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has been identified as problematic (Edwards 2013:277; Whitman 2011:3). The Lisbon Treaty 
seeks to deal with the issue of institutional inconsistency and ‘squabbling’ (particularly that 
between the Council and the Commission). The creation of the new post of High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the establishment of the EEAS 
to support her mission, create a focal point for the EU’s external identity. The Service brings 
together personnel from the EU Council and the European Commission together with seconded 
Member State officials. Menon (2011:78) points out that, even though the EEAS draws on 
personnel from diverse backgrounds, the differing national preferences and priorities as well 
as the lack of clear appointment of responsibilities in the Lisbon Treaty itself, are adequate to 
sustain the ‘bickering’ within the EU. The establishment of institutional structures and 
mechanisms is important in creating a unified and coherent external identity. However, it is not 
enough. Issues of internal coherence in this new Agency, particularly within the security-
development nexus of its responsibilities (Avery 2011, Overhaus 2013, Smith 2013, Tannous 
2013) as well as the absence of a unique esprit de corps of its staff (Hemra et al 2012) are 
needed in order to create and sustain an effective normative role in international affairs (see 
Chapter 4). Moreover, the provision of a long-term, explicit plan for the EU’s intended goals 
in foreign action is imperative. This will be identified within the literature review concerning 
the evolution of the EU’s CSDP, demonstrating the evolution of its international actorness and 
situating the EEAS in normative terms within that trajectory both in terms of its functionality 
as well as symbolic importance. This will be achieved through an overview of the nodal points 
in the EU’s foreign policy as well as an elaboration on the key academic discussions 
surrounding the EEAS and its impact on the EU’s identity as a global actor. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4, NPE provides a novel point of view in the understanding of 
the EU’s external action and can be identified in the operationalisation of the EU’s military 
mandates with the EEAS assuming a central role in the delineation of the relevant policies 
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which define it. Particularly through the critical frames presented in Chapter 3, the normative 
underpinnings of the EU’s actorness highlight the increasing pertinence of the selected theory 
not only in grasping the Union’s identity, but also identifying its manifestation through military 
operations.  
Analyses of the EU’s role as an international actor (Hyde-Price 2004, Menon 2011) 
seem to be inhibited by fixed perceptions about the soft-power nature it demonstrates in 
international affairs. Focusing mainly on the need for the acquisition and sustainment of means 
of hard power, such approaches appear not to take into account the empirical evolution of the 
EU and its changing role. For instance, neo-realism’s concern with hard power limits its vision 
of what the EU can achieve as a security actor. From this perspective, the EU’s weak military 
capabilities prevent it from imposing its international presence and achieving its aspirations 
(Hyde-Price, 2002). This view is predominantly based on the fact that the EU is not and does 
not resemble a traditional nation-state power. The EU, however, does not appear to aim for 
such a presence nor does it identify its goals from that point of view.  
As such, this thesis will examine whether the introduction of the EEAS, within the 
operations carried out in Somalia, has managed to establish the EU as normative power in its 
external action2. By examining the military operations, I will be focusing on the symbolic 
presence of the EU as a global actor, thereby shedding light on the connection between military 
and normative power. Within the critical frame analysis, reference to the EEAS will 
demonstrate the importance put upon its inclusion in the construction of an EU identity. What 
appears to be the case is a continuous and consistently increasing direct and explicit attribution 
                                                 
2 A clarification is required at this point. This research is concerned with the EU as a whole. The EEAS is an 
illustrative case and a key change in the institutional fabric of the EU that encapsulates the main research 
question of this thesis. The Service’s establishment is examined as a moment of evolution in the EU’s external 
action, one that signalled a turn towards a more normative global actorness. The selective choice of structures 
within the Service and their respective functions is made on the basis of pertinence to the illustration of the 
normative argument which is set by this research.  
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of power to the EEAS, culminating in the provisions of the most recent Global Strategy (June 
2016).  
 
1.6 EU intervention in Africa 
Authors including Kaunert and Leonard (2012) and Furness (2013) claim that the EU 
possesses the capability to project force despite it being perceived as lacking competence to 
materialise its endeavours in an autonomous fashion. CSDP missions in Congo, Chad and the 
Gulf of Aden are evidence that the EU and its members are able to intervene militarily, 
provided that certain interests are at stake and given that no strong internal opposition has been 
expressed (Edwards 2013, Dijkstra 2012:455).  Nevertheless, decisions concerning the use of 
force are volatile among Member States and hence are taken on an ad hoc basis (Vanhoonaker 
and Pomorska 2013:1320).  
The majority of the EU’s initiatives in Africa are premised on the basis of development 
and have accordingly influenced partnership between the two parties. The Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries from 2000 (revised in 
2005 and 2010), has a significant political and even security component. In contrast to previous 
agreements (Lomé and Yaoundé Conventions), the CPA reflects the EU's intention in taking 
an increasingly political approach to developing regions in general and to Africa in particular 
(Gänzle 2009:39). The 2005 revision contains explicit references to security objectives, such 
as the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of WMDs, and makes the reduction of 
poverty the primary, but not the exclusive, goal of the agreement. Although not all crises have 
a direct impact on EU vital interests, the colonial legacy of certain Member States becomes 
apparent in the way they respond to them (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010:16). When seen through 
a normative spectrum, the fragmented normative identities and intentions of those Member 
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States, hinder the EU from taking holistic approach, ie. one incorporating military and civilian 
means. In turn, this challenges the unity of the EU’s endeavours and international presence. 
On the other hand, the EU is gradually converging the varied institutional interests of 
the Council and the Commission through the creation of the EEAS. From a normative 
standpoint, the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty indicate the will to transform the EU into a 
strategic actor under a comprehensive 'grand strategy '-a reformed ESS (Biscop and Coelmont 
2010; Matlary 2006).  In June 2015 the HR was tasked with the responsibility to formulate a 
global strategy within a calendar year. The Strategic Review that was drafted outlines the 
challenges the EU faces and provides subsequent ways CSDP has to evolve in order to most 
effectively address those issues. Within the sections concerning the EU’s relationship with 
Africa, the critical frames of “comprehensive approach”, “partnership-ownership” and 
“effective multilateralism” (although the latter is not always explicitly mentioned) are 
prominent (see Chapter 6). According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:23) the nature of the 
strategic actor the EU is aspiring to become through CSDP and the establishment of the EEAS, 
is not dependent upon its military capabilities but is determined by the use it makes of them. 
A multilevel and complex case, the analysis of which could substantially shed light on 
the multiple facets of EU external action, is that of Somalia especially in view of the operations 
taking place in the Horn of Africa. The range of challenges that are present in Somalia, 
combined with the attention the broader region of the Horn of Africa has attracted (EU, UN 
and NATO), render it a pertinent case for the evaluation of the EU’s abilities as an international 
actor. The longstanding threat of piracy is one of the most interesting and complex challenges 
that have emerged in the region. The causes of this phenomenon are complex and 
interconnected: this problem can be seen as the result of state failure and subsequent disarray 
in Somalia combined with a weak economy. These deeper issues are not easy to eradicate. 
Although the maritime anti-piracy operations have proven thus far to be successful judging 
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from the significant decrease of incidents recorded from the beginning of this initiative up to 
the latest figures made public by EUNAVFOR Atalanta for 2014, they are still addressing the 
symptoms of a longstanding situation in Somalia (Biscop, 2010:17). As long as the latter is not 
resolved, the symptoms may remain or change form thus creating a vicious circle of untreated 
crises. The most recent resurgence of incidents of piracy that coincide with the latest famine 
and drought in the area can be seen as proof of this assertion (EUNAVFOR Somalia, Key facts 
and Figures, Accessed 29 May 2017). The training mission for Somali security forces (within 
the framework of EUTM) can be perceived as an initial step in the right direction. The CSDP 
structures that are part of the newly established EEAS (and particularly the Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate – CMPD) will be of the utmost importance seeing that they have 
gained substantial experience and built valuable expertise through the deployment of the naval 
operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:20) the latter can 
only succeed if EUTM Somalia succeeds. 
 In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council took a more strategic approach and, 
according to Quille (2010:60), made good use of the Treaty language when dealing with the 
issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Commission and Council 
attempts to approach the problem were fragmented; each instrument dealt with the facets 
present from its own area of competencies. The separate policy frameworks for engaging with 
Somalia were not adequately coordinated with the CSDP naval operation (EU NAVFOR 
Somalia) which was set up to protect the supply of humanitarian food as well as tackle attacks 
by pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The Foreign Affairs Council 
(3023/14 June 2010 and 3124/ 14 November 2011) acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of 
the problem and identified the root causes of piracy. The need to reinforce the stability of 
Somalia required a “comprehensive approach in the region, linking security policy with 
development, the rule of law, respect for human rights, gender-based aspects and international 
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humanitarian law” (Quille, 2010:60). It therefore called upon the HR to propose a 
comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa which would act as the foundation for 
continued multilateral cooperation, including regional partners. This strategy was adopted by 
the Council on 11 November 2011 (16858/11).  
What becomes apparent is that the scale of the case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa 
demands substantial multilateral as well as EU coordination. The success of this endeavour 
will be unclear in the short term and building a long-term strategic plan for the region must be 
a priority. The Council’s conclusions are indicative of such an approach to foreign policy 
whereby the HR/VP is given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate 
European action. 
The interest of the EU in its involvement in Somalia is twofold and underlines the 
importance of maritime security as an element of CSDP and the delineation of strategy (see 
Chapters 5 and 6).  Safeguarding a key trade route is undoubtedly of concern for the EU’s vital 
interests. Additionally, the close cooperation with the navies of three emerging powers (India, 
Japan and Malaysia) is a unique opportunity to enhance the credibility of CSDP and to 
demonstrate the scope of EU engagement (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010:18). The EU is 
entrusted with hosting the meetings among the involved navies, in order to ensure their efficient 
coordination, as the most acceptable actor to all.  According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:18) 
“any CSDP strategy must include a significant maritime dimension”. It is for these reasons that 
Somalia provides a unique case for examination, particularly when paired with the chosen 
theoretical framework.  
The case study of Somalia has been selected because it coincides with the EEAS’ 
creation, is of geopolitical significance (e.g. piracy) and involves both civilian missions and 
military operations. Through the critical frame analysis presented in Chapter 3, this research 
will demonstrate the operationalisation of the normative underpinnings within the efforts of the 
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EU in Somalia. Given that the most recent strategic documents outlining the future trajectory 
of external action focus on the element of the EU’s global actorness, namely the European 
Union Global Strategy (EUGS) and its Implementation report, this study will also demonstrate 
the catalytic role of the EEAS in the evolution of the EU as a global actor in normative terms. 
This issue relates directly to NPE, seeing that it reflects the discussion on ‘symbolic 
manifestation’ and its pertinence (a discussion further expanded upon in Chapter 2 and 
demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7). Furthermore, the EEAS chaired the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) for the calendar year 2014. This is particularly 
pertinent to the examination of this case study through the lens of normative power, given the 
academic discussions concerning its standing in relation to civilian and military power (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). 
Although cases such as FYROM would lend themselves for this area of research, the 
selection of a country geographically distant from the European continent and with a 
significantly different cultural background, enables me to avoid following traditional 
approaches to normative diffusion largely relating to EU integration. Therefore, the possibility 
of the results being influenced by such explanations is eliminated and thus the analysis which 
will be carried out can go beyond the more traditional accounts that have been prominent in 
this area of research to date, thereby bringing a new perspective to the discussion.   
 
1.7 Contribution and originality of research 
Given the fact that the EEAS’ work in Somalia is ongoing, plenty of scope for offering 
original findings is provided.  Furthermore, the EEAS is itself relatively newly-established; 
this means I can contribute to a new area of enquiry, especially in view of the continuous 
challenges the EU is facing as an international actor. Both its more (geographically) immediate 
 33 
partners as well as those further situated present significant alterations in their behaviour as 
international interlocutors, mainly due to the radical nature of phenomena which appear.   
This thesis’ theoretical contribution is two-fold; it will provide theoretical innovation 
by expanding on the debate regarding the operationalization of normative power as well as 
empirical originality via the selected case study. The theoretical contribution will be in the 
examination of the compatibility between military means and normative power, thereby 
addressing one of the main theoretical tensions of NPE (see section 2.4). This theoretical 
question will be explored empirically within the case of Somalia and, more specifically, 
through the two military operations carried out by the EU. Therefore, the contribution to theory 
will be incorporated within a case study that has not previously been explored through the 
normative lens whilst contributing to the literature on the case study itself. By identifying 
whether and how the EU can act has acted as a normative power/norm diffuser in the difficult 
case of Somalia, I will generate both useful material for policy makers and create new routes 
of enquiry for future research. 
Building on this, this thesis also 1) providing an original critique of the NPE literature, 
focusing on key issues of its operationalisation and adding to its understanding through the 
selected critical frames; 2) it will investigate how the EU’s external action within Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is evolving in the context of the creation of the EEAS; 3) 
it will establish whether in the Somalia case military operations and normative power are 
compatible; 4) it will identify how the core normative values of the Union's foreign policy are 
perceived by third countries, in this case Somalia; this will also include the discursive 
relationship in the formation and diffusion of normative power as well as the subsequent 
dynamics created between ‘self’ and ‘others’ within the NPE framework.  
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1.8 Conclusion: Thesis Structure 
This chapter has introduced the main tenets of the puzzle addressed in this thesis. It has 
introduced the main research question as well as the main theoretical questions underpinning 
the analysis. The main enquiry of this research concerns the creation of the EEAS and how it 
has contributed to the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’. Deriving from this, the 
theoretical questions addressed concern whether the EU is a normative actor based on its 
external action as well as if military means are compatible with the NPE framework and how 
they can be employed for norm diffusion. In doing so it describes the theoretical and empirical 
foundations for this project. 
 Furthermore, this chapter outlines the conceptual puzzle addressed within this thesis 
and provides an illustration of how the CSDP and EEAS fit in its exploration. This is followed 
by the research rationale for this thesis and a brief account of the EU’s engagement in Africa 
with particular emphasis on its military operations in Somalia. Additionally, this project’s 
contribution to knowledge and originality are presented through the argument that the EEAS’ 
creation has been catalytic to the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’, based on a critical 
frame analysis of the military operations in Somalia as an illustrative case, thus also 
establishing the compatibility of military operations with normative power on a theoretical 
level.   
 Chapter 2 serves as a critical review of the existing literature, with its objectives being 
to highlight gaps in current debates whilst simultaneously conceptualising the Normative 
Power Europe (NPE) theoretical framework. It contextualises the work of Ian Manners as the 
main theoretical axis of this research. Accompanying this, working definitions of ‘normative’ 
and ‘power’ will be provided following a discussion surrounding definitional ambiguities of 
these concepts. The nature of normative power and its analytic importance will be examined, 
especially in comparison to military and civilian power. Particular attention will be paid to 
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distinguishing normative power from civilian power. A focal debate will follow concerning the 
compatibility of normative power and military capabilities, as well as the role of military power 
within NPE. The discussion will move to examine the external elements of the proposed 
framework with relation to reflexivity: self-perception and perception of norms by ‘others’ will 
be explored, ultimately underlining the discursive nature of norm diffusion and the primacy of 
understanding ‘self’ and its role when dealing with ‘others’. An overview of the problematic 
aspects of NPE will then conclude this chapter. 
This will lead to the third chapter which will present the theoretical scaffolding of this 
thesis as well as the exploration of methodological means that will be employed. Building on 
the previous chapter, I will begin to cover the theoretical gaps within the NPE as well as the 
contributions that will ultimately enable the operationalization of the framework. This will 
include the distinction of the internal and external manifestations of normative power within 
the EU grounded on existing academic literature, the reconceptualization that determines 
successful normative diffusion by reconciling military capabilities and normative power as 
well as the importance of focusing on EU actorness rather than EU identity as a relatively static 
representation of normative power.  
The outline of the methodological approaches adopted for this project will follow, 
providing rationales grounded in the literature. It will also identify and justify the choice of 
content and critical frame analyses which will be carried out. The documents which will be co-
examined will be both EU official documents (strategies, sub-strategies, decisions, resolutions 
and reports) and Somali state documentation - the Somali Compact (2013). Through critical 
frame analysis, the level of convergence between the particular language that is used in public 
documents and the underlying norms will be explored. Three frames of analysis will be 
employed: 1) effective multilateralism, 2) the comprehensive approach and 3) the partnership-
ownership binary. The language of the selected documents will be analysed through these 
 36 
frames in order to determine the normative elements that underpin the military operations in 
Somalia.  
Chapter 4 will focus on the EEAS and how it is situated within the trajectory of the 
CSDP’s evolution. Throughout this chapter, relevant critiques within the literature will be 
employed in order to contextualise the EEAS’ role in external action as well as highlight the 
subsequent questions that arise concerning the EU’s identity and the nature of its actorness 
within CSDP. Therefore, the transformation of EU initiatives leading to CSDP will be 
presented, highlighting the changes they prompted to its overall structure as well as the issues 
that subsequently emerged. This will lead to the presentation of the Lisbon Treaty and its 
contribution, both in terms of structural reforms as well as in its overall impact on the EU’s 
international identity. To further illustrate the strategic vision of the EU, the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) will follow, thus adding insight to the subject of this chapter from a policy 
perspective.  Building on this, the EEAS’ role and importance will be elaborated upon 
including emerging criticisms with regard to its bureaucratic cohesion and why the absence of 
a unique ésprit de corps is an important factor in this. This point relates to the definition of the 
comprehensive approach as well as its pertinence to an NPE approach: according to De Zutter 
(2010:1111), continuity between internal and external practices is characteristic of normative 
power (see section 2.6).  Furthermore, the security-development nexus in the EU’s external 
affairs will also be covered, providing context to the examination of the EEAS which is also 
relevant to the case study of Somalia. This chapter will end with a presentation of previous EU 
operational efforts, highlighting key areas and the shortcoming of CSDP, thereby acting as 
‘lessons learned’ for the future endeavours. 
The fifth chapter will provide a historic overview of the political changes in Somalia 
from the fall of the Barre regime (1991) until the Somali Compact (2013). Within this, the EU’s 
institutional engagement through conventional agreements with the African continent as a 
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whole, particularly the Yaoundé association agreements (1963), the Lomé conventions (1975-
1995), the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) (2007), 
will be presented and subsequently the current links with the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS) will be traced, thus outlining the political elements of the EU’s relationships in 
normative terms. Furthermore, the EU’s efforts in the Horn of Africa and military operations 
in Somalia (EUTM and EUNAVFOR) will be introduced briefly, thus setting the ground for 
the presentation of the coding and critical frame analysis in the following chapter. Therefore, 
this chapter will illustrate the normative background of the intent-principle element within my 
analysis (see section 3.3) as well as the reasons why the selected critical frames are pertinent 
in the contextualisation of the EU’s engagement in Somalia. 
The following two Chapters comprise the main empirical sections of this thesis. Chapter 
6 will concentrate on the examination of the normative landscape upon which the military 
operations in Somalia are carried out. Therefore, it will focus on the elements of ‘intent’ in the 
examination of the strategies and sub-strategies. Chapter 7 will concentrate on the documents 
relevant to the EU’s engagement in Somalia, wherein the element of ‘action’ in the mandates 
of both EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia, as well as ‘impact’ mainly within the 
Somali Compact (2013) are demonstrated. The coding of the critical frames within the EU 
official documentation will be structured in the aforementioned fashion, thus providing a 
comprehensive account of the normative underpinnings. This will serve the purposes of this 
thesis in the following ways: 1) it will demonstrate the trajectory of the EU’s actorness in 
normative terms, highlighting the changes in its evolution, 2) it will identify the role of the 
EEAS within this process, underlining its role within it, thus justifying its characterisation as a 
catalyst within this thesis and 3) it will show the pertinence of the military operations in the 
evaluation of the EU through a normative lens, thereby addressing the theoretical tension in 
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NPE regarding military means and normative power whilst indicating the role of the critical 
frames in its operationalisation.  
Chapter 8 will bring together the conceptual framework constructed throughout this 
thesis. It will demonstrate the importance of the critical frames employed with reference to 
their operationalisation within an NPE context and highlight their contribution to the 
examination of the EU as a normative power in its external action. This chapter will also 
identify how the establishment of the EEAS was a catalyst in the evolution of the Union’s 
normative actorness and, subsequently, its identity. Within this, it will further highlight the 
relevance of the EU’s military operations within this research, both with respect to the 
theoretical tension within NPE concerning military means in norm diffusion as well as their 
pertinence in a normative evaluation of the EU’s actorness. 
 The concluding chapter will introduce some final thoughts on and an evaluation of the 
EU’s actorness through military operations from a normative standpoint as well as how it 
reflects the Union’s identity in external action. The most important points raised by each 
chapter will be summarised and the key contributions of this thesis will be highlighted. Caveats 
and limitations of the current research will be acknowledged. Lastly, thoughts on how this 
research can be extended will be presented.  
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Chapter 2 
Conceptualising Normative Power Europe (NPE) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Manners introduces Normative Power Europe (NPE) as a framework for the analysis 
of the role of Europe in the world. Following his seminal piece which introduced the concept 
of NPE (Manners, 2002), he investigates ways in which this approach can be explained more 
fully and what it entails. Confusion lies predominantly in its relationship with military and 
civilian power. Manners (2002) finds the debate of whether the EU is a military or civilian 
power outdated especially due to the supranational development of European integration. He 
suggests that normative power is only a ‘valuable addendum’ to our understanding of these 
debates (Manners, 2002: 236). By setting the weight of Europe’s normative role on ‘what it is’ 
rather than on ‘what it does’ (Manners 2002:252), Manners attempts to anticipate certain 
objections that may arise from critiques on his approach. Nevertheless, this opens the debate 
on issues concerning the definitions of intents, the essence of its constitutive parts as well as 
the definitive character of the EU’s history in forming and exercising normative power.  
 Before presenting the critiques concerning NPE as an approach and as a theoretical 
structure for the understanding of the international actor which is the EU, I will briefly outline 
the main points of Ian Manners’ approach. Ian Manners (2002) finds that the EU promotes nine 
substantive normative principles: sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule 
of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. These 
fundamental norms are incorporated into the actions and policies of the EU in its international 
activity and are promoted by persuasion and attraction rather than coercive means (Manners, 
2008). Manners (2013) also adds that the EU employs six means of diffusion: contagion, 
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informational, procedural, transference, overt and cultural filter (the definitions of the forms of 
diffusion as well as the mechanisms they employ are demonstrated in Textbox 1). 
 In my research I will identify the aforementioned elements and apply the framework, 
with due consideration of the critiques on its shortcomings, to the case study of Somalia. I will 
examine the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as part of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in the evolution of the operations carried out by the EU 
in the region and will thus determine the extent to which the Union can validly be considered 
a normative power (as outlined in Chapter 1).  
In order to set the grounds for the analysis of the framework which is NPE, definitions 
must be provided for the two core terms within its very name: normative and power. As I will 
be presenting further, the most problematic issue of NPE is deciding upon the content of these 
two terms. Depending on the approach promoted within each critique, both ‘normative’ and 
‘power’ prove to be fluid notions susceptible to multiple interpretations and, therefore, 
applications on a case-by-case basis. 
I will be discussing the views put forward by academics on the following subject 
matters: a) the contested definitions within the framework of NPE and clarifications of terms; 
b) the standing of NPE (and normative power in general) with reference to civilian and military 
power; c) the relevance of normative interests and the accordance of normative actions with 
promoted norms; d) the issue of ‘self’ and ‘others’ and its importance as presented within the 
critiques of NPE. Within each section I will highlight the aspects which form the EU’s identity 
as an international actor as well as outline the limitations of NPE. By combining the theoretical 
underpinnings and utilising the framework of the NPE I will be providing a comprehensive 
overview of this approach. Ultimately, I will be able to demonstrate NPE’s importance in 
operationalizing the concept of normative power, as part of the EU’s international endeavours. 
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2.2 Contested definitions – clarification of terms within the NPE framework 
Forsberg (2011) underlines an important dual distinction, prominent within the debate 
of NPE:  that between ‘normative’ and ‘normal’, and the difference between ‘power as a 
powerful actor’ and ‘power as ability to cause effects’. Within his analysis he separates 
‘normative identity’, ‘normative interests’, ‘normative behaviour’, ‘normative means’ and 
‘normative outcome’ as features of normative power (Forsberg 2011). Although the 
fragmentation of these terms can be seen as beneficial for the analysis of the NPE approach, 
nevertheless, the lines drawn between the terms (which are interconnected and to some extent 
undivided) may be problematic in forming a coherent conceptualisation of Europe’s actions. 
On the other hand, Forsberg (2011:1183) identifies the four basic mechanisms through which 
normative power is exercised, which may be seen as unifying procedures: persuasion, 
invocation of norms, shaping of discourse and leading through example. Therefore, a model of 
normative action could ultimately be constructed by combining the above mechanisms with 
the features of power: depending on the available means and the intended goals, actors can use 
this framework to mould a guideline for the operationalization of normative power. Defining 
the elements of this framework remains problematic within normative power; it is the 
clarification of the elements of normative power that consistently inhibit its ‘application’ but 
that simultaneously create potential leeway in forming subsequent initiatives.  
Diez (2005: 615-616) challenges three definitions/aspects of Manners' approach and 
suggests clarifications of the terms used. The first issue concerns the term 'power': in Manners' 
original article (Manners 2002) the term 'power' appears to be synonymous with 'actor'. 
According to Diez (2005), the wording was intentionally selected in order to avoid the 
discussion on the nature of this power and to focus on its potency. What Diez further clarified 
is that the term 'power' also entails a form of 'relationship' and a set of 'means'. Kalypso 
Nicolaides and Robert Howse (2002: 770-771) support this view: 'Manners' notion of 
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normative power, has a “descriptive and prescriptive” dimension; it can be read as referring 
“to means or ends” and it is “about values” and “process”’.  Diez (2005) raises a second point 
pertaining to the influential power of norms. He suggests that the argument made concerning 
normative power focuses too much on whether the actor-EU employs normative means and 
omits examining the impact the EU has as a normative power (Diez 2005:616). In other words, 
the analysis seems to be directed in identifying the nature of the actor rather than in determining 
the relational importance of its policy. Lastly, he reiterates his position on the interaction of 
normative power with the two other types and the conditions under which the former can be 
seen as separate from the latter:  the three notions of power can coexist and be seen separately 
as long as normative power remains irreducible to economic and military power.  
Stivachtis (2007) supports the aforementioned perspective of Diez. He makes a clear 
distinction between the EU's 'identity' and the 'means' it has at its disposal and argues that the 
former is not determined by the latter. He explains that the character of the EU is dictated by 
the way in which the means are employed (Stivachtis 2007:47). Nevertheless, he points out 
that this identity also depends on the reception EU actions have by other states (a point which 
will be further discussed in this chapter). Combining this point raised by Stivachtis (2007) with 
the aforementioned submission of Diez (2005) concerning the coexistence of types of power, 
this thesis explores the tension between the use of military means in the operations in Somalia 
with the EU’s ability to diffuse normative power. It is within this crux that the theoretical 
contribution lies, empirically identifying the establishment of the EEAS as a turning point in 
the EU’s pursuit of establishing global actorness as a normative power whilst engaging in 
military operations. This resides in the use of ‘symbolic manifestation’ (Manners 2006), a point 
which is further highlighted within the analysis of the military operations in Somalia (see 
Chapters 6 and 7).  
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Sjursen (2006b: 170) argues that NPE is more political than analytical in nature: she 
finds that this concept can be seen as promoting sympathy towards the EU and that it cannot 
be used for the purposes of analysis. The latter point is also supported by Pace (2007), who 
claims that NPE is “a semantically empty notion”. As Forsberg (2011:1183) concludes, 
“normative power is best seen as an ideal type-one which the EU approximates more closely 
than other great powers”. Although this last point takes the middle ground between the abstract 
‘ideal type’ and the more tangible analytical framework, one can only agree with it given the 
complex nature of this approach. Even though ‘normative power’ cannot be rigidly defined or 
experienced, this does not negate its existence or diminish its importance (as Pace appears to 
argue). Following Forsberg’s (2011) take on the issue, normative power can be substantiated 
through examination by example (the EU) but within a rigid framework of analysis. This 
examination can be complemented by the points of Diez (2005) and Stivachtis (2007) presented 
above, viewing normative power as a relationship/dynamic process and evaluating its 
effectiveness by looking at the receptive end ensure that the analysis is kept rigorous and 
founded on empirical input.    
 
2.3 NPE and Civilian Power 
Ian Manners bases his concept of NPE on a reformulation of Duchêne’s (1972) notion 
of Europe as a “civilian power”. The latter argues that Europe can be distinguished from other 
actors due to its commitment to prioritise/promote economic and political means instead of 
military ones (Duchêne, 1972:43). Civilian means are promoted within the NPE framework 
while military force is almost excluded. Civilian power is preferred due to its foundation on 
concepts of ‘socialisation’ rather than ‘coercion’. As Diez (2005) notes, norms that are imposed 
cannot be valued equally as those diffused and integrated by others.  Even though Manners 
(2002:240) initially defined civilian power by reference to civilian instruments, his subsequent 
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writings, with their connotation of civilian as civilizing, suggest that using economic means in 
an overly coercive fashion falls outside this category (Manners, 2006b: 183-184, 2010). This 
supports the aforementioned point concerning the distinction between imposition and 
acceptance through a discursive process.   
Diez’s approach both on the nature and the importance of normative power takes NPE 
one step further and tackles most of its weak points. Diez (2005:616) views civilian power as 
a type of actor, role and instrument that subsequently creates specific relationships and forms 
of means. Furthermore, he points out that normative power shares the aforementioned 
characteristics with civilian power and, therefore, that the two notions are similar. The 
relationship between the two concepts appears to be circular: Diez (2005: 635) challenges 
Manners’ claim that the two notions are distinct by arguing that normative power is not easily 
distinguishable from civilian power since it is already embedded in it but also 'civilian power' 
in turn specifies a 'particular kind' of 'normative power'.  
The relationship between normative and civilian power can more easily be seen as a 
framework of interaction rather than an issue of definition. In essence the two powers are 
almost identical in the means that they employ. Normative power becomes distinguished (and 
distinguishable) when analysed through its results. Civilian power tends to appear as the 
opposite of military power; both are defined by the coercive and non-coercive nature, 
respectively, of the means that they administer. In normative power the role played by the 
means and their impact are emphasized. In this sense, normative power may encompass both 
military and civilian power depending on the framework within which it is being 
operationalized. The important element in this approach is the non-coercive nature of measures 
and the extent to which the intended results are accepted and internalized by the recipients.   
 
 
 45 
2.4 NPE and Military Power 
 Contrary to the relationship between civilian and normative power, the one between 
normative and military power is more problematic. Military power and the relevant means are 
understood as incompatible with the non-coercive foundation of normative power. Following 
Manner’s (2006, 2010, 2013) proposition of an alternative approach to the military aspect, one 
that is not only compatible with but can also be beneficial to the diffusion of normative power, 
the ensuing sections provide a discussion on two levels: a) the relationship between normative 
power and military capabilities, drawing from the point raised by Stivachtis (2007) who 
distinguishes identity from means and b) the way military power can be understood from an 
NPE perspective.   
 
2.4.1 Normative power and military capabilities 
The origins of the debate on normative power and military capabilities can be found in 
the discussion on the compatibility of military with civilian power. Hedley Bull (1982) argued 
that Duchêne’s (1972) notion of civilian power is an ineffective approach. This was due to the 
EU’s lack of self-sufficiency and its need to focus on enhancing its military capabilities. 
Following this line of argumentation, Adrian Hyde-Price (2006:217) provides his neo-realist 
approach to NPE and suggests that the very insufficiency of the EU in coercive instruments 
and its basis on soft-power are a strength rather than a weakness in its portrayal as an 
international actor. Similarly, Mark Leonard (2005:5), within what he calls ‘power of 
weakness’, affirms that ‘each element of European “weakness” is in fact a facet of its 
extraordinary “transformative power”’. Nevertheless, with particular reference to the ‘ethical 
power’ component found in NPE approaches, Hyde-Price (2008:29) underlines the danger of 
the EU indulging in ‘quixotic moral crusades’ after being ‘left as a weak and ineffective actor, 
unable to further the shared interests of its member states’; he concludes that the EU should act 
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as a ‘calculator not a crusader’ (using David Clinton’s expression, 1994:259) on the major 
issues it will be called to tackle. In line with the aforementioned he supports the idea that 
foreign policy should be based ‘on the common interests of the member states rather than 
pursuing normative or “ethical” crusades’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:29).  
Moreover Hyde-Price identifies the need to prioritize security policy over the ethical 
dimension of EU foreign policy. He provides a restricted scope of circumstances wherein the 
normative agenda could be applied on the basis of three principles: prudence, scepticism and 
reciprocity.3 Nevertheless, the aforementioned should only be permitted when ‘vital interests 
are not at stake’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:29). A more absolute stance on the matter is taken by 
Therborn (1977:380): ‘[W]ithout the backing of force and a willingness to use it, “Europe” is 
unlikely to become a normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic 
and social institutions they should have’. Even though these critiques may be overlooked on 
account of their apparent opposition to the notion of ‘normative power’ the issues they 
highlight should be taken into consideration. In order to explore the EU’s international 
actorness efficiently, one must assess such critiques and evaluate the shortcomings they 
identify. In this case, the ‘purity’ of normative power should occasionally be reduced for the 
sake of more pressuring realistic needs. The issue is not retaining an absolute normative 
character but making sure that it is not outweighed by coercion. In some instances, measures 
that are not distinctly normative must be preferred for the sake of completing the task at hand.     
According to Hill (2004) the EU appears to be developing a more military oriented 
foreign policy, especially through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and with 
particular reference to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Prima facie that 
                                                 
3 Hyde-Price (2008:42-43) succinctly outlines the three principles set out in Weber’s ‘ethic of responsibility’ within the 
framework of realist ethics: prudence is presented as a form of modesty that avoids the pursuit of utopian visions, favours the 
preservation of the status quo and safeguards order and security. Scepticism, which derives from the aforementioned prudence, 
concerns the human ability to attain ‘perfect justice’ through political initiative (usually the ‘lesser of two evils’ has to be 
chosen). Reciprocity appears in realist ethics as a ‘call for compromise, restraint, mutual accommodation, and “give and take” 
between sovereign political communities, each with its own vision of the summum bonum.’ 
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would seem to contradict Manners NPE approach and his claim that the EU is a normative 
actor. Nevertheless, one may argue that the establishment of the EEAS within CSDP tilts the 
balance of power towards the ‘normative’ side, although still not going as far as supporting that 
the EU is a purely normative power: the military aspect of CSDP is moderated and the role of 
diplomacy appears as a distinct element of both EU foreign policy and particularly security.  
The component of instrumentality proves to be of the essence. The militarization of 
Europe has also been critiqued negatively as weakening the EU civilian international identity 
(Zielonka 1998:229) and as being a precursor of a state-like entity on a greater scale (with 
reference to the integration process) (Smith, K., 2000:27). The latter point directly contradicts 
Manners’ image of the EU as an actor beyond the Westphalian model (Manners 2000:239) and, 
consequently, challenges his vision of a sui generis EU ‘normative power’. Although this issue 
could be crucial in an analysis of the provenance of the norms and potentially create an 
interesting foundation for further research in the area of decision-making within the EU’s 
external action, this thesis focuses on the operationalisation of the norms in a military context 
and thus does not question the internal dynamics leading to the EU’s international actorness. 
As further explained in Chapter 3, this research identifies three critical frames and provides an 
analysis based on NPE, therefore demonstrating the normative nature and impact of the EU’s 
actions as manifestations of its normative identity.  
 
2.4.2 Military power within NPE 
 The discussion of the relationship between normative power and military power (as 
well as that with civilian power) has also been at the centre of theoretical debate within NPE. 
Manners (2006b: 194, 183) argues both a) that ‘the EU’s normative power is being undermined 
by the unreflexive militarization’ and b) that ‘militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead 
to the diminution of the EU’s normative power’ if the process is characterized by critical 
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reflexion. The last point is reaffirmed by Diez (Diez and Manners, 2007: 187; Diez, 2005) who 
finds that military power is not only compatible with normative power but also beneficial for 
spreading civilian values. Nevertheless, he stresses that if normative power relies on the use of 
military force, the repercussions are two-fold: a) normative power becomes indistinguishable 
from military power and, b) by no means is this ‘imposed’ power equal to ‘successfully 
changing others, which relies primarily on socialisation processes’ (Diez, 2005:621). This 
submission by Diez is enlightening in the debate on NPE on many levels. Firstly, he sets up 
the framework within which normative and military power can efficiently coexist. Secondly, 
he introduces the mechanisms which are employed in the diffusion of normative power.  
Furthermore, he provides the proper manner in which normative values should be spread, 
namely socialisation. Indirectly he appears to identify the strength of normative power within 
its ability to be distinguished from other forms of power (although within the same text he 
clearly argues that normative power is not completely a separate form of power and that it may 
be considered a category which includes civilian power and vice versa, Diez, 2005:617, 635). 
Maull (2005:781), similarly to the aforementioned position of Diez and Manners 
(2007), states: ‘the widely held view that “civilian powers” want nothing to do with military 
force, and that an EU which is in the process of developing its own security and defence policy 
can no longer be a civilian power, is…quite misleading’. Moreover, Lisbeth Aggestam 
(2008:3) highlights a finer point on the relationship of normative power and military force; she 
claims that the concept of normative power is premised on the idea of declining utility of 
military force in international relations. Moreover, Whitman (2002:25) characterises the 
development of EU military power as a ‘residual tool’ while assertively stating that the 
acquisition of military means does not weaken the civilian character of the EU. On the same 
point, Larsen (2002) argues that irrespective of the presence of military capabilities, the EU 
continues to portray itself as a civilian power. Even though the promoted character of the EU 
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as a civilian power may not always be persuasive in view of its actions, it may be argued that 
it retains its normative nature and power based on two points: a) if military force is not 
overwhelmingly being preferred to the detriment of non-coercive means, it is acceptable within 
a normative framework and b) if the discourse is superior to the actions, this would still favour 
the normative potency of the EU. As can be seen throughout the literature providing 
constructive critique for the development of NPE, the EU’s preference in normative measures 
is more important than the actual existence of military power. This does not entail coercion. 
Military force becomes an instrument (or symbol in the case of the NPE approach) within 
normative power rather than an indication of a coercive nature. Therefore, agency prevails over 
capabilities in this case. 
Cooper (2003) presents a middle ground between viewing the EU as part of a ‘modern’ 
or ‘postmodern world’ and realistically approaching it within the dynamics of foreign policy. 
He suggests that military force should still be a component of the EU’s tool kit as long as there 
are remnants of the ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ world (Cooper, 2003:23) for it to address. He 
argues that ‘those who speak of Europe, as a “civilian power” do so under the illusion that this 
could have been done without military power’. Dunne (2008:15) shares this idea of the 
compatibility of military attitude with normative power; he argues that both can coexist on the 
basis of a ‘moral middle way’.   
Stivachtis (2007:53) draws on the aforementioned points and concludes that although 
‘normative and military power are not incompatible, they can be in a serious tension and 
therefore this fact should not be ignored in the development of ESDP’.  He underlines that 
contradicting norms with reference to the use of power may in turn affect the EU’s normative 
direction. Nevertheless, he assertively claims that even though the EU develops military 
capabilities it does not risk its normative or civilian power as long as ‘it remains committed to 
international law and strictly observes international norms regarding the application 
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employment of military force’ (Stivachtis, 2007:55). This point has also been supported by 
Sjursen (2006) (and will further be elaborated upon in this Chapter). However, he does not 
exclude the possibility (provided that the aforementioned condition is not respected) of 
“normative power Europe” ultimately giving its place to “military power Europe” (Stivachtis, 
2007:55).  
Diez (2005) contributes to the debate by using the US as an example of a normative 
power abusing military means. He approaches the US not as a ‘traditional military power’ but 
as a normative power that relies too much on the use of military capabilities (Diez 2005: 622). 
He proceeds with an analysis of the reasons which led to the transformation of the US into the 
actor it is today by underlining the element of overseas intervention. As he explains, the 
‘supplementation of norms with force...was partly as a response to calls for engagement from 
outside the US (as the EU is facing calls for more military power now)’ (Diez, 2005:622). 
Nevertheless, as he continues to underline, the possibility of this occurring in the EU is 
improbable since, unlike the US, the EU binds itself to international legislation while 
attempting to impart its norms (Diez, 2005: 622). This illustrates the possible outcome of an 
unbalanced relationship between the two forms of power presented above. Manners’ 
contribution on this issue is focused more on the extent of the two elements’ interaction and 
outcome than on their nature. He argues that ‘unreflexive militarisation’ may prove to be 
harmful to the balance between short- and long- term solutions and in the perception of the EU 
by local populations (in a conflict) (Manners 2006b: 194). He also finds this problematic since 
the weight will be set on ‘addressing the symptoms rather than addressing the causes of conflict 
or insecurity’ (Manners, 2006b: 192). 
Stavridis’(2001:49-50) take on the reconciliation of the notions of normative and 
military power goes a step further than others. He finds that military means are essential for 
the EU in order to ensure civilian power. Furthermore, Mitzen (2006:272) finds that the 
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military element does not undermine Europe’s ‘civilising nature, because its identity is 
anchored deeply in multilateral security cooperation’. This last point may appear unrealistically 
reassuring on this matter. Nevertheless, issues of identity and the consensus to be reached 
among the member states may raise concerns for the overall coherence in policy (this will be 
separately dealt with in another part of the research).   
The consensus on this issue appears to lie in the view that normative power does not 
automatically exclude military capabilities, but this can only be acceptable within the 
framework of an agreed ranking and a given instrumentality. The mere existence of military 
capabilities by no means negates the existence and potency of a normative dimension; it is the 
use of coercion that undermines normative power. Manners (2006) posits that the existence of 
military means may even enhance normative power through their symbolic presence. The issue 
changes if military power were to be prioritised at the expense of a normative resolution. 
Aside from the perspectives which rigorously refute the coexistence of military 
capabilities and normative power (a view which in most cases can be attributed to the opposing 
theoretical positions of those academics), there seems to be a relatively wide agreement that 
the two terms are compatible. The points raised concern the setting of rules which prescribe 
the relationship of the two forms of power, the conditions under which they can both coexist 
and even benefit each other and the limits that have to be set in defining, using and qualifying 
them as terms depending on the circumstances. 
 
2.5 NPE interests, normative actions and normative results 
2.5.1 Normative interests: genuinely normative? 
The issue of whether the EU is actually a normative power has drawn the attention of 
the academic community and spurred intense academic debate. The most important critiques 
focus on whether norm promotion is genuinely ‘normative’ or whether it relies on mere 
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intrumentalism and the questionable normative nature of certain EU actions. The pivotal role 
of 9/11 to the concept of NPE has put the approach to the test, mainly on the grounds of the 
superiority of human rights within the EU value system (Manners, 2007). 
The intent of the EU in diffusing its norms has been taken on as a controversial issue. 
Definitions such as that of De Zutter (2010:1107) on what a normative actor is can be found 
too general: an actor is considered a normative power merely because it diffuses its norms into 
the international system. In this definition the intent for the diffusion of norms is absent. Sjursen 
(2006a: 244-245) narrows the scope of the aforementioned definition by introducing the 
distinction between acceptable and legitimate norms: a ‘true’ normative power is able to 
overcome power politics not only through enhancing international law but also cosmopolitan 
law.4 Reference to the legal framework and to higher values of legitimacy is indicative of the 
underlying reasons for diffusion. Through the invocation of international law, norms acquire 
an increased value and appear to be commonly accepted by virtue. On this point Manners 
(2008:46) agrees by contending that “the EU promotes a series of normative principles that are 
generally acknowledged with the United Nations system to be universally acceptable”. 
Through this approach he manages to circumvent the common critique that the EU is promoting 
its value system as a form of cultural imperialism or as a continuation of Europe’s mission 
civilisatrice of the former colonial powers.    
Diez (2005: 624) investigates the origin of norms from interests of a similar nature by 
examining cases of EU policy within the framework of the ‘War on Terror’. He suggests that 
                                                 
4 The importance of this distinction stems from the discussion on multilateralism and cosmopolitanism. Sjursen 
(2006a: 246-247) presents both sides of the argument on which would be better suited in the case of normative 
power: “Many will, however, consider that multilateralism is as good as it can get (Brown, 1999). Some would 
argue that this is due to inherent cultural differences that make it impossible to come to a rational agreement on 
universally acceptable norms. Others would rather emphasize the inherent characteristics of the international 
system leading to insurmountable practical difficulties in establishing cosmopolitan law, which would ensure that 
rights not only of states but also the fundamental rights of citizens.” Although through multilateralism (the 
agreement of states) cultural issues can be overcome more easily than addressing cosmopolitan law (agreement 
of individuals), nevertheless, the question that remains (if one were to enter the conversation on the ethical 
dimension of normative power) is whether the agreement and acceptance of norms should be aimed at reaching 
the individual level.  
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the increased securitisation of migration and the insistence on norms on behalf of the EU and 
its members post- 9/11 may stem from strategic and economic interests. Diez does not reject 
the possibility of these interests being promoted through the 'values and norms rhetoric' (Diez, 
2005: 624). Nevertheless, he asserts that 'the assumption of a normative sphere without 
interests is in itself nonsensical’ (Diez, 2005: 625). 
 A milder approach on the relationship between normative intent and strategic interests 
is introduced by Youngs (2004:422). He argues that the two elements are connected and that 
one needs to approach them from both a rationalist and a constructivist standpoint in order to 
determine their respective impacts. Given that the distinction between normative power and 
strategic incentive cannot be clearly determined, Youngs (2004: 429) affirms that the EU's 
approaches seem less instrumental, especially when juxtaposed with those given by the US. 
Therefore, ultimately, he appears to support Manners' NPE approach rather than undermine it.  
Within this project, the convergence of intents and actions is crucial. As will be further 
presented in the following section as well as in Chapter 3, intent underpins action and 
determines the nature of ultimate impact. The most important element in this project is 
“actorness” (see Chapters 1 and 3). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, intent is used as 
the first indicator of normativity in action.  
 
2.5.2 NPE accordance of actions to promoted norms 
Inconsistencies have appeared in the EU’s normative behaviour with cases such as the 
following: a) the relationship between EU and Russia both on energy interests and the former’s 
lack of input on human rights matters in the Chechnya conflict (Fernandez, 2008); b) the failure 
to diffuse democratic values to states with authoritarian regimes and substantial economic 
power, such as Libya with its oil production (Martinez, 2008:123); and c) the inability of the 
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EU to maintain a normative identity where strategic security must be prioritised over 
development aid, such as the case of the “War on Terror” and CFSP practice (Manners, 2007).  
The fact that the EU fails to be consistent in acting normatively, does not exclude it 
from being a normative power. Even though it lacks means of effectively imposing the norms 
it represents, nevertheless, it has been vigorous in raising issues on an international level, most 
prominently in the protection of human rights and environmental awareness. A good example 
of this is the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (especially when seen in contrast to the US’ 
stance), followed by the internal measures from 1997 onwards concerning environmental 
issues (especially the reduction of CO2 emissions). This line of action rendered the EU a leader 
of international policy-making in the field (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). Hence, NPE in this 
respect seems to still contribute valuably in the conceptualisation of the EU as an international 
actor. Nevertheless, it would not be realistic to evaluate the normative power of the EU based 
on an expectation that as an international actor it should be driven singularly by norms. In light 
of exceptional circumstances, especially when they include the tackling of threats, adaptation 
should be considered acceptable.  This usually means adjusting (although not going as far as 
breaching) core principles for the sake of effectiveness.   
 Focus on the real impact of the EU is arguably lacking within NPE literature. This 
shortfall has been attributed in reference to the denial of the success of the EU in diffusing 
norms, but also to the normative nature of the outcomes when the EU is successful. Among 
these critiques, the most prominent concern the self-image of the EU as well as the subsequent 
role given to the ‘others’ within the equation of normative diffusion. Diez (2005) puts forward 
the argument that NPE rhetoric creates a self-identity for the EU by depicting third parties as 
‘non-normative’ others. Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) as well as Merlingen (2007) suggest 
that through the construction of self as a normative power, the EU may simultaneously 
empower some actors while disempowering others (the aforementioned discussion will 
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constitute a large part of the qualitative component of the content analysis that will be presented 
in Chapter 6 as well as Chapter 7). This discussion is increasingly pertinent to the research at 
hand given the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ that has been promoted by the EU in 
the JAES (2007) as well as the relational identity construction that is built on the basis of this 
binary.  
   The issues of ‘intent’ and ‘action’ can become analytical pivotal points depending on 
the approach of normative manifestation. In the case of Manners (2002, 2006, 2008) the 
normative element of the EU is its ‘identity’. This is inextricably linked to the nature of its 
‘intents’. Thus, in this approach, actions appear subordinate or complementary. This research 
departs from the aforementioned assertion and refocuses the scope of analysis to ‘actorness’. 
Subsequently, the accordance of actions to promoted norms becomes the central axis of 
analysis. The element of impact-evaluation (see Chapter 3) is added to the method of approach. 
Consequently, the operationalization of normative power within this project will be examined 
comprehensively, while highlighting the roles of ‘self-perception’ and ‘othering’ in the process 
of diffusion. These elements will be approached both theoretically and empirically through the 
case-study of Somalia (see Chapters 3 and 6).    
 
2.6 Self-perception and perception of norms by 'others' 
 An aspect that has particularly attracted interest and has manifested as a critique of the 
NPE approach, is the clout that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power (Diez, 
2005:314). According to Diez, this representation is important as a precondition for other actors 
to agree to the norms set out by the EU but also as a formative part of the EU's identity, 
especially when viewed against that of the 'outside world'. According to Leonard (2005: 34), 
the normative narrative created between the EU and 'others' constructs a particular self of the 
EU and aims at changing others through the diffusion of norms. Therefore, this relationship is 
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particularly important not only in understanding the factors that come into play with the 
diffusion of norms but also that the essence of 'normative power' is not so much a static form 
of influence but a dynamic interaction which shapes the participating actors as it progresses. 
As Tocci (2008: 9-13) reiterates: Normative powers are, substantively, ‘other empowering’. 
Nicolaidis and Howse (2002:782) point out that the narrative of NPE on this matter may lead 
EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings unless a degree of self-reflexivity is reached.  
 According to Diez (2005: 613), the narrative created by the EU forms its identity but 
also transforms third parties into 'others' while illustrating the EU as a positive force in world 
politics. He provides a thorough account of the forms and strategies by which the 'other' is 
constructed in international politics. The 'other' may be viewed in the following forms: a) as an 
existential threat ('securitisation'), b) as inferior (wherein the 'self' is presented as superior), c) 
as violating universal principles (in which case the 'self' is superior, of universal validity and 
responsible for convincing the 'other' to adopt the values of the 'self'), d) as different (without 
placing judgement on the 'other' from the very beginning) (Diez: 2005: 628-629). Diez 
concludes that the discursive power is present in all forms of power, therefore in NPE as well. 
He identifies self-reflection as the key element which ultimately may render the projection of 
norms problematic; the diffusion of norms (which is formative of the EU's identity), if 
unreflexive, may allow the continued violation of norms within the EU and could possibly lead 
to the rise of military power instead (Diez, 2005: 632).  
 Following Diez's point on discursive power, Kavalski (2013) approaches the issue by 
exploring the receiving end of the diffusion process. He argues that a 'normative power' exists 
when it is being recognised by others as one. He bases his analysis on social norms (within an 
intersubjective context) and provides three steps which link together interaction, deliberate 
relations, and communities of practice (Kavalski, 2013: 250). He maintains that through 
“dialogical” relationships normative powers can have an impact on the behaviour of target 
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states; it is by engaging in interactions that definitions of the 'normal' gain their causal effects. 
He emphasizes the role of interactions: normative powers should have the capacity to be 
introduced, put to the test and either fail or be accepted. It is this ambiguity of outcome that 
consolidates the effect of normative power. Recognition as normative powers is granted to 
those actors who make credible commitments to the intended target. This point complements 
the perspective of Diez (2005) concerning reflexivity. The issue of reflexivity is also 
approached by De Zutter (2010:1111) from the standpoint of internal and external practices. 
Circumventing the manner by which the two are related (internal practices inform external 
practices, the latter take place as a continuity of the former or the automatic practice of the 
latter based on the mechanisms of the former), she defines a normative power as ‘a political 
entity whose norms guide its internal and external practices’ (De Zutter, 2010:1111). By doing 
so she underlines the continuity of the normative thread which runs through both internal and 
external action. With reference to the issue of reflexivity, this would mean that if this 
normative thread is not being followed internally (although it is being promoted), 
consequently there would be an effect on the practice of external actions. Therefore, what 
seems to be key in approaching reflexivity, is the principle of leading by example (or 
contagion), a form of norm diffusion presented within the NPE framework.  
The external image of normative power constitutes (and is constitutive of) specific 
identity politics. Kavalski (2013:257) bases this argument on the hypothesis that the arena of 
world affairs is populated by international identities (with their attitudes, attributes, and 
values) that are materialised by actors in the process of international interactions. Thus, the 
attempt to overcome past failures creates a critical reflexivity in the discursive formulations 
of external affairs (Diez, 2005:634). Such understanding infers that foreign policy is an 
identity issue which requires coherence in the context of negotiating national insecurities. The 
patterns of external relations simultaneously reflect, reiterate, and reconstitute its self-image. 
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 Kavalski (2013) introduces his analysis on a cross examination of the EU and China 
as normative actors. He concludes that the EU’s normative power to affect others is dependent 
upon its own awareness of a particular kind of self, therefore agreeing with the findings 
presented by Diez (2005:614). Thus, the socializing actorness of the EU depends not so much 
on its capabilities, but on the way it constructs relationships through which its normative 
power is applied in different global locales. As Kavalski (2013:262) states, ‘the definition of 
what passes for 'normal' in global life entails a deliberate practice of interaction, informed by 
an actor's willingness to suspend evaluations of others as long as they engage in shared 
practices’. Normative powers demand recognition of promoted standards. It is intentionally 
sustained and purposeful interactions-practices that provide the appropriate environment for 
such recognition to occur. In the context of such deliberate relations, beliefs and perceptions 
about others' intentions both emerge and are transformed.  This project incorporates the 
discursive approach to normative power argued by Kavalski (2013). By examining the 
normative impact of the EU’s military operations in Somalia and the way they are perceived 
(see Chapter 3), this thesis departs from the Manners’ initial conception of NPE as a one-way 
diffusion.  
 
2.7 Problematic aspects of NPE 
 Diez (2005: 624) uses 9/11 as a point of reference and explores the issue of internal 
consistency (both concerning actors as well as contesting norms) jointly with the nature of EU 
interests. With reference to the increased securitisation of migration by the EU and its member 
states following 9/11, Diez identifies an arbitrary application of human rights.  
 On a conceptual aspect of NPE, Sjursen (2006: 98) proposes that in order for the 
'normative, ethical civilizing power argument' to progress 'a further theoretical basis, a 
clarification of analytical concepts and clear critical standards is necessary.' Sjursen 
 59 
(2006b:238) identifies two gaps: a) NPE scholarship so far has largely overlooked the task of 
rigorously reflecting on its key concepts – norms and power, resulting in a lack of conceptual 
clarity; b) Research has so far not attended to the mechanics of power in the articulation and 
deployment of NPE. 'It remains an open question as to what is the “normative mechanism” in 
normative power’ (Sjursen 2006b:238). 
 As previously presented, another important problem which the EU has to confront in 
its effort to preserve its normative identity, is the security challenge. As Ian Manners 
(2007:406) states: ‘the security challenge to the EU presented by acts of terrorism against 
civilians...In the face of such undifferentiating, non-negotiable new terrorism and the need for 
effective counter-terrorism strategy, what place is there for the niceties of normative principles 
such as democracy, human rights or good governance?’.  Admittedly since 9/11, highly-ranked 
norms such as the preservation of the respect for human rights, have been at risk. There have 
been several cases of torture and extraordinary rendition by some EU Member States in the 
name of the War on Terror (Manners, 2007). With due consideration of the altering nature of 
the CSDP towards strategic security (this will be further discussed in Chapter 4), the 
importance of norms seems to lose ground in the list of the EU’s priorities. Nevertheless, 
considering the establishment of the EEAS within the CSDP framework, the importance of 
normative power seems to be reappearing to the forefront of the EU’s plans in foreign policy. 
The inclusion of a diplomatic arm could prove to be the catalyst in creating a balanced 
relationship amongst the forms of power the EU employs, hence leading it to be a more 
complete actor in the international arena.  
What has also been viewed as problematic is the ‘uniqueness’ of the EU as a normative 
power, especially with reference to the way it is comparable with the US (Diez, 2005). From 
a realist perspective, Hyde-Price (2006) maintains that liberal-idealist concepts of ‘civilian’ 
and ‘normative’ power disregard to an extent the dynamics of military and economic power. 
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From his point of view ‘the EU is far from being a “normative” power whose influence derives 
from “what it is” rather than “what it does”; the normative-transformative power of the EU 
derives from economic influence, the fear of exclusion from its markets and the incentive of 
future membership’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:31). This view appears to restrict the potency in its 
application geographically to Europe and the neighbouring regions. 
From the above discussion, four issues are identified: a) an inconsistency between the 
identification of norms and their subsequent operationalization on a member state level, b) a 
lack of conceptual clarity of the normative power mechanism, especially with reference to its 
applicability, c) the rise of a strategic security challenge with a questionable role for normative 
power within it and d) the neglect of military and economic power in the normative power 
conceptualisation. Even though the first issue falls beyond the remit of the current thesis (this 
will be explicitly addressed in Chapter 3), it is an interesting aspect to consider for future 
exploration, extending on the current research (see Chapter 9).  This research will focus on 
what the EU does and will particularly explore the impact of military operations in normative 
diffusion, thereby addressing the conceptual clarity of the normative power mechanism as 
well as highlighting its role as part of the EU’s initiatives as a security actor. The case study 
of Somalia will provide the empirical evidence, thereby demonstrating the extent of the EU’s 
ability to diffuse normative power even through the use of military means beyond regions in 
its geographical proximity.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that there are four different definitions-explanations which can 
be applied to NPE. It has made the case that a military aspect can be included in a definition of 
NPE as long as it is non-coercive.  
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In the overview of 'normative power' one can distinguish four different definitions-
explanations that can be applied in an effort to explain this approach. The first is the one 
provided by Ian Manners, which equates 'normative power' to 'normative identity'; he presents 
the EU as being 'normatively constituted' (Manners, 2002:252). A second point of view is that 
a 'normative power' can be defined by its normative interests. They also appear as the ends that 
are or that aim to be achieved and can be seen as the factor which defines a normative power 
(De Zutter 2010, Diez 2005, Manners 2006, Youngs 2004). Another approach is that a 
'normative power' is defined by its actions, in other words, that its behaviour is rule/norm-based 
(Diez 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007). Means of influence can be seen as 
a fourth issue that determines normative power (Nicolaides & Howse 2002, Stivachtis 2007, 
Whitman 2002). This thesis takes on board the aforementioned approaches to normative power 
by comprehensively identifying the normative element in the EU’s intents, actions and impact 
(see Table 3). The correspondence in normative terms between the three different stages is 
examined as part of the analysis following the content analysis of critical frames. This is further 
detailed in Chapter 3, which also demonstrates the way considerations of NPE are incorporated 
within the suggested analytical framework.  
 None of the aforementioned standpoints presupposes another. As Manners underlines, 
normative identity can explain both normative interests and normative behaviour. Furthermore, 
interests, irrespective of their nature, can coexist within a normative identity as long as its 
normative nature remains irreducible. As far as behaviour is concerned, normative goals can 
be achieved either by conforming to current rules and equally by breaking them in order to 
retain their nature intact.  
 Manners in his theoretical presentation of the EU remains unclear on where the bar has 
to be set with reference to the aforementioned criteria: should all of them be fulfilled? He 
suggests that in its ‘purest form’ the concept of normative power is ideational-that is, it relies 
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on ‘normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force’ 
(Manners 2009:11). Although he states that merely accepting the normative basis of the EU 
does not make it a normative power, he goes no further than providing a framework founded 
only on principles, actions and impact (Manners, 2008 and 2009). Such framing involves a 
three-fold understanding of normative power which links its principles, actions, and impact: 
first, the principles underpinning normative power should be seen as legitimate by the affected 
parties (in other words conforming with the provisions of international and not breaching 
universally accepted values). Second, the actions undertaken by a normative power should be 
perceived by the recipients as persuasive. Third, if normative power is to be appealing, its 
impact must emerge from non-coercive internalisation. Thus, Manners’ (2009:14) claim is that 
the ‘consequences’ of the concept of normative power regard envisioning the possibility of 
‘more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable world politics’. 
A basic claim that Manners (2002, 2006) makes is that the EU is a normative power 
because it has a particular normative identity. He argues that the normative identity of the EU 
derived from the nature of its hybrid polity and its treaty-based legal order. He suggests that 
these elements predispose the EU to act in a normative way. What he fails to address 
persuasively is the fact that even with such a background an actor may behave in a non-
normative way. It is hard to disregard that in the pursuit of values the need may appear to take 
political decisions which include contending norms. In extreme cases and for the sake of 
preserving certain values, ultimately, precedence may be given to non-normative initiatives.  
 It is therefore pertinent to claim that the tension described above will persist unless the 
EU manages to develop an understanding of 'self' and realise its role when dealing with 'others' 
(see Diez: 2012). In this manner, the EU will be able to live up to its aspiration of forming 
international politics as a normative power rather than remaining in its current state of simply 
being socialised in international norms. 
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Chapter 3 
Analytical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework for this project. It will initially 
recapitulate the most important theoretical issues that have been highlighted in Chapter 2, as 
well as the elements of NPE that will be used in this thesis. Namely, the role of military power 
and the use of military means in normative diffusion as well as the importance of examining 
normative diffusion within the scope of the selected rhetoric frames will be highlighted. Within 
this discussion, a presentation of the issues that will not be utilized and a justification for doing 
so will also be provided. The following sections will deal with the methodological apparatuses 
of this thesis, namely content and critical frame analysis. A subsequent section will discuss the 
selected methods for this project, specifically the content analysis and subsequent critical frame 
analysis of the primary source documentation as well the supplementary secondary 
documentation. Within the aforementioned, the justification for the selected methods as well 
as their pertinence to the current analysis will be discussed. The operationalization of NPE and 
the introduction of rhetoric frames will follow. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a 
summary of the proposed analysis as well as its expected outcome.    
 
3.2 Theoretical discussion: operationalising intent, action and impact  
Contrary to Forsberg’s (2011:1183) view of NPE as an ideal type that is unsuitable for 
analytical purposes (Pace 2007) it can be operationalized through example. This approach must 
take into account both sides of normative diffusion, namely the subject –EU- as well as the 
recipient –case-study/Somalia. Methodological rigidity for this endeavor is imperative. This 
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project proposes the evaluation of the EU’s effectiveness with due consideration of the 
empirical input from both parties of normative diffusion (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
Normative power emphasizes the role of means and impact (see Chapter 2). Tocci 
(2008:15) provides a comprehensive definition of normative power that incorporates the 
elements of intent, action and impact: 'In order to have an effective or “powerful” normative 
foreign policy an international actor not only needs to pursue normative goals through 
normative means, it also needs to achieve a discernible normative impact'. This approach 
includes the majority of the aforementioned criteria, but this could lead to setting the bar too 
high in identifying a normative power, rendering the theory void of corresponding empirical 
examples. Nevertheless, she points out that “if by a normative foreign policy we mean pursuing 
normative goals through normatively deployed instruments and having a discernible normative 
impact, then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always a normative 
international actor” (Tocci, 2008:26). 
Clarifications must be made at this point concerning the focus and limits of the current 
project: This thesis will focus on the military operations carried out in Somalia, given the 
particular tension between normative and military power (see Chapter 2). In this respect 
civilian missions will only provide the context for the analysis of the military operations. As 
presented in section 2.3, civilian and normative power are compatible (even overlap) to a large 
extent. By exploring the controversial relationship with military power, this project contributes 
to the understanding of normative power. Although the analysis of civilian missions in this 
thesis would provide a more comprehensive account of the EU’s operational abilities, it would 
detract from the in-depth exploration of the role of military operations. Additionally, this 
project aims at contributing to the understanding of normative power rather than to the 
exploration of CSDP (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the inclusion of civilian operations in this 
project will be restricted. Elements of civilian missions and their mandates will only be used 
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on limited occasions so as to provide a more vivid contrast with the provisions of the military 
operations.  Furthermore, the accumulation of military capabilities per se will not be examined 
in depth. As described in Chapter 2, the use of certain means determines an actor’s identity. 
Therefore, this research will note the EU’s accumulation of military capabilities without de 
facto assuming an underlying intent or preference in coercion. Nevertheless, the actual use of 
military assets within the military operations will be examined in order to illustrate the 
convergence of ‘intent’ and ‘action’. 
 Whitman (2002:25) depicts the development of military power as a “residual tool” 
while clarifying that the attainment of military assets does not diminish the EU’s overall soft-
power identity (see Chapter 2). Military capabilities in this sense are viewed as an instrument, 
or symbol in NPE, within normative power rather than an indicator of a coercive nature. 
Therefore, agency gains ascendancy over capabilities in this context. According to Manners 
(2006), military means, as symbolic presence, may even support normative diffusion as long 
as a preference for normative resolution is not subverted. 
 The establishment of the EEAS within the CSDP framework appears to be carrying out 
the mandated aspirations outlined in the ESS from a soft-measure oriented standpoint as will 
be highlighted in Chapter 4. This would indicate a resurfacing of the prominence of normative 
power in the initiatives of the EU in its foreign policy (Howorth 2007:205). The creation of a 
diplomatic arm may just as well be the catalyst in the formulation of a balance between the 
forms of power the EU employs, thereby rendering it a more comprehensive actor on a 
globalized scale. Nevertheless, even if the EU were to turn towards the advancement of military 
assets post-Lisbon, this would not automatically entail a change of its identity (see Chapter 2). 
Rather it is dependent on the intended use of such assets, the extent to which the EU eventually 
resorts to the employment of military coercion in order to achieve its designated goals and the 
way its actions are recognized by the norm-receivers. 
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Manners (2002:253) proposes three elements a normative power must demonstrate: 
“ontological quality to it – that the EU can be considered a changer of norms in the international 
system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; 
and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international 
system.” Initially, norms were defined as standards of appropriate behaviour shared by a 
community of actors (Finnemore 1996:33; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891). According to 
Finnemore (1996:5), actors “are socialized to accept new norms, values and perceptions of 
interest”. Norms are therefore justified on the grounds of their underlying socially constructed 
interests (Ruggie 1998). As socially constructed understandings of reality, norms therefore 
permit actors to “redefine interests and preferences” (Elgström, 2011: 459). 
Lenz (2013:213) portrayed the relationship between forms of power and forms of 
diffusion through relevant means (see Textbox 2). He illustrates dichotomies of coercion and 
socialization as constructed on the basis of material versus ideational diffusion. Furthermore 
the “active” and “passive” types of EU diffusion are presented as elements of the 
aforementioned dichotomy. This research will focus on the examination of the above divergent, 
possibly contradictory, components of the diffusion dynamic. The means of diffusion between 
military and normative power will be central as well as the “ideational, passive” type of EU 
diffusion. This last point referring to “emulation” will be examined through the content analysis 
particularly. The aim is to decipher its pertinence not only within the context of normative 
power per se, but in the broader framework of normative diffusion which incorporates military 
operations as well. 
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Textbox 2: Types of power and forms of diffusion (Lenz, 2013:213) 
 Diffusion 
mechanisms 
Type of EU 
diffusion 
Means/channels of 
diffusion 
Military power Coercion Material, active Military imposition, 
threats (negative 
conditionality) 
Civilian power Rewards Material, active Trade and 
cooperation 
agreements, technical 
and financial 
assistance (positive 
conditionality) 
 Competition  Material, passive Large, well-
integrated domestic 
market 
Normative power Socialization Ideational, active Cooperation 
agreement, political 
dialogue, technical 
assistance 
 Emulation Ideational, passive ‘Successful’ 
integration; 
discourse/narrative, 
symbolic 
representations 
 
 
3.3 Tackling the tension: reconciling military means with normative power 
The main theoretical question that will be explored throughout this research concerns 
the compatibility of military means with the diffusion of normative power. Furthermore, what 
will be investigated are the limits and the context within which a normative power is able to 
use military means, without it being susceptible to being characterized as coercive. The point 
of departure for this enquiry can be found in the joint reading of Manners (2006) with Whitman 
(2002) and Larsen (2002). Whitman (2002:25) states, ‘EU military power is developing […] 
as a residual instrument’. From this, military assets are attributed instrumental value, without 
defining the nature of actorness (see section 2.1). Whitman’s proposed conceptualization can 
be read as a way by which the acquisition of military assets does not invalidate the civilian (or 
even yet normative) character of the EU. To this end Larsen (2002) furthers the argument by 
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introducing the aspect of the EU’s narrative. Although the EU has managed to increase its 
military capabilities, its rhetoric and self-portrayal remains akin to a civilian power. This is 
particularly interesting as part of the discursive relationship between norm diffuser and 
recipient. Manners appears to reconsider his unwavering initial position of military power 
being completely contrary to the nature of a normative power (Manners, 2002), and submits 
that “militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative 
power” (Manners, 2005:182). 
The issue of actorness (that is to say the nature of an actor) has been debated at length, 
predominantly with due consideration of the means and ultimate goal a specific set of practices 
aim at. This discussion is particularly relevant when considering the relationship between 
military means and normative power, as previously discussed in section 2.4. It is in this context 
that the distinction and limits of actorness must be set to avoid possible misconceptions and 
lack of clarity. The term “civilian power” has been approached in both as an issue of a 
teleological nature as well as agency. As Stumbaum (2015:7) clarifies, the nature of an actor 
will not be transformed from ‘civilian’ to ‘military’ if the ultimate goals remain of a civilian 
nature. This is most pertinent when examining the case of the EU and its policy in external 
action. The soft-power philosophy of EU policy is not affected by the acquisition of military 
assets or the seeming incorporation of already existing military means, but is rather deemed as 
an effort to cover existing inadequacies or an increase in overall visibility as such (Chen 2004; 
Wei 2004).  On this issue, Chen (2004) and Xiong (2007) have further argued that the way 
military power is used is particularly important, i.e. as a last resort and/or with what type of 
justification-foundation in international law or mandates.  
Sanctions and coercion can be introduced into the normative analysis of an issue. 
Although their existence and use are in tension with the theoretical framework, their agency is 
of particular interest. As presented in Chapter 2, the utility of certain assets does not prescribe 
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the identity or nature of an actor. Goertz and Diehl (1992:638) conclude that norms are more 
than a ‘series of “oughts”, but the possibility of sanctions is also an essential component’. 
According to Manners (2002, 2004, 2006), the fundamental characteristic of norms is their 
ability to prescribe the standard behaviour, the “normal”. Therefore, the gap between 
“prescription” and “retention” of “normal” is left untouched. In the aforementioned line of 
argumentation, sanctioning can include the use of military means. As discussed previously in 
this chapter, the caveat is the non-coercive employment of these means. 
 
Table 3: Proposed framework for the establishment of a link between the NPE concept and 
the EU’s normative agenda 
 
Drawing from the above line of argumentation this project will be exploring the 
employment of military means in Somalia and the context within which they have been 
operationalized. It will therefore be able to decipher whether the EU has resorted heavily in its 
operational initiatives to imposition or whether it has incorporated its military means as a way 
of symbolic reinforcement in normative diffusion. This will be approached through the joint 
examination of its principles-actions-impact (Table 3). This will be particularly telling of the 
actual normative power the EU has accumulated as well as the extent to which it is capable of 
diffusing it. Stumbaum (2015:1) recognizes the limits of the EU in its normative diffusion 
internationally as being dependent upon the distance of the receiver from Europe. As she 
observes, the further away the receiver is from Europe, the less the EU is able to employ 
Principle Action  Impact 
Normative interests/ 
Intent 
The EU’s military operations – 
Promotion of Norms 
Somalia – military 
operations 
 Framing of Narrative Interpretation – 
Reception/Recognition 
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traditional means of diffusion that are based on its extensive use of conditionality or 
neighbourhood policy tools.  
The impact of a normative power particularly in fields related to security depends on 
the provision of military means as a form of credibility (Chen 2004; Xiong 2004; Zhu 2007). 
What is also important is the size of the military means that appear. That is to say, that promises 
for the provision of security can be contested on the grounds of insufficient means for the 
intended goal. Conversely, lack in military means is also telling of the nature of an actor. It 
tends to create the impression of an actor investing in more ‘peaceful’ means of resolution (as 
will be further presented in Chapter 4). Therefore, an actor that acquires military assets without 
imposing normative aspirations but ultimately resorts to them as symbolic manifestation, then 
that actor gains credibility while retaining a non-coercive identity.  
Pursuant to the aforementioned discussions, Somalia proves to be an illustrative case 
study for the operationalisation of NPE. Therein, the EU demonstrates a questionable ability 
of coercion, a low potency in conditionality as well as an inexistent incentive of membership 
or neighbourhood policy privileges. In the particular area of security, NPE is seen as the ability 
of the EU to advance and diffuse its norms as they have been proposed through the ESS 
(Stumbaum 2015: 8). Diffusion has been defined as being a dynamic procedure with a nexus 
of locus, i.e. it appears as a process of promoting ideas, policies and institutions on a 
transnational level (Strang and Meyer 1993). 
 
3.4 NPE from the “receiving end” 
This project will be focusing on the aspect of symbolic manifestation provided in the 
NPE framework. By separating military assets from the actual use of coercion, what will be 
explored is the potential of military presence being a contributing factor to the diffusion of 
normative power. This will be accomplished in two consecutive steps through content analysis 
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and subsequently critical frame analysis of documentation relevant to the organisation and 
deployment of EU military operations in Somalia. The EU’s intent to use coercion and the level 
of willingness it exhibits to resort to it will determine whether military means are theoretically 
compatible or even beneficial for normative diffusion. By looking into the way operations were 
carried out as well as their results, this research will demonstrate the link between intent, action 
and impact (Table 3), thus comprehensively approaching the connection between military and 
normative power. The aim of this research is to demonstrate the way the critical frames have 
been employed to project the EU’s normative power through the military operations. The EU’s 
actorness, particularly the way it has evolved due to the establishment of the EEAS, is therefore 
evaluated in normative terms rather than whether and how the normative elements have been 
incorporated within the fabric of its structures. Therefore, the internal dynamics of the EEAS, 
in terms of the operating environment of the Service and the values they produce, are not 
examined in this research (although it could be pursued as a future endeavour – see Chapter 9). 
It is for this reason that interviews have not been employed, seeing that they would provide 
more insight into the internal function of the Service, instead of contributing to the 
understanding of the EU’s externally projected normative power. Nevertheless, the allocation 
of powers to the EEAS and the way it is presented through the critical frames within the primary 
sources is important in terms of NPE.  
The argument of Kavalski (2013) for a non-Eurocentric approach to normative 
diffusion is important for this project. As presented in Chapter 2, Manners (2002:252) centres 
his theory in respect to the EU’s international presence on “what it is” rather than “what it 
does”. Kavalski (2013: 250) reverses the focus by proposing that “to be a normative power is 
oftentimes less important than to appear to be a normative power”. This shift in Kavalski’s 
theoretical approach alters the context of diffusion. The receiver in this conceptualisation 
determines normative power by acknowledging it. This is particularly important in the critical 
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frame analysis which will be carried out, specifically within the frame of ‘partnership-
ownership’. As Kavalski (2013:250) further elaborates, the aforementioned contexts can serve 
as a “cause”, a “barrier” and even a “changing meaning”. To conclude his line of argumentation 
Kavalski (2013:250) maintains that “normative power…is not necessarily only about affecting 
the perceptions of other actors…but mostly about framing the responses of those other actors”.  
It is within this framework that an added element of agency is stressed: that of the receiving 
end in the normative message.  
Alongside the issue of “what the EU does”, this research will also address “how the EU 
is recognised”, following the argument set forth by Kavalski (2013). The suggested analysis 
will therefore illustrate the EU’s aspirations/intent as a normative actor, but also extend the 
understanding of the EU within a global context as a dialectic relationship with other actors. 
This will provide insight of the standing of the EU not only as a normative actor, but also as a 
normative power. As prominent advocators for the further exploration of Manners’ (2002) 
seminal theory of NPE have underlined (Nicolaïdis and Whitman 2013; Björkdahl et al. 2015), 
it is imperative to shed light on the currently under-analysed conceptualisation of the receiver 
of NPE.  The effectiveness of the exported norms by the EU can be evaluated when the 
‘receivers’ of normative messages actually become “takers” of said messages. The element of 
agency thus becomes key (Chaban et al., 2015:2) in deciphering the relationship between the 
diffuser and receiver, as well as the reaction of the former to the response of the latter.  
The EU aspires to support its security environment internationally through the 
advancement of effective multilateralism and good governance via a holistic/comprehensive 
approach (European Council, S407/08:8, Schroeder 2011:58-60, Zwolski, 2012:994). The 
incentives that it is able to employ in its global aspirations differ from those it has utilized to 
shape its Foreign Policy internally, specifically future membership and market access (Hyde-
Price, 2008:31). Hence, as NPE provides, in order to promote its policies in regions that are 
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not in its direct proximity, the EU needs to build mechanisms of persuasion and communication 
while fixing issues such as visibility and capacity to effectively safeguard its commitments. 
This is a delicate balance given the tension, both theoretically and empirically (see Chapter 2), 
between normative and military power. The EU thus has to cautiously align its intents with its 
actions, without relying on coercion, in order to retain a normative impact. This puzzle will be 
explored in the current project while providing empirical evidence through the case study of 
Somalia (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
3.5 Linking NPE with the EU’s normative agenda 
Chapter 2 presented a variety of critiques pertaining to how NPE has evolved and 
subsequently been defined. The link between the explanatory, empirical and normative 
dimensions of this framework have been argued to be unclear and elusive (Aggestam 2009; 
Forsberg 2009; Haukkala 2008). The definitions and interpretations of NPE vary among 
academics (Björkdahl 2002; Diez 2005; Pace 2007; Sjursen 2006), therefore potentially 
making the purpose of this framework methodologically problematic. The reflective and self-
reflexive aspects that have been added to the framework, most prominently by Diez (2005), 
Kavalaski (2013) and Manners (2007), complicate the understanding of the role of normative 
power and its pertinence in the examination of international relations. This is further made 
more complicated by the links that have been drawn with references to international law 
(Eriksen 2006; Sjursen 2006).  Ultimately, the aforementioned components create a nuanced 
area of international relations, where norms, normative power and normative powers coexist 
within a flux of interpretation without a clear view of their ability to be operationalized within 
a methodologically rigid research framework. Björkdahl (2002:13) finds the issue of 
empirically distinguishing and identifying a diffused norm highly problematic. She identifies 
the existence of norms in the sphere of motivational factors that determine action. Therefore, 
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the only way of discerning the existence of a norm being successfully diffused is through 
“analysing the norm-induced pattern of behaviour” (Björkdahl, 2002:13). 
Responding to the need highlighted by Björkdahl et al (2015) for a location-specific 
case, this thesis will examine the EU’s military operations in Somalia. By focusing on the 
ideational impact of EU norms as they are reflected within Somali official narratives (in 
English), this project will unpick the dynamics which form normative diffusion. Furthermore, 
heeding the call for an empirical dimension, the case study of Somalia will be employed to 
apply the NPE theoretical framework on an actual setting. Additionally, within the case study 
of Somalia, two military operations are examined to capture the projected normative facets of 
military operations. Thereby this project can examine the following issues: 1) the EU’s 
diffusion and operationalization of normative power; 2) the extent to which this normative 
power extends beyond geographical confines and diffused through military operations; 3) the 
role the EEAS has played in the aforementioned process and d) the way military means are 
employed and the extent to which they can be incorporated in the NPE framework without 
acting to its detriment. This last point is comprehensively addressed through the examination 
of two case studies- military operations (see Chapters 6 and 7), thereby highlighting the 
normative element within a military context in a comparative fashion, whilst providing further 
insight into the EU’s actorness in Somalia.  
The framework within which I will therefore be working (Table 3) will connect the 
three analytical approaches that have been proposed by Manners (2002: 238-252), in order to 
examine what the EU ‘says it is’ and what it actually ‘does’ as well as the ideational impact it 
accomplishes. As Shen (2015:8) points out “in order to evaluate the EU’s policy coherence and 
consistency and identify its normative impact…identify gaps between rhetoric and policy 
action, between EU policy objectives and the impact on the ground”. 
 
 75 
3.6 Structure of Content Analysis 
In this project I will be engaging in a content analysis of texts as a first step in my 
method. Using MAXQDA, the material from the primary sources is collected and coded on the 
basis of the selected frames and in accordance with the codebook in Appendix 1. The frames 
are selected on the following basis: a) they play a core role in CSDP and have a distinct 
normative undertone in the way they are defined as well as in the role they play within their 
operationalisation; b) they appear and are utilised within the primary documentation as such, 
thereby reducing bias on behalf of the researcher and provide the analysis with more 
objectivity; c) they are encountered at all stages of the proposed framework (Table 3), 
encompassing: i) internal practices5, ii) external practices, iii) specific case-oriented 
operationalisation; d) all three frames directly reflect NPE core statements as well as the 
prominent critiques considered for this thesis (see Chapter 2); e) they have a clear operational 
orientation, detracting from the abstract nature of value/principle/normative claims. Therefore, 
the content analysis has not been carried out on newly generated codes. The frames themselves 
previously exist as terms within the primary documentation as such and within this research 
they are deemed of critical value for a normative evaluation of the military operations. 
MAXQDA has assisted in the organisation of the material. The research is therefore of a 
qualitative content analysis of the critical frames.  
According to Bryman (2012: 289), a content analysis must be objective and systematic. 
Conversely, the theoretical premise of this thesis is founded on a social constructivist – NPE 
basis, whereby analysis is accepted as being subjective. Nevertheless, this project aims at 
                                                 
5 Although the internal dynamics are not examined in this thesis as such, they are important to identify as part of 
a normative evaluation of the comprehensive approach. As clearly stipulated in the Comprehensive Approach 
(2013), it concerns the employment of "the full range of its instruments and resources- to make its external action 
more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (CA, 2013:2) but also “refers not only to the joined-up 
deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member 
States” (CA, 2013:3). More crucially, De Zutter (2010) identifies the continuity between internal and external 
practices as a core element of normativity. Therefore, the identification of internal practices (or their 
acknowledgement) is pertinent for the purposes of this research. 
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jointly examining both sides of normative diffusion (see Chapter 1) in order to explore its 
dialectic nature (see Chapter 2). Therefore, setting safeguards in the methodological approach 
so as to clearly encapsulate the divergences between the EU and Somalia becomes imperative.  
On the one hand impartiality will be achieved two-fold: a) the frames that will be 
utilised for the current analysis already exist as terms within the primary sources and b) the 
reduction of my personal bias in assigning my sources to categories, since they will be primary 
sources. As will be further presented in the following section, the selected critical frames for 
this research are: the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and the partnership-
ownership binary. With regards to the second component, the systematic and consistent 
application of the provided rules (also found in the Codebook – Appendix 1), will further 
suppress potential bias and allow the shifting of the focus from the norm-sender to the norm-
receiver (see in Chapter 2). 
The three critical frames appear in the primary documentation either explicitly or 
implicitly (please see Codebook – Appendix 1 for the relevant definition of terms). Therefore, 
the coding will include sections spanning from one to two sentences, which include either the 
terms explicitly or clearly define the terms (thereby making implicit reference). Given the 
complexity of the terms, the limit of two sentences as a single unit has been set as adequate to 
encapsulate the terms clearly enough that one can identify them and replicate the coding 
procedure (see Codebook, Appendix 1). The codes are then transposed into tables and charts, 
demonstrating the percentage each code occupies from the coded segments of the examined 
primary source. Seeing that the primary sources vary in length, this method of representation 
is suitable in order to achieve consistency in the reported data. Additionally, this form of 
reporting reflects the aim of this research which is not to demonstrate the prominence of the 
critical frames within the documentation, but to identify the normative underpinnings of the 
frames within the military operations. Depending on the dominance of one frame over the 
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others within the same document, the evaluation in NPE terms adapts accordingly to critically 
evaluate the importance of the frame’s use within the particular operational context. 
Furthermore, the analysis becomes more nuances given that the frames will be either explicitly 
or implicitly utilised and the extent to which they potentially overlap.  
The outcome of this project is important theoretically, through the elaboration of NPE, 
and empirically, as a contribution to the current literature in this area on Somalia. Therefore, 
this research is aimed at providing more depth of analysis within the case study rather than the 
provision of replicable findings. As Mahoney and Goertz (2006:230) posit, generalizability is 
an uncommon goal of qualitative analysis. What is rather the aim of qualitative analysis is the 
understanding of the outcomes in individual cases and focus on the distinctive attributes that 
arise from an in-depth exploration of a particular case. They go further and state that research 
on a qualitative basis is not based on the idea that all cases are equal but that the selected cases 
are “substantively important” and worth exploring in depth (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006:242). 
The main goal of this project is premised on the interpretation and the provision of 
understanding rather than description/explanation (Caterino and Schram, 2006:5, Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow, 2002:461). Nevertheless, caution must be paid in the subsequent analysis of 
the sources, more importantly due to the critical approach that will be taken. Although this 
method includes a highly quantitative element, this research deals with the underlying themes 
which are portrayed within the texts (Beardsworth, 1980).  
However, disadvantages can be found in this apparatus, most prominently with relation 
to the inferences. As mentioned above, an inherent bias can be suppressed by the objective 
definition and implementation of the coding according to the codebook (see Appendix 1). 
Furthermore, problematic elements such as authenticity and credibility of the documents, are 
not pertinent in this project, given that primary sources will be used to carry out the analysis. 
The coding procedure involves interpretation on the part of the researcher (Bryman, 2012: 306). 
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Therefore, particular care will be taken in order to restrict this bias from becoming 
overwhelming in the interpretation of the collected data and thereby portraying one side of the 
argument within the final analysis. As Cicourel (1964) and Garfinkel (1967) point out, the 
coding process is affected by the preconceptions of the coders as a result of their worldviews. 
In the present research the coding of the content analysis is based on terms used within the 
official documents. The frames that have been selected and will be explored, are not created 
by the researcher but appear in the exact same for within the primary documentation. Therefore, 
bias in the coding process is averted. 
 
3.7 NPE evaluation through rhetoric and the link with critical frames 
Critical frame analysis is extremely suitable for the purpose of this thesis given that it 
provides a structured qualitative approach while enabling “a detailed examination of the 
dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, revealing…implicit or explicit representations of who 
is facing the problem, who or what caused it and who should solve it” (Meier, 2008:156). The 
criticality of the selected frames is identified in the interpretation of the selected frames within 
the scope of a NPE understanding. Therefore, their repercussions on operationalisation is 
determined from their evaluation in normative terms, on the basis of the proposed intent-action-
impact structure (Table 3). 
Three discursive frames are utilised: 1) the comprehensive approach, 2) effective 
multilateralism and 3) the principles of partnership-ownership. The first “refers to the EU’s 
more pro-active, and more coordinated, integration of its various external policy tools to 
address specific international security problems” (Smith, M.E., 2013:25). Within the CSDP 
context, means at the EU’s disposal would include civilian and military. Therefore, through 
this frame, two objectives will be served. On the one hand, the identification of this frame 
within the ‘strategic’ documents will demonstrate what comprises the overall intent of the EU 
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within its external action. With reference to its ‘normative’ importance, the very core of this 
frame rests upon the combination of employed means. Seeing that one of the main theoretical 
issues argued in this thesis concerns the co-existence of military means with the diffusion of 
‘normative power’ via symbolic manifestation, the ‘comprehensive approach’ as a critical 
frame will allow for the exploration of this tension and lead to an in-depth understanding of its 
employment within a normative context. Due consideration will be paid to the role of the EEAS 
in this endeavour. The second frame of ‘effective multilateralism’, concerns the extent and 
form of the EU’s collaboration in military operations with other organizations in Somalia and 
the Horn of Africa, specifically the African Union (AU), NATO and the UN. In view of the 
EU’s increasing ambitions as a global actor, which have become more explicit in the EUGS 
(2016), ‘multilateralism’ will provide insight into the level of coordination it has achieved 
within an operational setting as well as in what terms it distinguishes itself from its partners. 
This will therefore contribute to the understanding of its identity as well as the extent to which 
its aspirations concern support to current crises rather than creating an autonomous presence. 
The third frame touches upon the particular relationship the EU has introduced with Africa in 
the JAES (2007). On a rhetoric level, this relationship is built on the binary of the promotion 
of “partnership” and “ownership” (Haastrup 2013:796, Rutizibwa 2010:216). This rhetoric still 
suggests a superimposition of the EU’s perception on the problems it identifies in Africa on its 
“partners”. This is important, theoretically, in relation to the EU’s self-portrayal (Diez 
2005:636, Nicolaidis and Howse 2002:782) and, practically, in the way it shapes its actorness 
towards ‘others’ (Diez 2005, Leonard, 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007).  
The aforementioned frames will help illustrate the normative underpinnings existing in 
EU and Somali official documentation. The comparison of these underpinnings will then 
indicate the convergence of their understanding by the two parties. What must be clarified at 
this point is that discourse analysis will not be part of the method followed in this project. 
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Nevertheless, the element of language and the way it is employed within the selected 
documents for the purposes of analysis must be presented at this point.   
The examination of the use of language is particularly useful in understanding what 
foreign policy entails (Pace, 2004:301). Pace (2004:292) defines ‘foreign policy as a discursive 
activity’. She finds that a critical theoretical approach benefits the exploration of this area 
particularly since it enables the unveiling of the construction of empirical phenomena. She 
reasserts Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis on the importance of the dialectic construction of self and 
the other. This approach is prominent in the NPE framework (see Chapter 2) and has influenced 
the focus of this project.  
Hill’s (2003) reading into the particular language of policy is enlightening in the overall 
understanding of foreign policy. He emphasizes the importance that the representative aspect 
of language plays as a means of explaining actions and understanding the complexities of 
international relations (Hill 2003: 9). Furthermore Hill (2003: 9) identifies it as a formative as 
well as a descriptive underpinning of an actor’s identity, especially when framed as different 
from the “other” (please see Chapter 2).  
The concept of frame, as well as “framing”, has been used increasingly in social 
sciences for descriptive and analytical purposes (Benford and Snow, 2000:611). Initially due 
to the influence of Goffman (1974), the concept of frame was particularly popular in 
sociological research. It has now gone beyond the subject area of sociology and infiltrated 
political science and policy studies (Schon and Rein 1994, Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998, 
Verloo and Lombardo 2007, Meier 2008, Bee and Guerrina 2013). 
Within critical frame analysis, the use of language is indicative of the combinations of 
ideological factors (i.e. beliefs, norms, values, goals and emotions) that are employed for the 
attainment of power and influence (Koller, 2012:22). The action which is encapsulated within 
the text, can have a material impact (Verloo and Lombardo 2007:32). This project will explore 
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the potential of attaining normative power through military operations. It is therefore important 
for the purposes of this project to examine and unpick the underlying representations in the 
texts. In turn this will lead to deciphering the normative underpinnings within documentation 
as well as within subsequent operationalization.  
 The framing of norms also helps in identifying the effects of the construction of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ (see Chapter 2) (Koller, 2012:22).  With reference to the discursive dynamic of 
normative power taken by Kavalski (2013), the understanding of identity imbalances appearing 
within the text, can not only highlight the existing inadequacies of current practices, but can 
also provide scope into potential mismatches in the reflexive adaptation of the involved parties. 
The issue of whether the recipients of the diffused representations view them in the same 
context as the producers can also provide interesting insight into the co-constructed meaning 
of a particular initiative (Koller, 2012:23). That is to say that the adoption, reformation and 
response to a particular set of norms is increasingly important when examining the level of 
alignment and the extent of dialectic redefinition within normative diffusion. 
Goffman (1974:21) defines “frame” as a denotation of “schemata of interpretation” that 
facilitate individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events within their personal space 
and the world generally in a meaningful way (Benford 993:678). Thereby “frames” structure 
and organize experience and, subsequently, determine individual as well as collective action. 
Verloo (2005:20) defines “policy frame” as an “organising principle that transforms 
fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a 
solution is implicitly or explicitly included”. The process of meaningfully constructing and 
attaching significance to phenomena (“framing”) suggests a dynamic and systematic 
phenomenon that stems from a controversial reality construction (Benford and Snow, 
2000:614). As Benford and Snow (2000:614) explain, the dynamic element of this 
phenomenon resides in the active character of the process’s evolution.  
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The way actors make sense of phenomena within frames, in turn attaches meaning to 
occurrences that may otherwise have seemed meaningless (Goffman, 1974:21). It is within this 
framework of understanding that the perception of norms by the receivers becomes important. 
The convergence of the meaning attached to specific actions may vary between the promoter 
and the audience-subject of norm-diffusion. It is within the level of this convergence that the 
following can be assessed: 1) the general acceptance of the diffused norms, 2) the disparity 
between the intent of the diffuser (see Chapter 2) and the subsequent action, 3) the impact of 
the cultural filter (see Textbox 1) in the promotion and diffusion of norms as well as 4) the self-
perception of the norm-promoter and the norm-recipient in their interaction. This supports the 
focus of this project on “normative power” being considered as one based on the extent of its 
dissemination of norms but also on its recognition as such. Therefore, the examination of the 
official documentation concerning EU-Africa relations, namely the Joint Africa EU Strategy 
(JAES 2007), the strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, the Roadmap for 2014-2017 
agreed at the 4th Africa-EU Summit, as well as the domestic Somali Compact (2013), will 
demonstrate the areas in which the EU is considered most potent within its partnership, both 
on a continent-to-continent level as well as more specifically with Somalia. 
Meier (2008) employs critical frame analysis within the examination of women’s 
representation in EU gender equality policies. Within the policy she identifies the need for 
policy actors to “detect and solve problems” (Meier, 2008:156). In doing so they have to go 
through the following steps when drafting policy documents: 1) outline the problem they are 
addressing and its potential legitimisation, 2) present the reasons why the problem needs to be 
dealt with and 3) suggest ways to resolve the problem. Therefore, the description of the policy 
problem needs to contain a diagnosis (what the problem is) and a prognosis (its solution) of 
the subject at hand. She underlines that the interpretation of both aforementioned components 
may vary significantly (Meier, 2008:156) depending on the links that are made with the 
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conceptual questions that are posed (also in Lombardo et al. 2007:84). It is in the application 
of the critical frames that the primary sources obtain a normative interpretation and therefore 
indicate the underpinning notions that are relevant to this research.    
Another issue pertinent to the conducted analysis concerns the actorness of the EU 
internationally, more specifically whether it can be seen as a single actor. As Pace (2004:300) 
states that the “EU itself is not a unified actor, especially when it comes to foreign and security 
policy…The EU is a moving object and any attempt at a Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP) will also reflect a moving target”. Given its predominantly intergovernmental nature 
and the constantly changing nature of the issues it is called to encounter, one may argue the 
same for CSDP. It is within this logic that the way the EU promotes itself through its initiatives 
will change and adapt to the challenges it faces. Furthermore, the means it employs as well as 
the way it deploys them is in constant flux. Consequently, this impacts on the overall identity 
of the EU as a global actor. Nevertheless, as Bretherton and Vogler (1999:170) argue, the EU’s 
presence is shaped by the common internal beliefs about the Union. This suggests that the EU 
has a single identity beyond that of the compounded identities of the Member States. In this 
line of argumentation, the EU’s presence derives from the aforementioned identity and thus is 
unique in its own merit. Therefore, within the framework of NPE, the diffusion of norms 
emanates from the EU as an actor, distinct from its parts.  
In defining presence as an element of actorness, Bretherton and Vogler (2006:27) 
identify its ability to influence externally and thereby define the “perceptions, expectations and 
behaviour of others.” They clarify that this ability is not necessarily intentional but rather the 
result of simply being. What they also posit is that the status of the EU is conferred upon it by 
its external audience as a result of its character and identity as well as by the perceived impact 
of its policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:27). It therefore becomes apparent that the 
normative diffusion of the EU externally is dependent upon its reception. Furthermore, it must 
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also engage in a reflexive process of its actions in order to eliminate the possibility of being 
misconstrued externally. On a theoretical level, this supports the critiques of NPE put forth by 
Diez (2005, 2012) and Kavalski (2013) (see Chapter 2). 
This research will explore the use of the means the EEAS has at its disposal, as well as 
the justification it provides for their employment, by examining the normative frames within 
which it organises its military operations. Within an EU security context, Sjursen (2004:108) 
identifies an alternation in the understanding and operationalization of the most appropriate 
means in ensuring security. This hints to a change of theoretical scope and stresses the need to 
adapt the theoretical foundations of our perceptions in this issue accordingly. A growing 
amount of literature that deals with the understanding of the European security context, has 
placed the focus on the normative elements that are central in concepts like human security, 
soft security and comprehensive security (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Buzan et al. 1998; Gärtner 
and Hyde-Pryce, 2001; Farrell, 2002). This is indicative of the potential that lies beyond the 
military force-security nexus and touches upon the questions on normative actorness in this 
project. 
The inclusion of the frames within the three stages of the EU normative power diffusion 
(intent-action-impact as presented in Table 3) create diverging interpretations as to their utility. 
Even though the intent projected may not be the actual reason for which a particular initiative 
has commenced, it remains indicative of a normative position that is incorporated within the 
identity the EU wants to present. The way this frame is then incorporated within a sub-strategy 
that is either geographically specific or concerns a particular military initiative produces a 
different interpretation that indicates a facet of the EU’s actorness. Lastly, the inclusion of said 
frame within the primary sources presenting the aftermath of an initiative or within a text that 
is produced by the ‘receiver’ of the normative diffusion, demonstrates the effective diffusion 
of the frame together with the underpinning normative context. Therefore, in looking at all 
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stages of the normative process, this thesis examines the full spectrum of potential 
interpretations of the norms, thereby mapping their actual connection to the EU’s identity as 
well as their potency in terms of external action. It is for this reason, that the analysis carried 
out in this research is quintessentially critical in nature, rather than an analysis of words or 
sentences regularly repeated to constitute the context of the examined ideas. 
In this occasion the content of the frames is set by the primary sources. What is 
examined in this case is the operationalisation of the frames within the relevant military 
documentation to illustrate the continuity of normative diffusion from intent to impact, thereby: 
a) demonstrating the existence of normative power, b) supporting the characterisation of the 
EU as a normative actor, c) linking the normative actorness portrayed through the frames with 
its effective impact on the construction of a normative EU identity. 
 
3.8 Case Study Design 
Through the employment of a case study I will be able to research the complexities and 
the particular nature of the specific operations carried out in Somalia. This will also help me to 
further unpick the nuanced and multifaceted nature of the EEAS with reference to its external 
action in particular in the African region as well as the challenges that appear in the selected 
country. Furthermore, the choice of the country is interesting in itself. Not only does it go 
beyond the traditionally selected geocentric niche of the EU’s actorness (identified in the close 
proximity of the European continent) but goes further in broadening the spectrum of the 
applicability of the EU’s involvement globally. An additional element, which is increasingly 
important in this case, is the alleviation of the common historical and cultural background (and 
the subsequent world view of the actors in question) thus allowing my analysis to proceed into 
an account of the normative diffusion dynamic solely on the grounds of its operationalisation.  
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 Although the use of a case study is susceptible to the faults arising from its place in the 
“inductive tradition of the relationship between theory and research” (Bryman, 2012:71), in 
other words to the ability of generalizing the findings from the specific case into a broader 
theory, it can also be seen as an illustration to the selected theoretical approach, thereby 
informing it and countering potential future flaws in its application. This is also a component 
of my research which touches upon the operationalization of the NPE framework (Chapter 7). 
As the selected case study is intended to allow a better grasp of the situations within which 
normative diffusion is successful, this would classify it as a critical case (Yin’s 2009). 
Therefore, the potential weakness in the generalisation of the findings is remedied by pointing 
out the particular elements that might in the future affect this endeavour in further research. 
 This thesis will provide an in-depth exploration of the role EU military operations have 
in normative diffusion and will focus on Somalia. Within this single-country case, this research 
will be focusing on the two operations carried out, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. 
By doing so, this project will extrapolate and highlight the diverse nature of the aforementioned 
operations, thereby demonstrating their commonalities as well as the unique features within 
each. This will be accomplished through the analysis of the selected critical frames. 
Consequently, this analysis will provide insight on the following levels: a) the EU’s identity as 
a result of its actorness through military operations, b) the level and nature of the normative 
underpinnings manifested through these operations, particularly with reference to Africa, c) the 
practical implications of the critical frames used within EU external action policy, d) the role 
of the EEAS in the formation and operationalization of these critical frames.  
The selected case study may lead to further research being carried out on Somalia, 
specifically, or on a comparative regional/African basis more broadly. Given that the NPE 
framework has not been widely operationalized in the area of CSDP, this project aims at setting 
the ground for future projects rather than providing a comparative account with other cases. 
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Although interest in the African region from a normative power perspective has become 
apparent (e.g Haastrup 2013; Rutazibwa 2010), it still remains limited. Furthermore, this thesis 
aspires to depict the relevance of treating single country-cases, rather than approaching them 
as part of a region, especially when researching delicate and complex issues such as military 
operations in consistently unstable settings, such as that of Somalia. 
 
3.9 Primary source documentation-research design 
According to Bryman (2012:554), the “documents that an organization generates… are 
representations of the reality of that organization. In other words, we might take the view that 
such documents tell us something about what goes on in that organization and will help us to 
uncover such things as its culture or ethos. According to such a view, documents are windows 
onto social and organizational realities.” This project will use the official documents drafted 
by the EU and the Somali state as a source for the content and subsequent critical frame 
analysis. Within them, the changes that have occurred as a result of the EEAS will be accounted 
for. Through the examination of the host-country’s documentation, the underlying intents of 
the EU as well as those of the norm receiver –Somalia, will be compared. This will demonstrate 
their level of convergence as far as framing and incorporation of promoted norms is concerned, 
thereby constructing the foundation upon which the extent of normative diffusion will be 
argued. The parallel examination of the operational mandates and their impact will lead to the 
evaluation of achieved outcomes. By doing so an account will be created which will illustrate 
the effectiveness of the initiatives and the level of ‘success’ of normative diffusion.  
However, considerable scepticism has been expressed concerning the role of 
documents as a source. Elgström (2011:466) underlines the importance of texts, especially 
within the EU context, and particularly legal documents. Although the latter in many cases may 
not be binding in all their aspects, they can be viewed as important points of reference. What 
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is further emphasized is their importance as far as normative impact is concerned with respect 
to future developments. Although documents may be viewed as a depiction of an underlying 
reality, academics such as Atkinson and Coffey (2011) have argued that they are a reality 
themselves.  
The documents that will be used for the purposes of this research will be attributed 
roles. More specifically, documents which serve a broader function (such as the ESS and the 
Report on its implementation as well as the JAES) will be used as a guide in order to provide 
scope for the definition of terms that are presented in texts with a narrower scope (like sub-
strategies such as the Gulf of Aden strategy, the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the 
Comprehensive Approach). The former will thus be utilised to provide context to the specific 
provisions that are foreseen within operational mandates. This context will not be limited to 
the definition of terms but will also concern the intent of the actors (EEAS). It will also be 
employed in detecting the continuity of intent through actions as well as in view of the 
accomplished goals/impact. The documents will not be taken as transparent representations of 
reality (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011: 79) but will be used as indications, the reliability and 
representative power of which will depend upon their convergence with the actual outcome.  
The call within the ESS to think of a “wider spectrum of missions” (European Council 
2003:12) is complemented by the EU Council’s claim that the use of force in situations where 
the state has failed would be acceptable “should it prove necessary, as a last resort” (Council 
of the EU, 2004:6). Bretherton and Vogler (2006:212) highlight the Artemis operation and 
reaffirm the EU’s intention of complementing its civilian initiatives (development aid, 
promotion of good governance, protection of human rights) with the use of military 
instruments. They add that a military solution was also resorted to only as an ultimate solution 
even after attempting to bring in African Union forces. The EU Council (2004:8) provides the 
limits and relationship of the means concisely as follows: “…the means should be proportional 
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to the objective, taking into account the need to prevent the recurrence and to ensure the 
stability necessary for reconciliation and reconstruction; and that it should carefully weigh the 
consequences of action against the consequences of inaction.” 
What is particularly important and innovative in the ESS is not the enumeration of the 
threats that the EU would be called to face, but the need for a comprehensive approach and a 
multilateral actor in order to effectively counter the upcoming challenges: the EU is 
“particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (European Council 
2003:12). What is also interesting is the identification of the threats abroad as well as the 
purported stance the EU would take in tackling them: “With new threats the first line of defence 
will often be abroad…nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (European Council 
2003:7). 
Bretherton and Vogler (2006:223) conclude the EU has transformed its normative 
foundation into action while forming a distinctive approach from its Member States. They 
nevertheless submit that, given the security-oriented approach outlined by the ESS for the EU’s 
practice abroad, it is possible that its reading in the future might “undermine the Union’s value-
based identity” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:223). 
Under CSDP, the EU operates civilian missions and military operations worldwide that 
serve a variety of tasks. For instance, EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandated aims are tackling 
piracy and protecting humanitarian shipments of the World Food Programme. One of the key 
mandates of the EEAS is to ensure the effective and consistent performance of the EU’s abroad. 
Therefore, the EEAS is also responsible with the production of the documentation relevant to 
the organisation and operationalization of the aforementioned initiatives. Given the double 
hatted role of the HR/VP within CSDP, and the institutional composition of the EEAS itself, 
the role it plays in the overall delineation of military operations becomes all the more pivotal 
(this will be further discussed in Chapter 4). 
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To provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of EUNAVFOR and EUTM’s 
normative importance emerging from the content and critical frame analyses, the following 
structure will be followed throughout Chapters 6 and 76. Initially the content analysis of the 
critical frames appearing in the key EU strategic documents – European Security Strategy (ESS 
2003), EU Global Strategy (EUGS 2016) and their respective Implementation plans as well as 
the Comprehensive Approach (CA 2013) and its Action Plan (2015)- will be presented in the 
light of the employed analytical apparatuses to provide a broader context to the EU’s actions 
within CSDP. This will construct a wider platform upon which the research questions are 
based, most importantly concerning how the EU has evolved as a normative power and whether 
the establishment of the EEAS can be considered a catalytic change to the Union’s actorness 
within a normative understanding. Building on previous discussions concerning the EEAS’ 
importance as well as shortcomings (see Chapter 4), it will become apparent how the vision of 
the Lisbon Treaty is echoed by the intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The 
EUGS and its Implementation Plan will demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the 
EU’s normative basis with reference to the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution 
of the EEAS into a pivotal actor bearing most of this normative actorness. 
The EU sub-strategies – Join Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security 
Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – will follow through a 
similar approach as the aforementioned category. As documents dealing with particular 
geographical regions and areas of action, this section will further narrow the focus of this 
analysis adding to the evaluation in normative terms. This will provide more specified insight 
into the employment of the critical frames and identify their pertinence within this thesis. 
Additionally, they provide a link between the broader EU intents in the area of CSDP and those 
                                                 
6 A detailed list of all the main primary sources as well as the supplementary documents used for the content 
analysis are included in Appendix 4.  
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expressly presented for Somalia. Furthermore, this section will demonstrate how the EU’s 
general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well 
as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime 
nature.  
The EU’s documents relating to Somalia will follow. Although they may not be 
strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these documents have 
elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis will be further honed down to 
the use of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, building on its 
introduction in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) will add the 
perspective of the Somali side in the dynamic diffusion of normative power (see Chapter 2). 
Therefore, both sides to the normative process will be accounted for thus completing the 
conceptualisation of NPE and, more specifically, how it is reflected in the impact of the EU’s 
relations with Somalia. 
Finally, the documentation relating to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta and EUTM, will conclude this chapter thereby completing the illustration of the EU’s 
normative actorness within a normative setting. This section will focus on the fluctuations (or 
lack thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the operations’ 
mandates, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, 
the emerging comparison between the two operations will contribute to the construction of a 
more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its 
overall actorness in normative terms. Thereby the element of ‘action’ will complete the 
conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3. 
To allow a more representative account of the strategies’ and sub-strategies’ normative 
interpretation, factsheets, institutional reports and press releases will also be incorporated in 
the content and critical frame analyses. These will thus support the conclusions drawn with 
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reference to the EU’s actorness. Additionally, for the purposes of thoroughness, supplementary 
coding concerning the EU’s global actorness, reference to the EEAS and attribution of credit 
(described in Chapter 3) will be referred to, to highlight the nuances within the frames, most 
importantly the partnership-ownership binary.  
Therefore, the juxtaposition of EU documentation relevant to military operations with 
those produced by Somalia, will be telling of inconsistencies between the clauses they provide. 
This will also shed light on the extent of reflexivity the EU has engaged with in the formation 
and materialisation of its external action. This is crucial within the critiques of NPE (see 
Chapter 2). Furthermore, an in depth understanding of actorness will be evident not only in the 
numerical repetition of particular frames, but also through the language used in the documents. 
In turn this will validate a self-perception of a military or normative actor.   
 
3.10 Operationalization – introduction of frames  
Critical frame analysis is extremely suitable for the purpose of my research given that 
it provides a structured approach that enables “a detailed examination of the dimensions of 
diagnosis and prognosis, revealing…implicit or explicit representations of who is facing the 
problem, who or what caused it and who should solve it” (Meier, 2008:156). With reference to 
the puzzles examined in this research (and the way the diagnosis and prognosis of the identified 
problems will be outlined), this project will address: 1) the prognosis on the basis of the EU’s 
perspective of the problems it is addressing in Somalia, with due consideration of its normative 
standing (particularly with reference to effective multilateralism, its operational comprehensive 
approach and the partnership-ownership rhetorical proclamations) and 2) the diagnosis by 
comparing the EU’s justification of its operational choices (intent), its selection of military 
operations (actions), the  impact of its actions as well as the meaning that is attached to them 
by the receiving end- Somalia. By doing so this analysis will have evaded the pitfall of applying 
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a biased approach to the treated issues while comprehensively covering the dynamic 
framework of normative diffusion. This will also indicate the extent of the discursive aspect of 
NPE (as argued by Diez 2005 and Kavalski 2013) and lead to the appraisal of the EU’s 
normative standing in its external action. 
 Frame analysis is founded on the assumption that policy-making is open to divergent 
interpretations. These interpretations can be either implicit or explicit and are premised on the 
representations actors offer about the issues themselves and/or their solutions (Verloo and 
Lombardo 2007:32). Giddens (1984) asserts that these representations derive from discursive 
consciousness, that is the way actors justify the frames they use, but also practical 
consciousness, which are the practices and rules routinely preferred in certain contexts. In 
either case, discursive and practical policy frames have real consequences that provide the 
foundation for future actions (Verloo and Lombardo 2007:32). 
Within this project the documents drafted from both the EU and Somalia will be 
examined. This will not only demonstrate the convergence of the frames used, but most 
importantly highlight their divergence, thereby detracting as far as possible the impact of biases 
on the analysis. This additional point of view will indicate where the aforementioned biases 
are situated. Subsequently, the shortcomings in the normative diffusion will become more 
apparent. 
This project will depict the normative underpinnings of the military operations carried 
out in Somalia. This will be achieved through a critical frame analysis of the relevant EU policy 
documents as well as those subsequently drafted by the Somali government. To achieve this, 
three discursive frames are employed: 1) the comprehensive approach, 2) effective 
multilateralism, 3) the principles of partnership-ownership. The first comprises of the way the 
EU combines the various means at its disposal within CSDP as well as the coherence it achieves 
between its internal and external practices (Comprehensive Approach 2013). Due 
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consideration will be paid to the role of the EEAS in this endeavour. The second concerns the 
extent and form of the EU’s collaboration in military operations with other organizations in 
Somalia and the Horn of Africa, specifically the African Union (AU), NATO and the UN. It 
also concerns the internal collaboration of actors on all levels (that is both the institutions as 
well as the member states). The third frame touches upon the particular relationship the EU has 
introduced with Africa in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). On a rhetoric level, this 
relationship is built on the binary of the promotion of “partnership - ownership”. Within this 
last frame dynamics of empowerment and disempowerment between the EU and the local 
actors is dominant (see Chapter 7).  As Haastrup (2013) and Rutazibwa (2010) argue, this 
relationship is not unproblematic. Although it departs from a previous rhetoric of “mentoring” 
(Haastrup 2013:796) and conditionality (Rutizibwa 2010:216) which appear in the Cotonou, 
Lomé and Yaounde Agreements, this rhetoric still suggests a superimposition of the EU’s 
perception on the problems it identifies in Africa on its “partners”. This is important, 
theoretically (Diez 2005:636, Nicolaidis and Howse 2002:782) and, practically, in the way it 
shapes its actorness towards ‘others’ (Diez 2005, Leonard, 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers 
and Sicurelli 2007).  
 The connection between the aforementioned frames and the exploration of the EU’s 
normative power will be drawn with reference to Manners’ (2008:47-55) ‘substantive 
normative principles’. Through the content analysis, the regularity with which the 
aforementioned frames (or phrases that imply them) appear within the selected documents will 
be accounted for. This will show the links that are drawn within policy between the intended 
actions and the normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the pairing of frames will also 
demonstrate the dynamics that appear in the delineation of the missions. The density with 
which frames appear will determine the foundation of the subsequent analysis and provide 
initial indications which will be further examined. Ultimately, the analysis of the frames will 
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indicate their pertinence in the operationalisation of the EU’s intents as well as how they inform 
its overall actorness in normative terms.   
The way the substantive normative principles are presented through the proposed 
frames will indicate the level of ‘normativity’.  Furthermore, the justification provided for the 
operational goals will be enlightening on two levels: 1) the extent to which the EU takes norms 
into consideration, and 2) through the mandated actions, the way the EU undertakes the 
operationalization of those norms. This will not only be important in illustrating the EU’s 
perception of its actorness but also in deciphering its identity and self-identity. To this end, 
further coding will be carried out in order to inform the understanding of how the EU depicts 
itself within the official documentation as well as how it manages to do so within the rhetoric 
it employs. More specifically, within the coding, sections have been selected for cross-relations 
between the frames in order to enhance the contextualisation of the actions as well as their 
impact within the official documentation. The elements highlighted by this supplementary 
coding, together with the analysis of the critical frames, will allow for a more detailed 
evaluation of the ways the EU operationalises its normative power but will also reflect the 
issues raised within the literature concerning its reflexive ability and self-identification (see 
Chapter 2). What will also emerge from the combination of coded segments with the critical 
frames will be the pertinence of the portrayal of ‘self’ and ‘other’ within the operationalisation 
of the EU’s normative standing through military operations. In turn this will contribute to the 
discussion concerning the critique of the EU as mentor in its initiatives particularly with Africa 
and more specifically with Somalia.  
Finally, further content analysis will be carried out within the documents to demonstrate 
the EU’s vision for global actorness and how the EEAS is incorporated within it. The former 
will be indicative of the overall trajectory the EU has set for itself within its external action, 
while the latter will illustrate the role attributed to the Service within the critical frames. 
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Although global actorness and subsequent presence are more explicitly visible within the 
EUGS (2016) and its Implementation Plan (2016), it is interesting to identify the presence of 
this aspiration throughout its external action, particularly within the context of the EEAS’ 
creation. Therefore, this second additional coding will complement the critical frame analysis 
seeing that it will situate the EEAS within global actorness as well as how it overlaps with its 
commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ in normative terms.  
What will also be highlighted is the uniformity of the actions taken in the case study. 
Although the EU is carrying out two military operations in Somalia (EUTM Somalia and EU 
NAVFOR Atalanta), the mandates and course of action each one takes appear distinct in the 
way they operationalise the underlying normative agenda (see Chapter 6). Although the 
“partnership-ownership” frame is present in both, the prevalence of the other two proposed 
frames alternates depending on the purpose of the document within the operation (see Chapter 
6). 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodological framework applied throughout this thesis as 
well as the analytical process that will be followed to demonstrate the relevance of the military 
operations in Somalia in demonstrating the pertinence of NPE. Through content analysis and 
subsequent critical frame analysis of EU documentation, this research will present the 
operationalisation of ‘normative power’ by the Union within its external action through 
military initiatives. The importance of this conceptualisation is twofold. On the one hand it will 
explore the theoretical tension between ‘normative power’ and the use of ‘military means’. On 
the other hand it will contribute empirically to the application of this theoretical argument on 
the EU’s external action within its operations in Somalia, thereby adding to the existing 
literature on the operationalisation of NPE. In serving these two purposes, this thesis will 
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highlight the role of the EEAS as a catalyst in the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’, 
both in terms of identity as well as actorness.  
The critical frames employed within this thesis will be the ‘comprehensive approach’, 
‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’. Complementary coding will be carried 
out on the EU primary and secondary documentation in order to complete the understanding 
of the frames’ operationalisation within the context of its military operations in Somalia. More 
specifically, reference to global actorness as well as cross relations of frames will highlight the 
nuances existing within the main critical frames. Thus, a detailed examination of the normative 
standing of the EU will be presented thereby underlining the pertinence of NPE in the 
investigation of its external action. 
For social constructivist approaches, values and principles are at the core of the research 
agenda. Principles, which translate values into policy action, closely relate to norms in social 
constructivist terms. Norms are defined as “collective expectations about proper behaviour for 
a given identity” (Jepperson et al 1996:54). Furthermore, norms can be constitutive (acting as 
rules defining an identity) or regulative, acting as “standards for the proper enactment or 
deployment of a defined identity” (Jepperson et al 1996:54). If the EU's international identity 
is pacific, principled, consensus-based, network-based, open and post-Westphalian (Manners 
& Whitman 2003:398-399), then it is only natural that its approach to international security 
and conflict resolution follows the norm of a holistic approach. It is therefore valid to argue 
that external objectives of the EU are largely characterized by 'milieu goals' rather than 
'possession goals' (Elgstrom and Smith 2006:2). 
The following chapter will build upon the theoretical elaboration of Chapter 2 and the 
analytical framework introduced in Chapter 3. It will present the trajectory of the EU’s 
evolution leading to the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the establishment of the EEAS (2010). This 
thesis argues that these two elements are pivotal in terms of the EU’s normative actorness and 
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identity. Relevant literature will be discussed in this chapter to support the arguments put forth 
within this thesis, demonstrating their pertinence to the research questions as well as the overall 
goals of this research. 
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Chapter 4 
The European External Action Service 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The issue of actorness stemming from EU policy in external relations and the dynamics 
that come into play for its formation are at the core of interrogation in this research. The EU, 
undoubtedly an important global actor, has been evolving in order to meet current challenges. 
The Lisbon Treaty brought important issues in this area to the forefront especially through the 
institutional and political changes it brought forth. The unification to a large extent of its 
‘external action’ and the creation of an institution specifically aimed at dealing with this sector 
of policy- EEAS- have justly drawn the interest of academia. Javier Solana succinctly managed 
to summarize the evolving aspirations of the EU in its Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP): “in the past the EU was intended to secure peace in Europe; today, it is about being a 
peace-builder in the rest of the world” (Solana, 2007). This transformation of the EU from a 
regional to a global actor entails multiple structural accumulations so much internally, 
including subsequent political re-evaluations, as externally, both in the formation of foreign 
policy as well as in projecting its identity internationally. Contemporary European security 
policy, therefore, assumes a central role, given the innovations provided in the Lisbon Treaty 
and in view of the issues arising on a global level which have attracted the EU’s interest and 
invoked its involvement.  
The question of identity and the nature of the EU’s actorness appears to be the focal 
point of critiques (Stavridis 2001; Whitman 2002; Smith 2004; Zielonka 1998; Moravcsik 
2003; Manners 2008; Haukalla 2007; Treacher 2004; Börzel and Risse 2012) put forth with 
reference to the CSDP; the institutional antagonism between Member States and the European 
Commission over the European External Action Service (EEAS) is indicative of the 
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shortcomings of the EU in formulating foreign policy and, subsequently, achieving and 
retaining a coherent, consistent and coordinated international policy while consolidating its 
role as a substantial global actor. Thus, the emergence of the EEAS within the CSDP 
framework is not only a thematic issue (i.e. foreign policy) but also one of conflict among the 
structural components of the Service. 
The EEAS, has been formed on the basis of a mixed legacy, both institutionally and 
politically: this is the result of the role it has been assigned to by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) but 
also by its own internal bureaucratic constitution (Hemra et al 2012:1) as detailed in the Council 
Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (Council of the EU, 
2010/427/EU, 26 July 2010) which whilst being a key document, due its establishing and 
outlining the functions of the EEAS, must also be seen as a compromise and leaves many 
questions unanswered:  
“The EEAS will support the High Representative, who is also a Vice- President of the 
Commission and the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, in fulfilling his/her mandate to 
conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the Union and to ensure the 
consistency of the Union’s external action …The EEAS will support the High Representative 
in his/her capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal 
tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council. The EEAS will also support the High 
Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, in respect of his/her 
responsibilities within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external 
relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action, without prejudice to 
the normal tasks of the Commission services”. 
    (Council decision of 26 July 2010, 2010/427/EU, Para. 3) 
Article 2(2) of the Council decision (26 July 2010, 2010/427/EU) adds that, “The EEAS shall 
assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the 
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Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations”. Its 
role has been described as that of providing “support to the European Council, the Council, the 
High Representative and the Commission concerning the strategic overview and coordination 
necessary to ensure the coherence of the European Union’s external action as a whole.” 
(European Council Draft Conclusions, 16 September 2010, from the General Secretariat of the 
Council to the General Affairs Council, 13460/10, Brussels, 10 September 2010:8). 
Nevertheless, questions pertaining to the institutional fit of the EEAS remain, given its 
particular nature of a decision-shaping body – rather than a decision-making body (Duke, 
2011:45). The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the decision-making aspect of external relations, 
thereby leaving the communautaire aspects a matter for decision by the Commission ( with 
increased areas of co-decision with the European Parliament) while the foreign and security 
policy aspects fall under CFSP and are thus subject to consensus by the Member States sitting 
in the Council. Therefore, the key in providing coherence between the aforementioned lies with 
the HR/VP, a position which combines the previously roles of High Representative for CFSP 
and that of the Commissioner for External Relations. Subsequently, the Service supporting this 
double-hatted position would also have to reflect the mixed nature of the HR, meaning that it 
would not emanate directly from the intergovernmental Council Secretariat nor from the 
communautaire Commission. 
As part of its role within the CSDP framework it has been assigned the civilian missions 
and military operations from the European Commission. Consequently, this has repercussions 
on the EEAS’ institutional culture in issues such as training, staff background and bureaucratic 
mentality. The institutional identity of the Service will of course differ from those traditionally 
associated with diplomatic services due to its mixed polity. It has currently remained to a large 
extent akin to that of the Commission and therefore inhibits the creation of its own esprit de 
corps. The emergence of what is in fact, if not in name, a major new EU institution is a 
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noteworthy event (Duke 2011:61). The Service implies learning how to support the top EU 
external relations posts most effectively and to enhance the coherence of the Union’s external 
actions, as well as learning how to nurture the increasingly important European-level of 
diplomacy and this will, in particular, involve an adjustment of state-centric Westphalian 
notions of diplomacy. 
According to Keukeleire (2014) and Nunes (2011) the EU’s internal policy and external 
projection in foreign policy should be analysed separately. With this dichotomy in mind, this 
examination of CSDP will incorporate three key themes: a) the EU’s institutional evolution in 
the area of foreign policy before and after the Lisbon Treaty, b) the EU as an actor in external 
policy; this part will focus on the main critiques concerning Member State-EU interaction and 
horizontal coherence (Edwards 2013; Smith 2013; Whitman 2011) c) the political aspect of 
CSDP with a focus on the EEAS, particularly with reference to its relations with the 
Commission, the importance of a Service esprit de corps as well as its role within the context 
of the security-development nexus. Their inclusion thus rests on their importance and relevance 
to the normative power paradigm. Lessons taught by operations will also be included in this 
chapter, thereby highlighting some of the shortcomings of the EU’s action in an operational 
setting whilst simultaneously complementing theoretical and practical understandings of the 
EU’s reflexivity. Seeing that this research employs the military operations in Somalia to 
demonstrate the pertinence of NPE as a theoretical lens to the analysis of external action, an 
overview of previous operational initiatives is relevant to the contextualisation of the EU’s 
actorness.      
The selected thematic axes consistently appear in the majority of academic discussions 
concerning the EU’s foreign action and, more specifically, the EEAS as themes of 
interrogation. They were further chosen on the grounds of their importance and relevance to 
the normative power paradigm, which comprises the theoretical orientation of this research. 
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The first part is important in deciphering the dynamics of the EU in external action and 
pinpointing the provenance of the decisions that comprise its foreign policy. This will be 
achieved through the presentation of the evolution of the EU’s institutional components 
(horizontal dynamics). In this section the focus will be set around the innovations introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty with particular reference to the EEAS and the potential it carries for the 
EU. When seen through a normative lens, the EEAS is important both in terms of the power it 
has been allocated in the delineation of external action as well as the compilation of a novel 
international identity for the EU.  
Strategy is a quintessential element of normative power as I will be presenting in the 
current chapter. Given that it provides insight into the long-term approach of an institution’s 
practices, it is important to make special reference to it in this research. Normative power, 
unlike military power, provides more sustainable results and is less drastic in its appearance. 
For this reason, the potential ‘strategic’ identity of the EU is important in completing the 
portrait of its normative power. A clarification is called for at this point. The terms ‘strategy’ 
and ‘strategic’ in this Chapter (as well as in this research more generally) does not refer to the 
particular area of strategic studies. The documents produced for the purposes of external action 
utilise this term to demonstrate a long-term plan, separate from the short-term provisions that 
can be seen in Council Decisions or other documents outlining immediate action. Furthermore, 
the importance of referring to the promoted long-term plan is increasingly pertinent in the 
current research from an NPE perspective as well. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, normative 
actorness is characterised by a reliance on long-term foresight given the time required for the 
diffusion to be internalised. Therefore, looking at the ‘strategic’ elements of external action 
will allow for an overview upon which the ensuing chapters dealing with the case of Somalia 
will further expand upon.  
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4.2 Evolution of EU initiatives leading to CSDP 
CSDP has been a contentious issue amongst its creators since its introduction, 
especially because of its nature and objectives. Seen as the starting point for CSDP evolution, 
the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998 (Bickerton, 2010:3) was characterized by the 
conflicting views of France and Britain and focused on the EU’s international identity as well 
as its relationship with other global actors. The meaning of the key ‘autonomy’, particularly 
with reference to its implications for the EU’s relationship with NATO, was the first point of 
disagreement (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:588). These opposing views of the two states were 
indicative of the dichotomy at the time between the so-called ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ 
approaches.  Cornish and Edwards (2001:598) posit the need to avoid viewing the “artificial”, 
as they characterize it, Atlanticist-Europeanist divide as a zero-sum relationship. Although this 
divide has been characterised as made up, it was demonstrative of the nuanced issue of the 
EU’s own international identity. As demonstrated in the most recent European Union Global 
Strategy (2016) and the Implementation Plan (2016), ‘autonomy’ and the relationship of the 
EU with international partners is still highlighted. The balance to be struck between the two 
facets of external action becomes more complicated. Furthermore, it also becomes normatively 
significant when seen in conjunction with the commitments of the EU towards regional and 
state actors, particularly through the frames of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ (see Chapters 6 
Chapter 7). This issue becomes even more pertinent to the discussion when considering the 
role of the EEAS in forming the ‘strategic’ elements of external action and continuously being 
explicitly mandated with the oversight and evaluation of the missions conducted globally (see 
Chapter 6).  
The ‘common European security and defence’ was officially introduced at the Cologne 
Summit in June 1999 and subsequently labelled ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ 
(ESDP). Under the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP was converted into the ‘Common Security and 
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Defence Policy’ (CSDP)’. For the purposes of supporting CSDP, the EU established new 
structures and developed their mandate and role within the complex system of its external 
action so as to achieve a balance between the supranational and intergovernmental levels. 
Although the goal was (and still is) the promotion of a functioning unique actorness centred 
around Brussels, the maintenance of the capitals’ role in the delineation of policy remains 
crucial. A number of committees were created to ensure member states’ involvement, notably 
a Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of Brussels based ambassadors dealing 
exclusively with CFSP and CSDP (inspired by the North Atlantic Council at NATO). In order 
to provide advice to the PSC, Military Committee composed of Brussels based senior military 
representatives and a Civilian Crisis Committee were established. As regards the Council 
Secretariat under HR Solana this was expanded to include not only the Policy Planning and 
Early Warning Unit (called Policy Unit) but also a military staff, two politico-military 
directorates dealing with both military and civilian crisis management, and a situation centre. 
These new structures had to work closely with existing EU institutions not least the European 
Commission and the rotating six-month member Presidencies. 
The evolution of this framework was not merely a change of title. It was accompanied 
by substantial structural change and reflected the change of the EU’s approach to its 
international security actorness (as defined in Groen and Niemann, 2011:6) and identity. The 
Berlin-plus compromise framework introduced in the 1999 Washington Summit was a 
milestone in the evolution of the EU as an international-defense actor. It set the premises of the 
collaboration on a multilateral basis with NATO in the area of shared capabilities. The 
initiatives presented in this collaboration were the following: a) assured EU access to NATO 
planning capabilities; b) presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO 
capabilities and common assets; c) identification of a range of European command options and 
the further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning systems to incorporate more 
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comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations (Cornish and Edwards, 
2001:590). The European Council meeting in Feira (2000) identified, amongst others, four 
areas of development in the relationship of the EU with NATO: security issues, capability 
goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and the definition of permanent 
consultation arrangements (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:590). It also underlined four areas of 
importance in civilian capabilities: police judiciary, civilian administration and civil protection 
(Cornish and Edwards, 2005:805). Emphasis was set on the civilian dimension of ESDP in 
cases of conflict prevention and crisis management and setting the aforementioned priorities 
(Cornish and Edwards, 2005:807).   
What can be seen in these stages prior to the Lisbon Treaty is the gradual focus of the 
EU as an external actor, not only with reference to its international actors, but also on the types 
of engagement it would further expand upon, most importantly within the ESS (2003) and its 
Implementation Report (2008). The combination of security with civilian capabilities is 
particularly telling of the trajectory the EU set for itself in a number of ways. Firstly, what can 
be seen is a propensity of the EU in committing itself to multilateralism in the area of security 
and defence. The relationship it has built with NATO in particular is still quite prominent, even 
more so in view of the recent European Defence Plan (2016) and the Warsaw Declaration 
(2016).  Secondly, it indicates the focus of the EU on non-coercive actorness, even within its 
relations with NATO. Although the element of shared capabilities is prominent, the emphasis 
still remains on the importance of civilian cooperation. This leads to a third observation, the 
combination of non-coercive powers despite the use of military means; which speaks to the 
focal point of this thesis. Despite the interest shown in the practicalities surrounding the 
realization of initiative within an operational context (that is the sharing of assets), the element 
of civilian actorness remains dominant. When seen through the lens of NPE, this point 
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reinforces this thesis’ argument whereby the establishment of normative power can also include 
the employment of military means in a non-coercive fashion (see Chapter 2).  
After a failed attempt to achieve the levels provided in the ‘Helsinki headline goal’ (for 
2003), which envisaged an army corps of 50,000-60,000 troops available at 60 days’ notice 
and sustainable in theatre for up to one year (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:802), the European 
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) introduced in 2001 during the Laeken European Summit, 
attempted to accomplish the rectification of the remaining deficiencies in the headline goal 
process by launching 19 bottom-up (by governments) panels proposing both qualitative and 
quantitative solutions for the shortfalls they identified (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:804). The 
EU proceeded with the concept of ‘Battlegroups’ (2004). It was aimed at improving the 
deployability of European troops by introducing small, self-contained force packages of around 
1,500 troops would be available within 15 days to respond to a crisis, usually in support of the 
UN and sustainable for about 30 days. (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:804). Supporting the need 
for the creation of a European strategic approach which will attain the goals set in Helsinki; 
they suggest that this can be attained with an all-encompassing view of external action (Cornish 
and Edwards, 2005:803). They also underline the need to avoid creating EU capabilities which 
will rival or duplicate NATO’s competences or scope (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:603).  
The comprehensive undertaking of external action therefore becomes a central focal 
point while simultaneously addressing cooperation with international partners. Although the 
complementary employment of capabilities is highlighted, the underlying question that 
emerges is the level to which organisational collaboration can be efficient and furthermore 
whether there is space for autonomous action. ‘Autonomy’ within actorness lies within the 
aspirations the EU has promoted in the EUGS (2016) (see chapters 6 and 7) and this becomes 
increasingly pertinent when exploring the evolution of the EU through a normative power lens, 
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especially in terms of its ability to establish an autonomous presence while being firmly 
committed to multilateralism.    
The next phase in the EU’s evolution came with the adoption of the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) in 2003. Efficient crisis management was introduced as part of an EU strategic 
vision that would comprehensively employ all the means at its disposal in order to tackle 
emerging complex challenges (Quille, 2010:56). This initiative was quintessential to the EU’s 
identity as an international actor, not only because of the forms of intervention that were 
provided but also from an actor-identity point of view (section 4.5.1). The European Council’s 
ratification of a Headline Goal 2010 and the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP included 
work on setting the Civilian Headline Goal (2008) further built upon the element of actorness 
introduced within the ESS. Initially, the European Council developed military and civilian 
capabilities equally but kept them as separate goals. Interestingly, the civilian aspects were kept 
briefer than the military operations and the new Civilian Headline Goal for 2010 was adopted 
in an attempt to converge the two strands (civilian and military) of crisis management goals. 
Therefore, coherence and the need to establish an effective combination of military and civilian 
initiatives is yet again underlined, thus demonstrating the pertinence of a normative power 
evaluation. Speaking to the discussion in section 2.4.2 and with due consideration of the 
combined contributions of Maull (2005) on the misleading view of civilian powers being 
incompatible with military force, Whitman (2002) and Larsen (2002) regarding the acquisition 
of military means as a ‘residual tool’ which do no reduce the EU’s civilian character and Dunne 
(2008) concerning the compatibility of military attitude with normative power, the 
aforementioned comprehensive employment of military with civilian initiatives underpins the 
value of an examination within a normative context. In this respect, the adoption of the ESS in 
2003 marked a pivotal change in the development of the EU as an external actor, particularly 
with reference to the range of its interests (both geographically as well as thematically). Drawn 
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by HR Solana, the document entitled: “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, was meant to serve 
as a strategy that defines the EU as a global actor. The text outlines the key global challenges 
and threats faced by the EU, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. On this basis, the strategy enumerated the 
key objectives in addressing the threats - building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and 
contributing to an international order based on effective multilateralism.  
The ESS emphasizes the comprehensive approach towards security by pointing out that 
none of the threats identified can be tackled by purely military means. However, in order to 
resolve regional conflicts and failed states (as is in the case of Somalia), military instruments 
may be needed to restore order and undertake humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, to 
accomplish a long-term resolution, other economic and civilian instruments need to be 
deployed subsequently to help the reconstruction and rebuilding of institutions. The strategy 
further emphasises the need for the EU and its Member States to act together and use the 
different instruments and capabilities in a coherent manner in order to achieve the best results. 
The strategy ends by calling for a more active, more capable and more coherent EU, working 
with its key partners towards “an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and 
more united world” (ESS, 2003:14). 
In the process of creating and maintaining coherence in the internal and external 
dimensions of the comprehensive approach, the ESS (2003 and 2008) plays an important role 
as a conceptual framework. Concerning the internal dimension, the EES states that “the 
challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European 
assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities 
from Member State and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security an 
on that of third countries” (ESS, 2003: 13). It highlights the security-development nexus by 
declaring that “Security is the first condition for development” (ESS, 2003: 13) and underlines 
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“building security in our neighbourhood” (ESS, 2003: 7) together with “international order 
based on effective multilateralism” (ESS, 2003: 9) as two of three core objectives. The ensuing 
Implementation Report of 2008 reiterates and broadens the risk analysis made by the ESS. It 
highlights that “for our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more 
coherent and more active” (European Council: Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, Brussels, 11 Dec. 
2008:2). The ESS was slightly updated in 2008 to take recent global developments into 
account. To the list of key threats identified in its previous version in 2003, the areas of piracy, 
climate change, energy security and cyber-attacks were added. The EEAS started in January 
2011 when staff from the European Commission (almost all of DG External Relations and 
some from DG Development) was merged with staff from the Council Secretariat. 
Additionally, diplomats from member states were recruited to bring national diplomatic 
expertise in to the service. In essence the EEAS at the European level is a combination of a 
“foreign ministry” with geographical and thematic desks and a “defence” or “crisis 
management” ministry – as it also includes a military staff (EUMS), a civilian operations 
headquarters (CPCC), an intelligence centre (INTCEN) and a situation room (SITROOM) as 
well as directorates for crisis response, security and conflict prevention and crisis management 
planning. 
What can be seen in the evolution of CSDP rapidly evolved from its very inception. 
The Union is engaged in a large number of interventions which vary in size and character 
(civilian-military) and range geographically from the immediate European area to Africa and 
the Middle East. It has also evolved from a military oriented scope in crisis management to 
deploying long-term civilian missions and other security-related activities. Those activities 
have also changed in order to address currently pressing issues such as counter-terrorism and 
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
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4.3 The Lisbon Treaty and its contribution 
Pre-Lisbon the member states serving their six-monthly rotating Presidency regulated 
the direction that was to be taken in foreign policy, including co-operation and integration 
initiatives. Initiatives were significantly influenced by national interests and reflected nation 
state policy. Although the alteration in influences may be considered advantageous in this area 
of policy making, the rotating chair system lacked consistency and specific direction. Usually 
the initiatives that were introduced did not provide for follow-up action therefore leaving the 
following Presidency to face a vacuum in the underlying rational of the policy it was called to 
promote.  
For the most part of its history, the process of foreign policy initiation was determined 
by ad hoc resolution of current challenges (Vanhoonaker and Pomorska, 2013:1320). As there 
was no commonly accepted strategic agenda, the rotating Presidencies took advantage of their 
turn at the chair to promote national interests. At the end of their term, follow-ups were not 
provided, therefore leaving behind a fragmented legacy of policy initiatives. The European 
Commission, which could have functioned as an agent of convergence between the national 
agendas, was careful not to upset member states and used its right of policy initiative cautiously 
(Vanhoonaker and Pomorska, 2013:1320).  
The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) introduced the new HR for CFSP. The person who 
would take on this role based at the Council General Secretariat. This initiative can be seen as 
a first attempt to forge an EU common identity in the area of foreign policy; this would have 
been the case if the HR had an autonomous role. It is also interesting to note the fact that 
although this symbolic formation of foreign policy was set under one representative, the role 
was based in an intergovernmental institution therefore making the transition from the 
previously presidency-dependent practice into a more unified approach milder.  
 112 
The Lisbon Treaty was the first step in addressing the continuity and leadership 
problems mentioned above. It introduced a longer-term chair, which would bridge the 
European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This was the dual-hatted High 
Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with Baroness 
Catherine Ashton as its first incumbent. She was bestowed the position of chair in the FAC but 
also of Vice-President of the European Commission. Just like the member states previously 
serving their terms in the Presidency, the HR has the authority to put forward foreign policy 
proposals. In her demanding role she is being assisted by a newly formed foreign policy 
administration, the EEAS. The centralization of competence in foreign policy around the 
HR/VP, in Rynning’s view, may only benefit the accomplishment of compromise and will bear 
no results on the coercive power of the EU (Rynning, 2003:488). Rather than highlighting the 
centrality of capabilities, Rynning (2003) emphasises the pivotal role of the EU’s internal 
coordination particularly in view of the mixed legacy the EEAS is built upon. He echoes the 
vision set out in the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS (Council of the EU, 2010/427/EU, 26 July 2010) which accentuates the importance of 
the HR/VP within her double-hatted role in external affairs. Nevertheless, this coordination 
remains problematic both in the allocation of clear responsibility between the Commission and 
the EEAS in the area of security and development as well as between the personnel which has 
not yet formed a coherent Service esprit de corps thus still maintaining their previous 
organisational perceptions (see sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).  
The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthened the potential role of the HR in promoting 
foreign policy initiative. The HR is now an actor with an increased discretional ability to put 
forth proposals as well as assure their implementation. One must not overlook the symbolic 
value of this position, as a unifying element in foreign policy. Her authority in introducing 
proposals is shared in the area of CFSP with the Member States (Art. 30.1, TEU) and in the 
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other areas of EU external action with the European Commission (Art. 22.2, TEU). 
Nevertheless, success is not guaranteed by her being granted formal right of initiative. Other 
features, such as institutional rules, and the preferences and eagerness of other actors to achieve 
convergence of views (Pollack 1997:130) are of increased importance. The rule of unanimous 
decision (prevalent in CFSP initiatives) is a good example of restricting elements to policy 
setting. 
The Lisbon Treaty creates a framework for the unification of external action. The 
responsibilities of the HR will touch upon external economic relations of the Union (in her VP 
capacity of the Commission) as well as CFSP related matters (in her HR and Chairman of FAC 
capacity). This can be seen as an attempt to create a more robust and all-encompassing, 
coherent external action (Laursen, 2010:6). From an EU-integration standpoint, the Lisbon 
Treaty recognized the ‘functional indivisibility’ of CFSP and external relations decision-
making previously divided between the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission. 
However, Furness (2013:110) finds that the Treaty did not alter the various legal frameworks 
and decision-making procedures for different policy areas with international implications, such 
as foreign and security policy, trade, enlargement, migration, environment and development; 
it also omits specifications about how the new institution setting would work in practice when 
it came into force.     
  Furthermore, within the expanded Petersburg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty allows the 
possibility of a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ to be allocated certain tasks. Although these 
flexible provisions within CFSP and CSDP can be seen as progressive, away from the 
restricting requirements of unanimity, nevertheless, one must not overlook the repercussions 
they have in creating and solidifying a collective common identity among all Member States. 
This common identity furthermore could provide more efficiency in some cases (Laursen, 
2010:17). The repercussions of this initiative may result in two ways: a) the control of a 
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comparatively small number of countries over the decisions taken with respect to military 
matters (nevertheless assuring the required capabilities in order to cover the requirements of 
each initiative) and b) the more volatile response to challenges whilst relieving the countries 
that are unable to contribute. Nonetheless, the consensus-based EU identity (and especially its 
projection externally) might be significantly weakened. The effect of this from a normative 
standpoint is debatable (see Chapter 2). 
Although the launch of a CSDP mission will be decided by the Council (acting 
unanimously) and development programmes adopted by the whole College of Commissioners, 
the Treaty adds that it is the HR “acting under the authority of the Council and in close contact 
with the Political and Security Committee, [that] shall ensure coordination of the civilian and 
military aspects of such tasks” (Lisbon Treaty, 28B.2) and “may propose the use of both 
national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate”. 
The Lisbon Treaty sets the HR as the principle coordinator of civilian and military instruments. 
This pivotal role is supported by a specific mandate in order to acquire the highest degree of 
cooperation between Member State, CSDP and Commission external relations instruments. It 
therefore provides an opportunity to create a new EU foreign and security policy. The 
innovations it introduces in the area of CFSP and CSDP are significant, but the comprehensive 
approach it has on the issue of external action gives rise to new potential for the EU in attaining 
the status of an international actor. The upgraded role of HR/VP and the establishment of the 
EEAS reveal a more strategic approach to foreign policy formulation. It also provides 
substantial potential for a coherent and efficient employment of all levels of EU instruments 
(including diplomacy, CFSP and CSDP) while enhancing the role of the EU Member States 
throughout the policy making and implementation stages of foreign and security policy.  
 Henökl (2014:1) finds the EEAS as a step away from a state centred approach in public 
administration. He underlines the importance of such an innovation in the area of foreign 
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policy, given that it is traditionally based on values/principles of state sovereignty (Henökl, 
2014:1). He approaches his analysis of the EEAS from an “administrative space” perspective; 
his goal is to conceptualize the nature of the polity which is the EU in this area (Henökl, 
2014:2). His focus is on the organizational components of the EU which entail a multi-level 
governance approach (Henökl, 2014:2). He argues that capacity-building on the European level 
is being impeded by inter-governmental dynamics (which are driven by state interests) which, 
as he points out, mirror this conflict of interests in the vagueness of the EEAS’ legal and 
institutional status (Henökl, 2014:3).  
Menon (2011: 79) identifies an issue concerning the insufficiency of military assets in 
order for the EU to play the role it aspires. Depending on the reading of this statement one can 
draw valuable conclusions. If it were to be viewed from a realist approach, it means that the 
EU needs a force of coercion in order to become a potent international actor and to some extent 
impose its dominance in the varied areas of its external action. From an alternative normative 
standpoint, one must comprehend that the significance of a military force (comprehensive in 
its competence and coherent in its organisation) is of increased symbolic importance in assuring 
the smooth implementation of any policy it engages, whether that is within civilian missions 
or other initiatives of a clearer normative nature. As further elaborated in Chapter 2, the 
safeguarding of initiatives within the competence of the EEAS can be accomplished with the 
symbolic presence of a military power without it resulting in the exercise of coercion.  
The EU has made its aspirations apparent within the Lisbon Treaty to become an all-
encompassing international security actor, consistently employing the whole scale of 
instruments at its disposal. This endeavour and self-identification becomes more apparent in 
the trajectory and language incorporated consistently in the Comprehensive Approach (2013) 
and most recently the EUGS (2016) and its Implementation Plan (2016). However, in its 
attempts to formulate a more integrated, ‘strategic’ international security policy, the EU has 
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risked undermining the apolitical character of its aid, a cornerstone of its much-coveted 
normative identity (Zwolski, 2012a:988). This discussion is essential in the evaluation of the 
EEAS’ efficiency as well as the impact of the institutional dynamics that appear within the 
security-development nexus of the EU’s initiatives (see section 4.5.2). 
Regardless of this, the EU has long been promoting the view that security and 
development problems are closely interlinked. Therefore, they require a comprehensive 
response, including assets that can be deployed in the short, medium and long term. This view 
is instilled in the major strategic documents of the EU, such as the ESS (2003), the 
Comprehensive Approach (2013), the EUGS and its Implementation Plan (2016) but also in its 
regional multilateral agreements, such as the Cotonou Partnership, as well as the more 
thematically oriented documents, such as the EU Maritime Security Strategy (2014). 
However, even though new Community instruments offered an opportunity for the EU 
to assume a more effective role as a comprehensive security actor, their formal separation from 
CFSP and CSDP undermined the consistency and strategic focus of the EU's external action. 
The institutional reforms provided in the Lisbon Treaty, particularly the upgrade of the EU's 
HR and the establishment of the EEAS, aim to alleviate this flaw. By effectively converging 
the variety of bureaucracies and assets of the EU, the EEAS can trigger the generation of more 
‘strategy’ and the accomplishment of consistency in the EU's affairs as a global security actor. 
However, the same consolidation that can turn the EU into a more ‘strategic’ and effective 
security actor raises strong objections from those concerned with the impartiality and 
credibility of the EU in the areas of development and humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 6 
and 7 for a more case-specific evaluation). This debate demonstrates the conflict between two 
well-established EU norms: the norm of taking a holistic approach to international security, 
and the norm of apolitical development aid being deployed, solely on the basis of the economic 
needs of recipient countries (Zwolski, 2012:989). 
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The purpose of the reforms introduced with the Lisbon Treaty is to enable the HR to 
“ensure overall political coordination of the Union's external action, ensuring the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action” (Council 2010:36). This also 
undermines the criticism that the EU lacks a 'grand strategy', and therefore is under-equipped 
to utilize the different security instruments that it has at its disposal in a consistent manner 
(Biscop 2009; Howorth 2010). It also challenges the criticism that Community instruments 
themselves have not been used in a sufficiently strategic way to have a sustainable effect on 
the structure of foreign policy (Keukeleire and Mac Naughtan 2008:228). Currently, the 
institutional structures have been set in place in order to allow for a potential increase in 
consistency as well as a more strategic scope to the EU's external action, which includes 
international security policy.  
 Kaunert and Leonard (2012) view the change in the institutional structure of the EU 
and the enhancement of the legislative framework deriving from the Lisbon Treaty as a result 
of exogenous factors-shocks (2012:417). They observe a turn towards an enhanced 
supranational security governance in the EU as well as a broadening of the EU security agenda. 
This perspective functions as an antithesis to the commonly perceived endogenous factors 
(commonly brought by the Member States) that pressure the EU into evolving its policy and 
thus coping with the need to address international issues. The involvement and interest the EU 
has shown in advancing itself in the sector of security is important yet contested by some 
depending on their theoretical standpoint. The expansion of the EU’s approach towards security 
has gone beyond the traditionally accepted military perspective. It has come to include threats 
that can only be resolved with ‘soft power tools’ (see section 4.5.2). It is at this point that the 
academic dichotomy takes place: those who engage in a military understanding of security 
view the EU as weak while the ones supporting a broader view of security consider the EU as 
an increasingly potent security actor (Kaunert and Leonard, 2012: 418). This becomes 
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especially important when taking into account the repeated formal expression of the EU’s 
ambition to become a global security actor (Kaunert and Leonard, 2012: 418), which is most 
recently underlined in the EUGS (2016: 3-4).  
 
4.4 The European Security Strategy (ESS) 
 In 2003 the EU set out its strategic vision for what would become external action, 
known as the European Security Strategy (2003). This vision was later complemented and 
refined by its Implementation Report in 2008, thus setting the ground for the changes that 
ensued with the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and culminated in the establishment of the EEAS (2010). 
The nature of the threats and challenges was complex and therefore called for a comprehensive, 
all-encompassing approach which would employ the whole array of EU resources ranging from 
diplomatic and trade to development and crisis management instruments (Quille 2010:56). For 
this reason, emphasis was placed upon commitment to multilateralism thereby creating a need 
for threats and challenges to be addressed through international cooperation. A second 
important innovation was the express need for prevention (rather than resolution) as well as the 
link between economic development and the level of security, which would provide the post-
conflict aims. The trajectory of strategic documents altered significantly after this point leading 
to the latest EU strategy, the EUGS (2016). This evolution of EU strategic documents will be 
examined in more detail through the coding of the critical frames (section 6.2) 
The ESS remained the most comprehensive attempt to formulate an all-encompassing 
European foreign policy. Although it depicted the broader range of threats Europe was facing 
in 2003 and put forth policy implications, broadly providing manners with which the Union 
could become more involved, more competent and more coherent in its foreign action. 
Nevertheless, the level of explicit guidance it provided was quite vague. It introduces few 
explicit and specific recommendations, therefore leaving implementation processes and 
 119 
measurement of success in a vacuum. Therefore, the ESS can only be seen as providing a 
guideline. As Matlary (2006:115) points out, the ESS is an indication of a strategic approach 
but is based on the values of intergovernmentalism and unanimity. It also does not explicitly 
specify the importance of UN mandate nor does it provide the existence of a mandate as a 
requirement for military force deployment (Matlary, 2006:115). This stresses the need to 
develop a more complete strategic framework especially with the growing importance of the 
role of external action and the establishment of the EEAS. Even more so, with the vision 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) emphasising the importance of a more comprehensive 
external actorness, the ESS itself as a fundamental document falls short in clarifying the role 
of institutions. These shortcomings became more apparent in the years to come, particularly 
with reference to the security-development nexus (see section 4.5.2); this gap became even 
more problematic with the establishment of the EEAS.  
In the delineation of specific strategic provisions, the EU strategy lacked focus both on 
geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement, namely maritime.  As far as regions 
are concerned, the eastern and southern neighbourhood, Central Asia, the Gulf and sub-Saharan 
Africa were not explicitly provided for despite their importance with relation to the EU’s 
international role. Until the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, 2014), growing concern 
had also been identified by the international community in the area of maritime security. 
Although this threat was highly visible in certain geographic areas (ie Horn of Africa), it raised 
global concerns, thus demanding coordinated efforts on the same scale. An opportunity to 
address this issue appropriately appeared through the Lisbon Treaty’s provision for 
multilateralism and more specifically as supporting the UN, especially in scenarios considered 
to involve the responsibility to protect.  
Although an explicit ‘comprehensive approach’ did not appear as such until 2013, 
elements of this concept were included in the ESS. As presented in Chapter 3, this frame is 
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particularly important in normative terms, seeing that it provides for the employment of all the 
means at the EU’s disposal to tackle the challenges it would face. Therefore, it is important to 
point out that even ten years prior to the Comprehensive Approach (COM, JOIN (2013) 30 
final, 11.12.2013), the idea of combining both military and civilian means in external action 
existed within the EU’s intents. What is also interesting is the fact that coordination was not 
only foreseen with reference to employed means but also related to the creation of horizontal 
coherence, both between institutions as well as their respective policy areas. Furthermore, as 
discussed in this Chapter, the vision created by the Lisbon Treaty and reflected in the creation 
of the EEAS was precisely to achieve this continuity in terms of cohesion internally as well as 
complementarity externally in the EU’s initiatives.  Therefore, a continuum of intent can be 
identified, culminating in the establishment of the EEAS institutionally and the Comprehensive 
Approach conventionally. 
According to Hynek (2011:82), the ESS referred to the notion of ‘comprehensive 
security’. This position underlines the direct connection between peace, development and 
political stability. It explicitly stressed the need for civilian and military instruments to be used 
together, promoting the development of “operations involving both military and civilian 
capabilities” (European Union 2003:13). This point is complemented by Cornish and Edwards 
(2005:810) who find the need for a more comprehensive approach to security related situations 
that would call for more than military action (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). They underline 
the need for civilian measures (ie. Political, economic, police intelligence and humanitarian 
action) and find the EU “particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” 
(Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). Stress is put on the need for a more strategic approach in 
order to optimize and enhance this form of well-rounded action against security threats 
(Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). They find the ESS as an important step towards the 
institutionalization of ESDP: at once it provided the response to the needs of the missions that 
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would be carried out as well as incentive to the states and the HR (Cornish and Edwards, 
2005:810). Cornish and Edwards (2005:814), through the ESS document, identify an increased 
concern when it comes to preventive diplomacy over the past decade. They posit that in order 
to achieve the aforementioned manner of intervention and action (Cornish and Edwards, 
2005:810), the gap in coordination which appears, even though agreement on which states can 
be considered as failed is wide, must be covered. Although this coordination is essential, reports 
reveal that in most cases it is still undependable. They underline the need for efficient 
interaction between member states, the Council (and its mechanisms) and the Commission in 
order to assert preventive diplomacy (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:814).  
The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 11 December 2008) adds some 
new security challenges, beyond traditional threats, related to climate change, information 
systems and energy resources (ESS Implementation Report, 2008: 1). It also expands on the 
security-development nexus particularly with reference to terrorism and non-proliferation.  
Furthermore, it explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on EU “security through crime, 
illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 2008:1) thereby 
clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related to maritime 
security. Within the aforementioned phrase, the case of Somalia is essentially illustrated. What 
makes this reference to Somalia even more interesting is the fact that the EU’s first maritime 
operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10 November 2008), 
was launched a month before the publication of the Implementation Report. Therefore, the 
importance of the case itself, is raised to a level of strategic importance through its 
incorporation in this document. Additionally, the link presented between state failure and 
criminal behaviour, underlines the interconnected nature of deeply rooted causes with arising 
security threats, and it is this issue lies at the crux of the situation in Somalia (chapter 5). What 
the Implementation Report contributes to this discussion is the interest of the EU to address 
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both levels of the problem. When seen within the context of the ESS’ call for a comprehensive 
approach, one cannot fail to notice the similarities with the current operational setting in 
Somalia, whereby the military initiatives (EUNAVFOR and EUTM) are complemented by 
civilian missions (EUCAP Somalia) in an effort to accomplish both short term (security 
focused) as well as long-term (developmental) results. Further to the elaboration on the 
security-development nexus (section 4.5.2), the normative underpinnings of this 
conceptualisation emerge, particularly with reference to norm diffusion. The ESS and its 
Implementation Report would clearly fall under Manners’ (2013:316) ‘informational diffusion’ 
(see Textbox 1), but the provision of humanitarian assistance, engagement and support related 
to the long-term goals would also relate to ‘transference diffusion’ within the framework of 
NPE. Therefore, the contribution of the Implementation Report is not restricted merely to 
covering the gaps left by the ESS, but also compliments its normative significance through the 
expansion of the EU’s aims as well as the links it introduces between them. 
Zwolski (2012) goes further in providing insight on the ESS from a discourse point of 
view.  He argues that the rhetoric emphasizing a holistic approach to security, incorporating 
military as well as civilian and development policy instruments, has become dominant in the 
EU and remains largely uncontested (Zwolski, 2012:994).  The 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS underlines that “there cannot be sustainable development without 
peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no 
sustainable peace” (European Council 2008:8). Biscop and Coelmont (2010:9) reiterate that 
“in line with ESS, such a proactive policy will be preventive, multilateral and holistic, putting 
to use all instruments at the disposal of the EU, of which CSDP is an integral part”. From the 
aforementioned, the pertinence of the comprehensive approach as a critical frame becomes 
apparent. The ESS, as a first step in the conventional organisation of this concept, introduces 
the combination of military and civilian means as the way forward in CSDP. Following the 
 123 
discussion presented in Chapter 2, the link with NPE is apparent: concerned with the 
employment of means rather than the nature of the means themselves, normative power as a 
conceptual tool foresees the employment of all means at the disposal of an actor as long as they 
are utilised in a non-coercive fashion. Furthermore, the ESS highlights a parallel between 
internal and external security. The notion of interconnectivity between these two elements is 
pivotal within the Comprehensive Approach (2013) as well as the relevant Action Plan (2015). 
Additionally, emphasis is put on the centrality of multilateralism in the effective 
operationalisation of the concept. This element is further expanded within the sub-strategies 
focusing on geographic areas (Horn of Africa, 2011) as well as areas of operational engagement 
(EU Maritime Security Strategy, 2014). Therefore, post-EEAS, the EU’s effort to compensate 
for the shortcomings of the ESS is more visible, thereby further illustrating the argument set 
forth in this thesis concerning the catalytic role of the EEAS’ establishment in the EU’s 
normative actorness. Following from the above, the creation of the EEAS appeared to be the 
institutional attempt to coordinate action taken within the internal-external security nexus as 
well as that relating to internal coherence. Although that may have been the vision of the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007) and ensuing Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU), the case 
of its effective function is a debatable issue, both internally as well as externally (see section 
4.5).  
 
4.5 The EEAS: role and importance 
The EEAS was created by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to support the new ‘double hatted’ 
office of European Union (EU) High Representative for Common Foreign Security Policy/ 
Commission Vice President (HR/VP). The “organisational hybrid” which is the EEAS, 
comprises of a broad range of structures encompassing foreign aid and development, 
international crisis management and defence units, with personnel including officials with 
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national and supranational organisational origins7. As a bureaucratic actor, the Service is 
comprised of staff and departments from three sources: a) the former European Commission 
Directorates General (DGs) for external relations and development, b) the external affairs parts 
of the European Council Secretariat and c) Member States secondments. Its intended goal is to 
increase the capability of the EU to pursue its interests and values internationally ultimately 
strengthening Europe’s influence on global matters in a more multipolar world. This is a pivotal 
point for the EU's foreign policy and its own actorness. If the EU fails to reconcile the structural 
tensions within the EEAS, particularly appearing within the security-development nexus of its 
activities (see section 4.5.2) it cannot fulfil its role and the member states will lose confidence 
in the value of a common framework in foreign affairs. The opportunity, nevertheless, if it 
succeeds, is the reinvention of its role internationally (Hemra et al, 2012:2). 
The Service has to face the additional difficulty of coordinating foreign policy 
previously formed and handled by the rotating EU presidencies. An important point that has 
been raised with respect to the delineation of EU external action is the strategic vacuum which 
is prevalent in dealing with the aforementioned issues (Hemra et al 2012:1). The absence of an 
explicit and comprehensive statement of the interests and objectives guiding EU foreign policy 
are highly detrimental to its acquiring a global identity in a constantly evolving international 
arena. Nevertheless, the consecutive steps that have been taken on a strategic level prove that 
the overall actorness of the EU in external action is further being specified through the 
interaction of the comprehensive approach with multilateralism. The first steps in overcoming 
the vagueness exhibited in the ESS (see section 4.4) appeared within its Implementation Report 
                                                 
7 Although the internal dynamics of the EEAS are not questioned as such, elements of the functions carried out 
by the Service as a whole or by individual structures as well as subsequent critiques are accounted for to 
demonstrate the potential mis-alignments that may appear in the operationalisation of CSDP initiatives. This is 
particularly important in terms of an NPE evaluation considering De Zutter’s (2010) submission concerning the 
continuity between internal and external practices as a core element of normativity. Additionally, this aspect 
becomes more crucial for the purposes of this thesis in view of the comprehensive approach, which essentially 
encapsulates the continuity of the internal-external nexus within the CSDP framework more broadly, as well as 
the delineation of military operations more specifically. 
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(2008) and continued in the strategies that followed. More specifically the Comprehensive 
Approach (2013), which although not a strategy, defines the intent of the EU to progress in a 
fashion that employs and combines its military and civilian capabilities while interconnecting 
the relevant policies to facilitate this coordination, as well as the Global Strategy (see section 
6.5) indicate the gradual refinement of the EU’s external action priorities as well as the ways 
by which it foresees them progressing. The elements that become apparent through the critical 
framework analysis of these documents are the following: a) the explicit global role the EU is 
determined to establish as an actor, b) the extensive outlining of the multilateral cooperation it 
is basing its initiatives on c) the willingness to develop an autonomous presence while retaining 
the aforementioned commitment to multilateralism and d) the increasing importance it sets on 
the role of the EEAS to bring together all the aforementioned tangents within the delineation 
of its external action (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
4.5.1 Structural tensions: forming a Service ‘esprit de corps’ 
The internal coherence of the EEAS’ bureaucracy is also an element that has attracted 
interest, particularly around the subject of whether the officials functioning within it, despite 
their differing institutional backgrounds, can develop an esprit de corps. Juncos and Pomorska 
(2014:302) define it as “shared beliefs and values among the individuals within a group and 
their desire to achieve a common goal”. They find that this has not been achieved to a 
satisfactory degree thereby concluding that the lack of esprit de corps could become an 
inhibitory factor in the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS itself. The entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty raised expectations about a more effective and coherent European foreign 
policy headed by the new HR and supported by the EEAS (Juncos & Pomorska 2014:302). 
Much commentary on the Service has revolved around the political circumstances of its 
establishment, its performance and the legal provisions regulating its functioning (for example, 
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Lehne, 2011; Smith, 2013; Wouters and Duquet, 2012). The fact that the EEAS is composed 
of officials originating from three different institutions (the European Commission, the Council 
General Secretariat and the foreign ministries of the Member States), with potentially different 
mentalities and values, has made this a particularly challenging process to manage. David 
O’Sullivan (2011:3), EEAS Chief Operating Officer, pertinently portrayed this challenge: “In 
terms of organizational culture, the merger of the different EEAS’ component parts is not 
unlike a merger between corporations: it brings with it the challenge of establishing a common 
identity.” Research has also shown that while officials identify strongly with the EEAS and 
believe that its establishment has been a positive step for the EU to take, they have complained 
about the lack of an esprit de corps within the organization (Juncos and Pomorska, 2013). 
According to Tomic (2013:228) EU foreign policy is turning into an integrated 
bureaucracy also comprising of non-elected actors (such as seconded national diplomats) and 
slowly abolishing its intergovernmental character. The institutions assigned with the full range 
of the policy process are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and its advisory bodies: 
the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management (CIVCOM). PSC has been characterized as the “de facto highest 
administrative body in the ESDP” (Vanhoonacker et al, 2010:9). The EUMC is the highest 
military body in the CSDP; it is assisted by a working group and the European Union Military 
Staff (EUMS). The latter consists of military and civilian experts and have been integrated into 
the EEAS (Tomic, 2013: 228). 
The civilian aspects of CSDP policy have been allocated to CIVCOM and the Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).  CPCC is now part of the EEAS (Tomic, 2013: 228). 
Aside from the specialized institutions on the military and civilian aspects, the CFSP/CSDP 
framework is also supported by the Crisis Management and Planning Directory (CMPD); it has 
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been integrated into the EEAS and charged with the representation of a single strategic 
planning structure in the CSDP (Tomic, 2013:228).   
 The EU is not adequately unified on this matter and this inhibits its ability to create a 
strategic profile. It is also found quite slow in its foreign policy action and lacks substantively 
in coercive diplomacy (Matlary, 2006:110). Matlary finds the EU to be an international actor 
in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria: it is premised on democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and market economy principles; it also considers the satisfaction of the 
aforementioned values as preconditions in all its external relations-ie membership procedures 
and with third countries (Matlary, 2006:114). She provides the definition of strategic actor as: 
“the ability to threaten the use of force through coercive diplomacy and the ability to actually 
deploy force” (Matlary, 2006:112). She adds that both of the aforementioned have political 
will, political ability as well as military capability as prerequisites. She supports the use of 
coercive diplomacy, nevertheless she points to the inherent paradox: “The EU can be expected 
to be able to deploy force with more and more capability and legitimacy, but it cannot be 
expected to threaten the use of force effectively” (Matlary, 2006:112). On this point, Hyde-
Price, (2004:341) concludes that there should be a new European approach towards the use of 
coercive military power: one that is aligned with the normative values and democratic political 
culture. He underlines the necessity of retaining military force as an instrument of last resort 
(Hyde-Price, 2004:341). Therefore, the importance of acquiring coercive means and employing 
coercion (or being expected to do so) in the arena of diplomacy becomes more of mixed image. 
This question lies at the crux of the theory underpinning this research and further demonstrates 
the difficulty in applying a normative power lens on the examination of the EU’s military 
operations as part of CSDP.  Nevertheless, it employs military means as part of the diffusion 
of its normative intents without in fact (or scarcely) resorting to the use of force, thereby 
rendering it a normative power, both in identity as well as in actorness. 
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 As pointed out by Lefebvre and Hillion (2010:2), the employment of diplomats in the 
staff ranks of the EEAS is indicative of the belief that diplomacy, although traditionally being 
considered an area of State sovereignty-policy and subsequently a domain suited for inter-
governmental procedures, can include elements of a 'functionalist' method (Lefebvre and 
Hillion, 2010:2). An institutionalised cooperation between the seconded national diplomats 
could result in a new form of solidarity under an EU perspective. Henökl (2014:16) finds that 
“such phenomena of interwoven multi-level European bureaucracies deserve attention, since 
they are indicators of a transformation of the European political order and a rebalancing of the 
EU’s institutional equilibrium”.  
Nevertheless, Riddervold and Trondal (2017) find that the EEAS has managed to 
establish a relatively independent mode of action (Bátora 2013; Blom and Vanhoonacker 2015; 
Henökl 2015), suggesting administrative autonomy from the member-state governments. They 
also identify that it has also integrated into the Commission thereby suggesting a potential 
“‘normalisation’ or ‘communitarisation’ of CFSP policy processes” (Riddervold and Trondal, 
2017: 33), thus further demonstrating development beyond the formally intergovernmental 
procedures. An explanation to the aforementioned administrative integration can be linked to 
the EU’s comprehensive approach. Stemming from the Lisbon Treaty, this approach calls for 
“consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these and other 
community policy areas” (Riddervold & Trondal, 2017:41). The broader initiative it reflects 
towards better coordination is seen both on horizontal and vertical relations. As Lægreid et al 
(2014) add, the administrative doctrines corroborate the need for ‘better coordination’. This 
quest for coordination of the EU administration has affected the way officials from the 
Commission administration and the EEAS administration work together and thus how the 
EEAS has settled within the Commission’s family of DGs. 
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As an important part of the general framework of the EU in international security and 
foreign affairs, CSDP overlaps partially with CFSP from an institutional standpoint. The first 
steps towards the determination of its infrastructure were taken with the establishment of the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC). This effort was followed by initiatives in the civilian dimension with the 
establishment of the Civilian Crisis Management Committee. Slow progress in this field is 
attributed to the preference shown by Member States for non-binding mechanisms in the field 
of improving capabilities (Reynolds, 2006; Witney, 2008). 
 From an institutional perspective, what is considered within the scope of Community 
as ‘external relations’ remains essentially within the range of action of the Commission (e.g. 
Trade, external aid programmes), while issues of “foreign and security policy” continue to be 
resolved predominantly by unanimous decision in the Council (and European Council) [Art. 
31.2 TEU]. One of EEAS’ most important assets is that it could act as sui generis, without 
being confound with the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It had also been approved 
that the crisis management structures (CSDP tools and CFSP budget) would fall under the 
authority of the Service while retaining their intergovernmental nature. The Commission 
delegations would be integrated into the EEAS and placed under the authority of the HR.  
 In relation to the organizational structure, Henökl (2014:10) expresses his concern 
about the ties with the Commission. He finds that the EEAS’ dependence on the Commision’s 
expertise and infrastructure complicates the autonomy of the Service’s standing and affects its 
freedom of creating an identity of its own. Although from an integration perspective, the bond 
between the two institutions is considered positive, it nevertheless hampers the evolution of the 
EEAS into something more in the future and living up to the expectations provided in the text 
of the Lisbon Treaty. What complicates issues more is the dependence of the EEAS from the 
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Commission when it comes to the latter’s competences (via DEVCO) in the Financial 
Instruments Service (Henökl, 2014:10).  
 Henökl (2014:5) also provides an interesting insight of the EEAS legal standing which 
affects both its independence as an institution but also limits its potential in creating an identity 
of its own, ultimately rendering it dependent upon the initiatives of other actors within the EU 
(both institutions and Member States). He underlines the EEAS’s lack of legal personality 
(unlike all other regulatory agencies) stemming from the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, he points 
out that from a legal perspective, the EEAS is endowed with a legal capacity to ‘perform its 
tasks and objectives’ (Henökl, 2014:5).  It is apparent that the EEAS’ autonomy in its area of 
competence is to some extent reduced; although not fully capable of performing independently 
in the contraction of legal relations, it is given space to act freely in the formulation of the 
organization’s objectives (Henökl, 2014:5). He further argues from an institutional perspective 
that the EEAS is not considered a core institution, but rather a body created under secondary 
law (Henökl, 2014:5). Its legal standing is reduced given that no decisions that have legal effect 
can be produced by the EEAS (Henökl, 2014:7). Nevertheless, Henökl (2014:7) argues that 
through Service Level Agreements, the EEAS creates legal ties with other EU institutions. 
Therefore, one may argue, that indirectly the Service does have effect on the contractual 
relations of the EU without having to bear the full repercussions of the entailed obligations; 
this also means that it does not profit from the full extent of the benefits/rights foreseen within 
the legal agreement. A contentious point is also the Services limited legal standing before the 
Court. This is directly linked to the initial problem of its legal personality mentioned above. 
Therefore, for the time being the EEAS is once again bound by proceedings involving the 
European Parliament, Commission and Council (Henökl, 2014:7). In extension to this 
argument, the issue of the EEAS’ fit in the institutional framework is accentuated, particularly 
in view of its reduced legal standing. By not profiting from a full range of benefits, the 
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importance of the Service in a legal sense is presented as inferior to that of the other institutions 
with which it has to coordinate for the design of external initiatives. Furthermore, this 
undermines the pivotal role it has been allocated within external action, seeing that it will 
require the consenting opinion of an institution whose decisions have legal effect. Therefore, 
within a legal understanding, the EEAS’ impact is reduced even though its role has been 
presented as crucial. In turn, from a normative perspective, this issue indicates that although 
the EU has identified its intent in establishing a coherent and comprehensive actor in external 
relations – the EEAS- it appears to not reflect this vision within the relevant law. Thus, from a 
theoretical perspective, the creation of the Service may be seen as an important step towards 
evolving normative power through external action, nevertheless, it is not echoed within its legal 
framework hence reducing the normative impact of the EEAS and subsequently the EU.   
 According to Meyer (2005:537), the new European structures for decision-making in 
security and defence lend themselves for the creation of a convergent mode of strategic 
thinking (an issue further analysed below). The Office of the HR (and now the EEAS) can 
become the means appropriate for the institutional induction of a learning process, capable of 
delivering a socialization effect (Meyer,2005:537). Given their foundation in the very identity 
of the actors and that they have been deeply ingrained in their perception of defence and 
security, they could be taken as a point of reference for the creation of a collective set of rules 
for appropriate behavior (Meyer,2005:529).  
Morillas (2011:243) argues that although the policy-making procedure within the two 
strands of foreign policy after the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty still remains to its 
majority intergovernmental, changes have been made as a result to the increased power of 
initiative bestowed upon the new structures introduced by the Treaty (with particular reference 
to the HR/VP and the EEAS). These newly appointed powers are now shared with the 
previously exclusive powers held by the Member states and the rotating presidency of the 
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Council (2011: 244). He posits that the innovations indirectly put forth a “process of 
institutionalization be practice” (2011:243) in foreign policy initiative, particularly through the 
prominent personalities allocated within the new EU structures, the reformulation of the 
procedures introduced in the formulation of policy papers and the tackling of crisis challenges. 
He underlines the potential in the institutionalization of foreign policy now appearing through 
the establishment of the EEAS which not only provides a rule-governed basis for taking action 
but also includes a budget of its own, staff and permanent headquarters for the sole purpose of 
external action (2011:244). The essence of Morillas’ contribution to the debate can be 
summarized as follows: although the policy-making framework has radically changed by 
alleviating the exclusivity of the power of the Member States and the presidency of the Council 
and bestowing upon the newly established EEAS and the HR/VP powers of initiative, the rule 
of unanimity (especially within the process of engaging with CFSP issues) remains prevalent 
hence keeping the decision-taking procedure highly intergovernmental. This can be seen as a 
balance being struck between innovation on the level of exterior presence of the EU in the area 
of external action while retaining the traditionally held power of effect on the Member States. 
As Ioannides (2010:45) points out, one of the most crucial tasks the EEAS is 
responsible for is the enhancement of CSDP-CFSP coordination, given that the successful 
outcome of CSDP operations depends on the long-term sustainable political strategies which 
are associated with CFSP. The EEAS has the potential of evolving into a promoter of 
cooperation and cohesion spanning across the decision-making processes that include Member 
States, EU institutions and officials. By bestowing upon the HR and her supporting staff the 
formal right for policy initiative, the Lisbon Treaty has provided the foundation for a potentially 
new foreign policy advocator. Nevertheless, the influence that this actor can exercise is a 
process not an automatic attribute: this entails a masterful and effective use of the full range of 
assets combined with adequate strategic guidance.  
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4.5.2 The EEAS within the security-development nexus 
An issue that has arisen within the external affairs that has attracted academic 
discussion is the reconciliation of the security and development policy objectives of the EU, 
with particular reference to international aid in conflict arenas. More specifically the 
reconciliation of short-term security and long-term development priorities lay at the crux of 
this discussion and become increasingly pertinent when examining the operational activity of 
the EU in the Horn of Africa through an NPE (see Chapter 2), especially Somalia (see Chapter 
8). However, as Murdoch et all (2014) observe, much of the available EEAS literature 
demonstrates a normative bias towards assessing how the new Service ought to be organized 
to make the EU a rational global actor (see for example Batora 2011; Carta 2011; Nivet 2011; 
Furness 2012). However, others offer more ‘positive’ analyses by examining its initial 
formation (Murdoch 2012), the roles and dynamics between its officials (Benson-Rea and 
Shore 2012; Duke et al. 2012; Juncos and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013), 
and discussing its initial vision for the harmonization of EU foreign policy (Duke 2012; Raube 
2012; Furness 2013; Smith 2013; Wisniewski 2013). 
The EU often struggles to support reconstruction and development in countries where 
insecurity and violent conflict coexist with deeply rooted socio-economic issues and extensive 
property (Overhaus, 2013:511). As witnessed in the Horn of Africa, and especially in Somalia, 
it has become increasingly apparent that piracy can be effectively dealt with only when 
maritime operations are complemented by parallel efforts at land. As Overhaus (2013:512) 
contends, the Treaty of Lisbon created “the prospect for better dealing with conflicts at the 
intersection of security and development” particularly through the creation of the EEAS. This 
research identifies this particular potential of the EU’s external action within NPE in theory 
and within the military operations in Somalia in practice. Normative power’s ability to combine 
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military means with non-coercive use (Larsen 2002; Maull 2005; see discussion in section 
2.4.2) for the operationalisation of the EU’s intents largely in the area of development (see 
Chapter 6) demonstrates the pertinence of NPE when exploring external action and echoes this 
thesis’ argument that the creation of the EEAS is a catalyst in the establishment of the EU’s 
normative power.  
The centrality of the security-development nexus within the critical frames of the 
‘comprehensive approach’, ‘multilateralism’ and the ‘partnership-ownership’ binary also 
become apparent from the above. As Smith (2013:38) asserts “the comprehensive approach is 
largely about linking the EU's new CSDP policing/military capabilities to its longstanding 
expertise in using civilian and economic foreign policy tools”. The need for a combination of 
means at the disposal of the EU is required to attain the effectiveness of its short-term (security) 
and long-term (development) goals – thus operationalising its “comprehensive approach”. As 
an international actor, it is required to cooperate with the other actors in the areas of interest as 
well as the recipient countries of its aid, hence demanding “multilateralism” in its action in 
order to achieve effective coordination. According to the World Development Report (2011, 
Conflict, Security, and Development 2 (World Bank 2011: 13) the swift availability of aid 
aimed at ameliorating living conditions in a timely and visible fashion can reduce tensions in 
the national governments. Nevertheless, the longstanding violence and state fragility can only 
be tackled with the coordination of short and medium-term aid which is supported by long-
term approaches to establishing legitimate institutions (World Development Report 2011: 10). 
This has been the EU’s approach in its involvement in Somalia. By securing the transportation 
of aid to the population in need through EUNAVFOR Atalanta (within its multilateral 
cooperation with other international actors as well as more autonomously from 2015), training 
the local forces through EUTM while simultaneously promoting democratic governance 
culminating the 2017 elections, the EU has been operationalising the normative foundation 
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theorised within NPE. Furthermore, this conceptual understanding of effective aid provision 
demonstrates the importance of the coherence between intent-action-impact argued within this 
research. This comprehensive approach is reflected in the military initiatives of the EU and, 
due to the combination of non-coercive use of its means with civilian missions (EUCAP 
Nestor) that produce short-term as well as long-term changes, highlights the pertinence of the 
normative power paradigm and the focus of the EU in pursuing it through the multifaceted role 
it has attributed to the EEAS.  
Additionally, seeing that the majority of CSDP operations are carried out in developing 
countries, the comprehensive approach is to a large extent an issue of bridging and coordinating 
the EU's development cooperation agenda, which is mostly by civilian instruments and the 
Commission, with its foreign security policy agenda, which is dominated by EU Member States 
with reference to military/policing capabilities and the EEAS regarding strategic design and 
oversight. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach serves another purpose with regards to 
the timeframe set for the operationalisation of initiatives which also indicates the urgency for 
tackling the issues that arise. Seeing its pertinence to the security-development nexus, this 
approach attempts to link short-term crisis management/conflict resolution efforts with longer-
term security sector reform and state-building efforts in order to ensure the sustainability of its 
results wherever the EU conducts its operations (Smith, 2013:38).  
According to Overhaus (2013:511), the priorities proposed by the European 
Commission for the period following 2014 are mostly aimed at addressing the procedural and 
bureaucratic obstacles for EU aid in conflict states while neglecting to touch upon the 
underlying political problems. He posits that “It is unlikely that these problems will be solved 
by grand bargains and institutional design. Rather, confidence in the EU’s foreign policy 
system to deal with conflict states- and to bridge short-term crisis management and long-term 
development cooperation- will have to be created over time through practical cooperation” 
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(Overhaus, 2013: 511); and it is this assertion that serves as this thesis’ point of departure. 
Building on Overhaus’ (2013:511) observation, this research suggests that it is being seen to 
by the EU via the gradual establishment of a normative identity. Theoretically, normative 
power provides the opportunity for a long-term solution to be put in place through the diffusion 
of its intents. On a practical basis, the EU is demonstrating continuity through the 
implementation of its military means within the context of its operations in Somalia (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). The creation of the EEAS establishes a basis for a coherent 
operationalisation of the EU’s normative ambitions seeing that it is tasked with the oversight 
of the strategic planning as well as the operational practice on the ground.  
The basis for the security-development nexus and the problematic operationalisation of 
the relevant intents is particularly apparent in the cooperation between the EU and the states of 
Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) within the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 (Overhaus 
2013: 517). Based on this document, cooperation in this area included specific provisions on 
peace building and conflict prevention as well as on dealing with violent conflicts. Successive 
revisions in 2005 and 2010 put even more emphasis on the linkage between security and 
development in situations of fragile statehood. This becomes more apparent in a comparative 
reading of Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement from 2000 on 'Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention 
and Resolution' and Art. 56 from the European Commission, Directorate-General Development 
and Cooperation - EuropeAid, Second Revision of Cotonou Agreement (European 
Commission, ACP- The Cotonou Agreement, accessed 20 June 2016). 
Given the structure of the Service’s bureaucracy (see section 4.3.1), which includes 
personnel form the Commission and the Council Secretariat plus seconded diplomats from the 
member states, Avery (2011) foresees a “risk of friction and rivalry between EEAS and the 
services of the Commission”. Particularly when seen within the context of the security-
development nexus, this friction could unfold as damaging since an important part of the EU’s 
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action in international affairs relates to common policies. The High Representative, who is also 
Vice-President of the Commission, could therefore steer the EEAS under its mixed institutional 
nature, both with reference to its internal makeup as well as to the institution which it would 
ultimately support within the double hatted role of the HR, to operate in many ways like a 
service of the Commission. Nevertheless, as Avery (2011) posits, this complication will require 
good cooperation on both sides in order to be averted. 
The increasing overlap of security and development policy objectives has not yet 
prompted a better harmonization of these objectives within the EU's foreign policy system 
(Overhaus, 2013: 527). It was precisely the goal of the Lisbon Treaty to create the EEAS under 
the leadership of the HR as a systemic fulcrum for harmonizing different policies and 
objectives under a more strategic political framework, however, the new Service has not been 
able to exploit its potential in this regard. Instead, institutional rivalries between the 
Commission and the EEAS as well as within the EEAS between the sundry personnel 
backgrounds create an unsuitable environment wherein the initial objectives for the Service 
can be achieved. The nexus between security and development has also become more visible 
and has been accompanied with a widely concerning 'securitization' (Tannous, 2013: 350). 
More specifically the concern is identified in the merging of different policies under a single 
strategy which would be executed at the expense of genuine development matters. A number 
of intersections which have emerged support this fear, one of which being the strategy for the 
Horn of Africa (2011) (Tannous, 2013: 350). Even though these strategies have been prepared 
jointly with the Commission, it is evident, however, that the topic security and development is 
discussed in an increasingly political way, whereby issues such as piracy are more clearly 
linked with the EU's own security. Most importantly, the EEAS will only then become a 
systematic hub in dealing with the security-development nexus if Member States support it 
more forcefully than they did in the past - both in Brussels and in the partner countries. Based 
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on past experience, it is fair to say that the major obstacles for the EU to overcome the conflicts 
at the intersection of security and development are unlikely to be solved by grand bargains and 
institutional designs. Some country and regional settings seem to be more conducive to such 
cooperation than others (Overhaus, 2013: 528). 
As part of the institutional re-allocation of duties, mainly from the Commission, the 
transfer of the DG Relex to the EEAS, especially country and region-related positions were 
transferred from the Directorate General for Development (DG Dev) to the EEAS. Staff from 
the former DG Dev remaining in the EU Commission now constitutes, together with the 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO), the new DG 'Development and Cooperation - 
EuropeAid' (DEVCO). The new structure of DG DEVCO comprises of three political and 
thematic directorates (EU Development Policy, Human and Society Development and 
Sustainable Growth and Development), five geographic directorates (East and Southern Africa 
and ACP Coordination, West and Central Africa, Neighbourhood, Latin America and 
Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific) and an administrative directorate 
(Tannous, 2013: 341). Therefore, the split existing within the Commission regarding 
developmental responsibilities into DG Dev (responsible for the ACP countries) and DG Relex 
(responsible for the ‘other countries’), has now been bridged. Within DG DEVCO the 
Directorate ‘EU Development Policy’ takes a leading role (Tannous, 2013: 341). It is tasked 
with the formulation of the general framework defining the direction of the Directorate General 
and is responsible for a range of initiatives ranging from budget support and policy coherence 
for development to assuring the effectiveness of aid and maintaining international development 
dialogue.  
Even with the replacement of DG Relex by the EEAS, the cumbersome procedure was 
not simplified despite initial expectations that this would be the case (Tannous, 2013: 350). 
The EEAS, positioned outside the Commission, needs to maintain strong internal cohesion 
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within the complex system in order to avoid potential risk occurring from its operation parallel 
to the Commission as well as malfunctioning (Tannous, 2013: 350). This indicates the frail 
cooperation which is in place, despite the expectations which were put forward with the 
establishment of the EEAS. Although the assumption was that the creation of the new Service 
would simplify the processes taking place within a comprehensive approach to security and 
development, what appears to be a consensus within the literature is that they have fallen short. 
This gap between expectations and their operationalisation stems from the complex network 
of responsibilities, the heterogeneous nature of the personnel within the EEAS which lacks its 
own esprit de corps as well as the very core of the security-development nexus being disparate 
in terms of aims and urgency to be addressed. Ultimately, this particular element of the EU’s 
external action inhibits the very efficiency of its initiatives, given that the responsibility for 
making a decision and responsibility to act are situated within different parts of its institutional 
framework still without having achieved a smooth cooperation in bureaucratic terms.  
An interesting element within the security-development nexus of the EU is highlighted 
by Terkovich (2014) with particular reference to the element of ‘crisis response’. According to 
Terkovich (2014: 150) the European Union (EU) has become a more prominent actor in the 
international realm of crisis management (Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2013). Within this area 
of external action, Member states acknowledge that they must increase their mutual 
cooperation capabilities given the rising number of transboundary crises (Ansell, Boin, & 
Keller, 2010). As she highlights (Terkovich, 2014: 151), the definition of an EU crisis is closely 
linked to and stems from the nature of the EU and rests upon the interpretation given to core 
societal values that necessitates immediate action (Rosenthal & Hart, 1989; Rosenthal, Boin, 
& Comfort, 2001). Given its broad scope of applicability, ‘crisis response’ creates the space 
for overlap of institutional competences. More specifically, the emphasis on ‘crisis response’ 
can still be seen as competing with “the ‘crisis management’ competence of the CSDP and the 
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humanitarian/civil protection response led by DG ECHO” (Terkovich, 2014: 156). The tension 
within this nexus spill over into the lack of a straight-forward and precise system of 
competences is set within the EU, particularly the EEAS and EU Commission. The coherence 
and coordination of EU’s external action in the field of crisis management is the central aim of 
External Action Service’s Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department 
(CR&OC). This department was developed as one of the key foreign policy innovations of the 
Lisbon Treaty and tasked to ensure an effective horizontal Comprehensive Approach (Sherriff, 
2013; Wollard, 2013) in responding to natural and man-made crises. This crucially includes 
the oversight of the member states’ involvement and ensuring effective exchange of 
information between them, as well as between member states and EU institutions (Terkovich, 
2014:150). Different instruments have already been put in place or revised to accomplish better 
coordination: the EU Crisis Platform, the EU Situation Room, and the EU Integrated Political 
Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements. 
 
4.6 Lessons learned from operations 
An important change in the traditional civilian character of the EU came with the 
“Petersburg Tasks”, thereafter permitting autonomous military crisis management operations 
(Adrian Hyde-Price, 2004:333). Adrian Hyde-Price (2004:332) argues that the lessons learnt 
in the 1990, with particular reference to Sierra Leone, the Balkans, and Somalia, are that seldom 
does diplomacy suffice for the resolution of complex situations such as incidents of aggression, 
human rights violations and or genocide. 
Adrian Hyde Price (2004) presents one more key lesson gained by the aftermath of the 
situations in the 1990s: the crisis management and post conflict states required the collaboration 
of various actors and from the full range of possible action (economic, political, policing as 
well as humanitarian aid and military force). This emphasizes the need for bridging civilian 
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with military means in order to accomplish the most effective and efficient operational plan. 
He points out the need for a “comprehensive concept of security” and the necessity of 
examining “how the military dimension relates to other elements of a multi-faceted and multi-
dimensional approach to international crises” (Hyde-Price, 2004:336).  
Biava (2011:45) draws some conclusions about the scope of CSDP policy based on 
operations carried out. She finds that (as the ESS already states) CSDP operations have taken 
place within a multilateral framework of cooperation and acted complementarily to 
international operations (ie, EU in DRC: UN-MONUC) (Biava, 2011: 45). She also 
distinguishes the participation of the EU in long-term effects in the field as part of its global 
approach; these types of operations are comprehensive in their scope and aim at complementing 
broader strategic interests in the states/regions-fields (ie, operation Concordia-FYROM now 
an EU candidate state) (Biava, 2011:45). Furthermore, the EU appears to be interested in 
geographical areas surrounding it or that have historical links with the European continent; the 
majority of operations have been deployed in the Balkans. Biava (2011:45) purports that this 
engagement outside the limits of Europe “implies force projection” but also indicates “enlarged 
perception of the threats” and a “broader vision of security”. 
According to Biava (2011:46), CSDP interventions are characterized by a high level of 
respect to international legitimacy. The interventions carried out within this framework have 
taken place after explicit invitation or based on agreement. In the few exceptions from the 
above, intervention was carried out after explicit demand by international organizations. 
Furthermore, CSDP interventions mostly take place after the actual conflict or crisis and aim 
at stabilization, peacebuilding or reconstruction (as was the case of the operations in the 
Balkans) (Biava, 2011:46). She also finds that most operations are of a civilian or civil-military 
nature (Biava, 2011:46). Additionally, civilian missions tend to be of a monitoring nature or 
supporting local authorities. Operations of a military nature appear small in scale and brief; 
 142 
they are always based on explicit mandate and act as part of a broader operation sanctioned by 
the UN and in cooperation with other international organisations (either UN or NATO) (Biava, 
2011:46). 
Another important characteristic of EU operations is their level of adaptation on the 
field; the evolution of each situation is followed by a reconfiguration of the staff deployed on 
the field (ie. EUPM and EUFOR Althea) (Biava, 2011:47). It is interesting that CSDP missions 
are always followed up by another intervention or EU programme/initiative. This shows the 
long-term approach the EU takes on international operations and that the scope to its actions is 
not limited by ephemeral interests. It may also be considered a spark of a strategic culture, built 
on norm setting and value projecting rather than simple resolution and/or gain. On a military 
level, Biava (2011:47) posits that “this implies that an exit strategy is very often identified at 
the beginning”.  
Menon (2011:80) underlines another practical shortcoming of CSDP which became 
apparent in operations. The aforementioned lack of military assets is not attributed to under 
investment. It mainly concerns the fluid consistency of the military forces deployed on the 
ground as well as the gap in their organisation. He finds that the “deployable forces, cannot 
always work together effectively” (2011:80). This lack of continuity, as goes on to analyse, has 
been partially covered by the Lisbon Treaty through the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ 
mechanism. This can only go that far. The broader issue which is actually identified in this 
instance is the lack of a cohesive and comprehensive strategic framework, capable of 
organising and effectively allocating the existing forces. This would not only increase the EU’s 
speed of intervention when that is of the essence, but it would also provide a clear goal to 
command of the units. An overall grand strategy is of dire need and, apparently, would be of 
the utmost importance in the creation, classification and solidification of the EU as a normative 
actor and power.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has been proposing the creation of a new security 
paradigm essentially adapted to international crisis management; this initiative is only barely 
challenged by the larger Member States (although this as an argument has been questioned 
with reference to the crisis in Libya, see Howorth 2012). That framework includes both a 
military and a civilian component but is continuously moving beyond the constraints of its 
constituents and creating a new compound identity. The fact that the EEAS is composed of 
officials originating from three different institutions (the European Commission, the Council 
General Secretariat and the foreign ministries of the Member States), with potentially different 
mentalities and values, has made this a particularly challenging process to manage. 
  The purported ambitions of the EU that are visible within CSDP could be summarized 
as follows: a) to create an institutional framework which would strengthen the ability to 
intervene internationally in situations threatening international security and b) to endow the EU 
with the material assets for intervening through co-ordination of military and civilian 
capabilities. CSDP has generated significant activity in both fields (military and civilian) which 
varied in terms of size, autonomously (Artemis 2003, in DRC, EUFOR Chad) as well as with 
the support of NATO (Concordia in FYROM, Althea). The number of requests now received 
for EU interventions indicates the enhanced role the EU has developed as a substantial partner 
in international crisis management (Bickerton, 2011:5).  
Criticism concerning the role of Member States in the delineation of foreign policy 
(vertical coherence) and that of EU institutions (horizontal coherence) has been vigorous. The 
Union's ability to ensure post-conflict stabilization has been greatly hindered by shortcomings 
in resources, hesitation in implementation and bureaucratic rivalries. The result is absence of 
coherence in the EU's approach for managing post-conflict situations in a comprehensive 
fashion (Korski & Gowan, 2009). 
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While the focus of EU institutions has increasingly revolved around development and 
security policies particularly in the mutual challenges of insecurity and poverty, the lack of a 
comprehensive strategy leads to significant improvisation. On the one hand, the ad hoc replies 
to this commitment have resulted in the development of a particularly fragmented EU toolbox 
to deal with these challenges. On the other hand, this raises important questions regarding the 
choice of appropriate legal bases for the various policy initiatives that span the security-
development nexus. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty, by interlinking the CFSP and 
development cooperation both constitutionally and institutionally, creates significant 
opportunities that, combined with the necessary political will, allow the EU to move beyond 
its ad hoc approach. 
 Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS present significant 
potential in the formation of a holistic approach of external action. Currently EU operations 
have been limited in range and more focused on underlining the role of CSDP than overcoming 
problems on the field (i.e. DRC 2006). Further steps have to be taken for the alleviation of the 
existing lack of coordination among the various components of external action, especially in 
the area of capabilities and the clear determination of the long-term goals of the EU as an 
international actor. The EU failed to participate in significant international crises in the Middle 
East, the Caucasus and East Asia as well as to intervene on a number of cases (Darfur, DRC 
2008) thereby allowing for CSDP operations to have “come to serve as an alibi for a tendency 
to avoid broader international security responsibilities” (Menon, 2009:228; Bickerton, 
2010:217-218). Pivotal in this last point is the exploration of a coherent strategic vision which 
will allow the EU to establish an identity founded upon coordinated action. 
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Chapter 5  
Somalia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a historical overview of the main political changes in Somalia 
from the fall of the Barre regime (1991) and the first UN peacekeeping operation until the 
Somali Compact 2013. This overview will include the EU’s institutional engagement through 
contractual responsibilities with the African continent as a whole, particularly the Yaoundé 
association agreements (1963), the Lomé conventions (1975-1995), the Cotonou Agreement 
(200) and the JAES (2007). This will be followed by the tracing of the EU’s current links with 
the FGS, thus outlining the political elements of their relationship in normative terms. The 
EU’s military operations in Somalia (EUTM and EUNAVFOR) and its efforts in the Horn of 
Africa will be introduced briefly in this chapter to set up my argument for the empirical 
evidence which will be examined separately in the pursuant chapters given their increased 
weight in this research. This chapter will thus act as an illustration of  the normative background 
of the intent-principle element within my analysis (see section 3.3). It will also delineate the 
reasons why the selected frames are important in contextualising the engagement of the EU in 
Somalia as well as highlight the points that will be further elaborated in the subsequent chapters 
wherein the content and critical frame analysis will be presented.  
 
5.2 Historic overview of political changes in Somalia 
 Within this first section a historical overview of the domestic political scenery will be 
provided. Landmark political changes in the development of Somalia’s efforts to establish and 
reform its governmental structure will be highlighted within the framework of international 
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commitments more broadly and bilateral relations with the EU more specifically. The particular 
relations that derive from the operational involvement of the EU as well as the other 
international partners will be addressed in Chapter 6.  
 The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual background which highlights the 
nodal points in the evolution of Somalia within the scope of international intervention, both 
within a humanitarian-development aid context as well as a security context. This will allow 
the drawing of conclusions concerning the problematic areas within which the impact of the 
EU’s involvement in the country was reduced. In tracing the origins of the problematic 
interaction of the two continents but also the alignment of the EU’s involvement within 
Somalia, the final Chapter will identify the issues that underlay the connection between the 
purported intents of the EU in its military operations, the actions that it underwent to 
operationalise them as well as the impact it intended to achieve as opposed to the effect that it 
actually accomplished. This initial overview of contractual relations between the two 
continents as well as between the EU and Somalia more specifically will also set the foundation 
for the analysis of the critical frames selected within this thesis. In understanding the root of 
the issues that arose in Somalia, the critical frames will focus on the ways the latter were 
perceived by the EU and thus allow for the evaluation of the operationalisation it selected in 
order to address them. 
 
5.2.1 The fall of the Barre regime and UNOSOM 
The chain of events leading to the EU missions started in 1991, when Somali dictator 
Siad Barre was ousted by a coalition of northern and southern based clans. The power struggle 
between the clans began shortly after the coalition’s victory, leaving the country in a war 
between warlords. As a result of the struggle, Puntland and Somaliland declared their 
independence. Of course, their sovereignty was, however, not recognized internationally. 
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Somaliland has been recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia. The former dictator and 
his followers remained in the south part of the country until mid-1992. The fighting in the rest 
of the country resulted in the devastation of Mogadishu and the agricultural areas in the 
country. This resulted in massive famine where approximately 300.000 people died. Due to the 
famine, the UN organized the peacekeeping mission: United Nations Operation (UNOSOM I) 
in Somalia I. UNOSOM I’s mandate was limited to self-defence and it was disregarded by the 
opposing warlords. This resulted in United States intervening in December 1992 by launching 
operation Restore Hope. The operation resulted in the end of the famine and when the 
American troops withdrew, they were replaced by UN troops (United Nations Operation in 
Somalia, UNOSOM II). Some militias saw the UN operation as a threat to their power resulting 
in large numbers of casualties, both military and civilian. The UN forces withdrew in 1995 
without restoring rule of law. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was formed in 2004 
and has been the most recent attempt to restore the institution of the government in Somalia. 
Whether or not the intervention by Ethiopia in 2006, helped to give TFG support inside Somalia 
is debated. The African Union’s (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM) states that it did while 
other claims that TFG still struggle to gain popular support within the country (Oksamytna, 
2011: 4). The intervention helped in driving out the Islamic Court Union (ICU) which 
splintered into smaller groups shortly thereafter. Some more moderate joined the first fight 
against TFG but later settled a peace agreement to end the bloody dispute. Another more radical 
faction, called Al-Shabaab still fights the TFG. 
Following the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991 the country had remained without 
a legitimate government until the institution of the TFG in 2004. Since the 1977-78 Ogaden 
War, the Barre government had focused all its efforts in sustaining the regime, while utilising 
money from aid-agencies in order to make ends meet (Menkhaus 1997). The very small circle 
of ministers during the regime rotated on a regular basis to avoid the rise of the opposition, 
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while it simultaneously preserved the interests of the most powerful clans and their leaders 
through its devolved security sector (Laitin and Samatar 1986). According to Henze 
(1991:125), the strategic location of Somalia allowed it to collect such an amount from foreign 
aid during the Cold War that it made up 57% of the country’s GNP by 1987. The 
aforementioned systematic corruption of the state, together with the predatory behaviour of its 
security forces (Menkhaus, 2014:156) were complimented by a “baseless optimism” on behalf 
of the donors (Rawson 1993:115) which led to a vicious circle of funding with no impact. The 
foreign funds that were meant for institutional capacity building were instead diverted outside 
the country by political elites, especially those closely related to the clansmen and the president 
(Menkhaus 2014:156). As Menkhaus (2014:156-157) observes this type of dynamic still 
persists. Therefore, the current state of Somalia cannot be attributed to relatively recent 
phenomena such as warlordism, but it is deeply rooted in the evolution of the state for the past 
40 years. He goes even further on the matter of the political subculture that has appeared in 
noting: “To the extent that this behaviour has become the “new normal” in Somali politics, and 
deeply embedded in the shared norms of rival elites, it will be challenging to reverse.” 
(Menkhaus 2014:157).  
The issue, therefore, that is highlighted can be detected within the normative foundation 
of the state and even further the profusion of this type of behaviour as the standard modus 
operandi. Subsequently, one can argue that the most effective way to tackle such a deeply 
embedded subculture and provide a long-standing solution to the appearing problems can only 
be through the effective diffusion of an opposing (or at least more functional) set of normative 
standards. As will be further demonstrated in ensuing sections, this understanding has been the 
basis of the EU’s efforts in the country. In deploying two complementary military operations 
as well as supporting them with a broader regional civilian mission (EUCAP Nestor now 
renamed to EUCAP Somalia), the EU demonstrates its commitment to operationalising a 
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‘comprehensive approach’, tackling both short-term security challenges as well as long-term 
development ones. The latter speaks most to the NPE framework, given its reformative 
character stemming from the diffusion of norms (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, it is telling of 
the approach the EU is taking in its external action, seeing that it has been geared towards a 
coordinated and holistic manner in resolving challenges within its global actorness. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, this particular view is encapsulated and echoed within the 
establishment of the EEAS. 
 After the collapse of the regime an era of external efforts in state-building started. 
Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 794 in December 1992, the first peace keeping operation in 
Somalia – UNSOM – commenced as a response to the civil war and famine that ensued. The 
Resolution included a call for reconciliation for the revival of the state: “broad participation by 
all sectors of Somali Society (UN 1993), a task that was unprecedented (Clarke and Herbst 
1997). Following a failed attempt to state-building “bottom up” -which included the 
empowerment of local communities to select their own leaders- and a four-month battle 
between the UN and a local warlord -peaking with the “Black Hawk Down” incident- 
UNOSOM leadership decided to approach state-building in a “top down” fashion. This 
included a provision of power-sharing among the three dominant warlords of the country 
(Menkhaus 1994) which also failed and consequently, UNOSOM was withdrawn in 1995. 
 Despite the international community’s continuous efforts to build and sustain a new 
government, the southern and central regions continue to be the arenas of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency, leaving the communities unprotected and facing famine. In the absence of 
a central government, the regional states such as Puntland, the secessionist state of Somaliland 
as well as districts and municipalities became the focus of institution-building post 1995.  Since 
2001, the efforts for institution building in the eastern parts of the country – Horn of Africa 
were more targeted towards increasing the state’s capacity to counter security threats, 
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particularly those connected to al Qaeda and its affiliates (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee 2012, 
9-10). This new trajectory of ‘securitising’ the aid provided marks a shift from the previous 
“democratising” character of institution-building. In view of the rise of violent extremist 
movements, particularly the Somali based al-Shabaab, the process has been expedited (see 
Chapter 7). It has also broadened the type of donors and acting parties to include external 
militaries, UN peacekeeping operations and private defence contractors (Menkhaus 2014:158). 
The assistance in this direction which benefitted the entire eastern Horn of Africa region has 
also led to a shift in the provision of aid, henceforth emphasising security sector capacity 
building over human rights and accountability.  
 
5.2.2 The Transitional Federal Government and Garowe Process (2011)  
Although the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2004) made attempts to provide 
a new trajectory to Somalia’s domestic landscape which would advance from its previous 
dysfunctional character and allow the alleviation of the root causes for security concerns in the 
country, it has been accused on multiple occasions as perpetuating the aforementioned 
embedded corrupt practice (Hammond, 2013:184). The end of this period of transition 
commenced with what is known as the Garowe Process in 2011 when the representatives of 
the TFG, Puntland and Galmadug, together with a Sufi militia (Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a) 
aligned with the TFG decided to set the milestones out of the transition and decide upon the 
structure for the new government. This process was acknowledged as an effort to bring together 
actors beyond the TFG, therefore broadening the political process. Nevertheless, it was also 
criticised for the increased influence of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as well 
as other western donors (Hammond 2013:184). An interesting point of contention was raised 
concerning the power-sharing arrangement that was set up (with a provision to be abandoned 
once the post-transitional government was established). It essentially institutionalized 
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discrimination against Somalia’s smaller clans (Garrowe Principles 2011, para. 1.c and later 
reintroduced in Garrowe Principles II 2012, Section II para. 3.1.b) which were granted half the 
rights of those attributed to majority clans in the selection of member for the new government. 
When considering the efforts of the 1990’s in building the institutional layout of the 
periphery of the TFG, together with the discriminatory treatment of the smaller clans in the 
Garowe process, it is not difficult to foresee the perpetuation of tensions that would risk the 
unity of Somalia as well as the frail foundation for the establishment of a post-transitional 
government. Also taking into account the increased interest of the international community in 
“securitising” the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, particularly with the ongoing threat of al-
Shabaab, the interest shown by the international donors appears to depart from the 
humanitarian concern (which was initially put forwards as the driving force for providing aid) 
and lead to an area that would make them appear self-interested. What is interesting is that the 
trajectory of the conventional framework set up with Africa, more broadly, and Somalia more 
specifically demonstrates fluctuations in the way it represents the donors as well as the 
recipients of aid. The initially almost controlling, portrayal of the EU for example in its 
involvement in the region (described also as “mentoring” by Haastrup (2013)) is softened in 
the later texts that focus more on presenting the concerned parties as partners/equals.  
 
5.3 EU-Africa policy overview 
Within this section an overview of the most important policy landmarks between the 
EU and Africa will be provided. These initiatives demonstrate the evolution of the relations 
between the two continents as well as highlight the changes occurring within the areas of 
cooperation. Therefore, this section will serve as a broader foundation which will contextualise 
the analysis of the EU military operations in the following Chapter.  
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 The aim is therefore to demonstrate the nodal points in the relations between the two 
continents, both within a humanitarian-development aid context as well as a security context. 
This will allow conclusions to be drawn on the perception of challenges by the EU thus adding 
to the understanding of the operations it carried out (see Chapter 6). Adding to the previous 
section which presented the nodal political changes within Somalia, this section broadens the 
scope to incorporate the initiatives of the EU within the African region. Seeing that the majority 
of strategic documents concerning EU operational action are primarily on a continent-to-
continent basis, this section will highlight the particularities of the two parties’ relationship and 
the domestic political issues of Somalia within them. This will allow for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the foundation upon which the analysis of the critical frames within this thesis 
rests. In understanding the perception of challenges within Africa, the critical frames will allow 
the EU perceptions to emerge and thus enable the evaluation of the operationalisation it 
selected in order to address them. 
 
5.3.1 Yaoundé (1963) and Cotonou (2000) 
The institutionalisation of the relations between EU-Africa were achieved through a 
series of policy texts from the 1960s with the Yaoundé association agreements. The first 
association agreement was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon 1963 and subsequently renewed in 
1969 (Yaoundé II). In this first instance, focus was set on reciprocal trade, technical and 
economic assistance. The accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 led to a new single agreement 
with the additional former British colonies that led to the Lomé, Togo convention of 1975. The 
convention was subsequently renegotiated and entered into force in 1980 (Lomé II), 1985 
(Lomé III), 1990 (Lomé IV), and with each renegotiation new issues were introduced which 
was a sign of the gradual development of the relations. These innovative issues included: non-
reciprocal trade concessions (Lomé I); the globalization of EU-ACP cooperation (Lomé II); 
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economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as human dignity (Lomé III); and human rights, 
structural adjustment policy, economic diversification, intra-ACP regional cooperation, 
democratization and rule of law (Lomé IV).  
The Cotonou Agreement (CA) 2000 was signed to provide the basic framework on how 
to pursue future EU-Africa relations. It set the ground for a more focused process, the Cairo 
process, that culminated into the 2007 and 2014 Joint Africa-EU Strategies; the latter two were 
more purpose-driven strategies, aimed at addressing the most pertinent issues in the EU-Africa 
relations. The new strategic partnership is based on a “Euro-African consensus on values and 
common interests” and is aimed at bridging the development gap between the two continents. 
It is broader in scope than the original agreements, seeing that it retains the concept of 
partnership which, in the early 1970s, was considered innovative in the conduct of North-South 
relations (Farrell, 2005). This notion of partnership is still fundamental to Africa-EU relations 
and has in fact been given stronger emphasis.  
 
5.3.2 The Lisbon Strategy (2000) 
In the Lisbon Strategy (2000), each of the eight strategic partnerships is presented 
separate from the Declaration with a rationale linking it to the overall objectives of the Joint 
Strategy. The Joint Strategy proposes a series of new approaches in order to respond to the 
following challenges: to move away from a donor-based relation towards a political partnership 
of equals; to build on positive experiences and lessons learnt from past experiences; to move 
away from inherited negative stereotypes and instead promote more accurate images of each 
other; to promote a mutual social and cultural understanding between the peoples of two 
Continents. The Joint Strategy thus establishes a partnership between Africa and Europe, in 
which both parties commit themselves to address a series of objectives on strategic priorities 
to support African countries in their efforts to achieve all Millennium Development Goals by 
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2015, and in general to promote political, economic and social development and the inclusion 
of Africa in the world economy. The Cairo Africa-EU Summit (2000) emphasised mutual 
benefits and both sides’ determination to strengthen their political economic and cultural 
understanding of the other through the creation of a constructive dialogue on economic, 
political, social and development issues. Europeans by and large were putting the accent 
particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more and more on the trade and 
economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. This 
disconnection is particularly problematic and simultaneously interesting within a normative 
evaluation. On the one hand, it demonstrates the perception of the EU side oriented towards 
providing security and therefore gearing its attempts towards short-term solutions. In turn this 
indicated the lack of interest in addressing the root causes of the challenges the Union perceived 
within its role as an international actor. Furthermore, what is implied is a fragmented and 
interest-driven approach to the evolving partnership. Given the increased power of the Council 
in the delineation of ESDP (at the time), this interpretation becomes more prominent seeing 
that the influence of rotating presidencies at the time essentially defined security priorities 
within an intergovernmental context rather than EU priorities in a supranational one (see 
Chapter 4). It further underlines the priority set by the EU in securing the area so as not to be 
affected by the arising issues, rather than aiding in the alleviation of the problematic issues it 
identified for itself. On the other hand, within a normative understanding, what becomes 
apparent is the absence of a dynamic construction of ‘normative identity’. Echoing Kavalski 
(2013) and Diez (2005), this process is essential to the substantiation of normative power. 
Therefore, within this period of negotiation, the EU falls short in addressing the needs of the 
party it is meant to support, thereby inadequately transforming its core norms into effective 
action.  
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5.3.3 The Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JAES) (2007) 
The Lisbon Summit was the second EU-Africa summit held in 2007 which brought 
together the Heads of State and Government from the EU and Africa. At this Summit the JAES 
was adopted which was aimed at enhancing the already existing political dialogue in the 
following areas of partnership: Peace and security; Governance and human rights; Migration; 
energy and climate change; MDGs; Trade, infrastructures and development. To ensure a 
comprehensive implementation of the Joint Strategy and effective follow up mechanism, a first 
Action Plan was adopted. The dual concept of ‘one Africa and one Europe’ was the centrepiece 
of this strategy in that, for the first time, the EU wanted to “treat Africa as one” within a 
“continent-to-continent partnership” (JAES 2007, Section II para. 8) and act towards it in a 
more unified manner than before. But the EU also made it clear that the principal objective of 
its strategy towards Africa was to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (JAES 2007: 2, Section II, para. 8.ii). 
The determination of these central objectives highlights an intent to evolve the EU-
Africa relationship into a political partnership (see section 6.3.1) that goes beyond the issues 
that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and 
embraces a number of global concerns. Although this document will be examined in more 
detail in the following chapter, it is pertinent at this point to highlight two fundamental 
dynamics appearing within it that drive the current status of EU-Africa relations can be 
summarised as: deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world community. To that 
end, the two parties have identified ten key political challenges that need to be addressed in 
order to achieve and maintain a successful partnership (JAES 2007:3-4, Section III, para. 9): 
a) to move away from their traditional relationship (aid-development) and forge a real 
partnership characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives; b) to build on 
positive experiences and lessons learned from the past;  c) to promote more accurate images of 
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each other; d) to encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two 
continents; e) to recognize and fully support Africa’s efforts and leadership to create conducive 
conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation 
of partner-supported development programmes; f) to work together towards gradually adapting 
relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks; g) to ensure that bilateral relations, 
dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to 
the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy; h) to integrate in our agenda 
common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in 
multilateral context; i) to encourage the full integration of members of migrant 
communities/diasporas in their countries of residence; j) to bear in mind that we can only 
achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders.  
The Strategy for Africa (2005) is an interesting precursor upon which the JAES built 
and further elaborated upon, particularly with reference to issues such as ownership and 
partnership. Unilaterally formulated by the EU, this Strategy was received with scepticism and 
a great deal of criticism by key African players from its inception. Criticisms centred on the 
fact that the Africa Strategy had been developed without sufficient consultations and retained 
elements of a traditional, unilateral donor-client approach. It was also pointed out that the 
Strategy reflected a too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to 
forging African ownership. In ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’ initiative, 
adopted by the European Council in December 2005, the primary goals of the EU’s Africa 
strategy were the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of 
sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa. Regional integration 
introduced under the heading Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade 
is linked to the Economic Partnership Agreements, and to a whole array of objectives around 
the integration of Africa into the global economy, support for improved governance and for 
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compliance with EU rules and standards, aid for trade, and environment and climate policies. 
In this regard, the EU promoted African regional integration as a way to face the main problems 
affecting the African continent. According to the EU’s document, “The European 
Community’s Development Policy” (2000), regional integration and cooperation can both be 
considered instruments to tackle poverty and instability in developing countries, since they 
‘facilitate integration into the world economy, conflict resolution and resolution of cross border 
problems, for example in the field of environment.’. 
The Joint Strategy solidifies the relations between EU and Africa based on the principle 
of ‘a partnership of equals’. It contains several innovations. For the first time the EU treats 
Africa as a single entity, with the focus primarily on eight thematic partnerships that extend 
beyond the traditional spheres of aid and development (trade, regional integration and 
infrastructure, the MDGs) to peace and security, democratic governance and migrations. The 
comprehensive approach of the agendas includes issues such as energy, climate change along 
with science, information society and space. These partnerships are linked with periodic action 
Plans, with measurable actions and objectives to be taken jointly by the EU and Africa. These 
Plans provide for routine reviews at successive EU-Africa summits. In emphasizing this 
‘partnership of equals’, The Lisbon Declaration- EU Africa Summit (2007:2) states: “In 
recognition of our ambitions...we are resolved to build a new strategic partnership for the 
future, overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship and building on common values 
and goals in our pursuit of peace and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and 
development. We will develop this partnership of equals...”. What becomes apparent from this 
final quote is the recognition of previous shortcomings of the EU, particularly pertinent in a 
normative context. Initially what is recognised within this except is the implied confession on 
behalf of the EU that the previous relations with Africa were those of donor-recipient. To put 
it in terms of a ‘self-other’ conceptualisation, a potent donor-self and a weaker recipient-other 
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(Diez 2005:628-629). Echoing the contributions of Haastrup (2013) Rutazibwa (2010) with 
reference to the issues of EU (self)imaging and the Union acting as mentor (see Chapter 2), 
this statement is important through a normative lens.  
Within the vision of a ‘partnership of equals’ the need for more coordinated decisions, 
reflecting the needs of both parties in equal proportions is highlighted thereby demonstrating 
the EU’s commitment to carry out regular meetings to accomplish this. Additionally, given the 
extensively normative language related to the Union’s core values (“common values and 
goals”, “our pursuit of peace and stability”, “progress and development”, “democracy”) as well 
as more formal manifestations of its normative foundation (“rule of law”), the EU demonstrates 
an intent to engage in a process of normative diffusion. The extent to which this intent has been 
translated into action will be further examined in Chapter 6 within the context of the military 
operations in Somalia.   
 
5.4 The Somali Compact (2013) 
The New Deal compact in Somalia (16 November 2013) appears to revolve around 
international policy rhetoric around Somali ownership and leadership (see section 6.4.2). 
Although this marks a turn towards incorporating the equal view of all parties (which had 
previously been the core of criticism for all the international efforts), the distrust of Somalis 
among themselves as well as between them and the western parties, may prove to be a 
hindrance in the evolution of formal institutions and the promotion of legitimate politics in the 
country (Hearn and Zimmerman, 2014:2). Therefore, despite the pivotal role the Somali 
Compact is intended to have, the remnants of the past attempts to cooperate still could prove 
to be detrimental to its operationalisation. 
The FGS and the EU hosted a conference to endorse the New Deal Compact in Brussels 
on September 2013. The Compact foresaw “a new political, security and development 
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architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, its people, and the international 
community” (The Somali Compact, 2013:3). It was intended to align the international 
assistance to the country’s own national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, while 
preserving the principles of mutual accountability for the realisation on the commitments made 
from both parties. The nature of these commitments was influenced by two major shifts, one 
within Somalia and the other in the international development community. Internally, the 
newly elected President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2012, inspired optimism in Mogadishu 
as well as the donor countries about the prospects of peacebuilding (Hearn and Zimmerman, 
2014:3). The new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) pursued to take control over the 
country’s political and aid priorities so as to depart from the previously dominant supply-driven 
aid and humanitarian assistance. Before the Compact, the primary development framework in 
Somalia was the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) which, although well-
tailored to the financial needs of the country, did not provide enough scope for Somali 
ownership or donor coordination. The external environment was also conducive to the 
changing nature reflected in the Somali Compact. The need to invest in local confidence 
building was recognised in the 2011 “New Deal for the Engagement in Fragile States”. This 
set of principles agreed upon between OECD donors and the g7+ group provided the alignment 
of aid to country-led and country owned transitions out of fragility. 
The Compact consists of the five New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals 
(PSGs), and subsets of priorities per goal. The five PSGs are: (1) legitimate and inclusive 
politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services. The 
summer before the Brussels Conference, five corresponding PSG working groups were 
established, made up of representatives from the FGS, civil society, MPs, and donors. Each 
working group had one lead donor. The working groups produced the Compact within a limited 
timeframe, before the September Brussels Conference. What can be seen in the Compact (see 
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Chapter 6) is essentially the development of the foundation set within the JAES 2007. The goal 
of the incorporation of ‘non-state’ entities as well as the change of focus on a citizen-based 
concern for security, changed the focus of the needs within Somalia from broader 
state/developmental to more precise security on an individual basis. This is important when 
viewing this change through the scope of the critical frames. From the perspective of the 
comprehensive approach, this alteration called for the entirety of the spectrum of instruments 
at the disposal of the EU as well as the TFG and the AU. While the financial and developmental 
support could have been defined and operationalised through Summit meetings or institutional 
cooperation on a continent-to-continent level, the assurance of security for the citizens required 
the further development of the domestic structures of the Somali government. This in turn 
justifies retrospectively the turn in the EU’s operational stance in the country to incorporate 
training of the Somali National Forces through EUTM as well as its efforts to encourage 
democratic elections in 2016.  
From the perspective of effective multilateralism, the narrow scope of international 
organisations was expanded to incorporate ‘non-state’ actors in an attempt to head the needs 
of the population rather than those of the government. In turn this not only complicates the 
framework of interactions but also shows a shift of focus to the receptive side of the 
intervention. In including these parties within consultations, the multilateral efforts 
demonstrate a shift towards understanding the potential gap between the governmental 
shortcomings in efficiently transferring the benefits of multilateral involvement to the 
population. From a normative perspective, it shows commitment to the principles underlined 
within JAES as well as the alignment of those with the EU’s own normative foundations (JAES 
2007, Section 1 para. 1).8  
                                                 
8 JAES 2007:1, Section 1 para. 1: “Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a 
common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, 
justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the 
constitutive texts of our respective Unions” 
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5.5 Security and humanitarian aid: the role of the comprehensive approach  
The institutional provisions set up by the Lisbon Treaty have not only created potential 
for a more uniform and comprehensive response to crisis but have also allowed for the rise of 
problems in coordination and cooperation between and within the supranational and 
intergovernmental levels (see Chapter 4). This issue of coordination becomes particularly 
important when one of the main pillars of the EU’s external action is the comprehensive 
approach. Even more importantly it renders the work of the EEAS, whose staff combines the 
bureaucratic spirit of three different actors within the EU (Commission, Council and seconded 
diplomats of Member States), even more challenging especially when dealing with designing 
and implementing this approach within foreign and development policies. Although the 
provision of security and the short-term elements of the interventions taking place have to large 
extent been transferred to the competencies of the EEAS, the provision of aid still remains 
within the responsibility of DEVCO. In the case of Somalia this becomes a central issue 
concerning the gap between the initial intents of the operations carried out and the ultimate 
goals achieved. Although the mandate of EUNAVFOR is specifically targeted to the provision 
of security, the underlying normative justification concentrates of the provision of aid by the 
vessels which are being protected (see Chapters 6 and 7). Subsequently, the responsibility for 
the effective outcome of the combined initiatives cannot be decisively attributed to either one 
of the two actors involved, the EEAS and Commission. From a normative standpoint, the fact 
that the two form part of the same rhetoric promoted within a military mission demonstrates 
the existence of the comprehensive approach as well as the theoretical coexistence of normative 
power with the use of military means (see section 2.4.2). Nevertheless, the element of 
institutional incoherence and potential overlapping in the initiatives they undertake still 
remains an issue to be resolved, although does not concern the questions dealt with in this 
research.   
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A point that has been raised by academics with regards to the European humanitarian 
and development policies is an evolving tendency towards them being viewed complementarily 
to the provision of security (Furness and Gänzle 2012, Keukeleire & Raube 2013, Zwolski 
2012b). This issue becomes problematic when considering that the principles, objectives and 
modes of intervention of development policy and humanitarian aid are considerably different 
from those of foreign and security policies. The Conclusions of the Council identify this issue 
in the case of the ‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’ which only feature one out of 
five main areas of action linked to development, yet provide an overarching framework of 
foreign policy objectives for the region. According to Henökl et al (2014:527) the pivotal role 
to be played in operationalising the aforementioned incoherence, which could in fact prove to 
be highly problematic not only in its design but also in its intended impact, has been left to the 
EEAS and more specifically to the EUSR. It is this actor that is tasked to connect the security 
policy-oriented aspects with the more political work and then to DG DEVCO.  
Additionally, Menkhaus (2011:29) has identified five reasons for which the 
international community, including the EU, had a belated and ineffective humanitarian 
response to the famine: 1) the restrictions imposed by al-Shabaab on the access of donors to 
the stricken areas; 2) the US-led suspension of food aid to areas controlled by al-Shabaab; 3) 
chronic insecurity he dates back to 2009; 4)the corruption of TFG officials who diverted food 
aid and 5) what he calls the ‘privilege gap’ which existed between the groups in Somalia that 
had access to the food aid and lateral assistance and those that did not. What is interesting is 
the consistent pattern that appears in the underlying root causes of the aforementioned example. 
The assistance provided by the Western donors was not distributed equally to the areas in need 
nor were the particular obstacles on the ground taken into account. Furthermore, the more 
hidden issues of distrust to the government and the subsequent rise of extremist groups, in this 
case al-Shabaab, can be traced back to the Barre government of 1991. The TFG was Western-
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backed and thus the corrupt nature of its officials was also attributed to the humanitarian 
assistance coming from the international community. What becomes apparent from this is the 
need for a deeper understanding of the issues the international actors are trying to address. If 
only the symptoms are treated while neglecting the ideational root causes, the situations that 
arise will be perpetuated. It is due to this understanding that the EU has demonstrated an ability 
to formulate its long term ‘strategic’ external action based on the comprehensive approach. On 
this point Cordano (2015) contends that the strength of state institutions is identified as a 
weakness in Somalia and severely impedes the efficiency of the fight against al-Shabaab. As 
he goes further to explain, the “Somali armed forces have traditionally been an amalgamation 
of forces loyal to local clans and warlords” (Cordano, 2015:3). He accentuates the deeply 
embedded conservatism that feeds into the group’s resilience as well as its link to the growing 
Wahhabi preaching in Somalia, which is a stark contradiction to the predominantly Christian 
composition of AMISOM forces. He therefore underlines the importance of political and social 
considerations as imperative conditions for a comprehensive approach that would tackle the 
root causes of al-Shabaab, thus accomplishing a long-term and sustainable outcome. The 
element of Somalia’s international partners is identified as an inhibitory factor due to the high 
level of demonstrated dependence of the FGS not only in terms of security, but also economic 
and political. 
During the humanitarian response to the famine, the areas that were not under the 
control of al-Shabaab were protected by the TFG, AMISOM and the allied international forces. 
Nevertheless, the governmental entity that was recognised by the international community as 
legitimate consisted of politicians with independent military groups operating in small 
fiefdoms (Hënokl, 2014:532). What becomes therefore apparent is that the delivery of aid by 
the international humanitarian donors becomes a complex and dangerous venture given the 
numerous armed checkpoints for the payment of ‘fees’ (Menkhaus 2011). The challenge for 
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external actors, such as the EU, therefore becomes a politically complex framework of inter-
clan alliances, the international donors combined with the absence of an overarching polity. 
Henökl (2014:532) highlights the propensity of external actors to reduce the aforementioned 
complexity. In the case of the EU’s Draft Report on EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa 
(21012/2026(INI)), Somalia is divided in to ‘terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab’, pirates and 
‘the new government of Somalia’. Nevertheless, the latter is supported by and consists of 
several former Somali warlords and shady businessmen that maintain their private militias. 
This adds to the complexity of the several competing quasi-mini state administrations that are 
formed around clan identity, which is often overlooked or simplified by the EU within its 
policy. More importantly, the security concerns that arise from the multiplicity of conflicting 
interests can be misconstrued, thereby rendering the relevant policies ineffective. As mentioned 
above, the development and aid policies tend to be incorporated within security-centred 
contexts. Therefore, taking into account the misperceived homogeneous threats that can be 
confined into specified areas, the development goals are hard to achieve. Furthermore, the 
effect can then be traced and alter the long-term (or ‘strategic’) aims.  
From the above the need for coordinating international efforts (multilateralism 
appearing as the dominant frame in the 3124 FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, see Table 
6.3 and 7) and complementing them with actions that bear a long-term effect becomes apparent. 
Combatting the symptoms of deeply rooted pathologies without changing the normative 
underpinnings, underlines the need for a comprehensive approach that provides solutions for 
short-term as long-term results. Even more so, the fact that external actors such as the EU fail 
to understand and consequently provide for the complexities of the social fabric on the ground, 
indicates the need for input from the side of the recipient of the aid. In order to counter this 
element, the EU has focused on introducing and operationalising a binary of partnership-
ownership (see Chapter 6) which incorporates the host country’s point of view while 
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reaffirming its primacy in the way initiatives are conducted on the ground. In the case of 
Somalia, the fact that the EU has invested in the parallel and complementary military operations 
and civilian missions based on the principle of empowering the local and regional actors, 
demonstrates its commitment to attaining a sustainable result. Nevertheless, its indirect 
engagement also indicates a reluctance on behalf of the EU and the potential fear of 
responsibility, thereby detracting from it being considered as engaging essentially (see Chapter 
7). 
 
5.6 Contextualising effective multilateralism and the comprehensive approach: EU action 
in Somalia 
The sole employment of either ‘soft power’ or ‘hard power’ has been vigorously 
debated, as presented previously in Chapter 2. The common agreement appears to be that 
neither of them are sufficient on their own to address the complex security challenges of today’s 
world. While the EU is often criticised for resorting solely to ‘soft power’, it is now appearing 
to be able to exercise a hybrid. Through the Comprehensive Approach (2013), facilitated by 
the Lisbon treaty, the EU can now use the various means at its disposal in a joined-up manner. 
This means that diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, 
international cooperation and crisis management capabilities are all foreseen to be utilised in a 
complementary fashion that enables the EU to address the challenges at hand and resolve them 
with a long-term scope for their effects. While a military- ‘hard power’ response would be able 
to alleviate threats at hand immediately, it would only be considered effective in its tackling 
symptoms of deeply rooted problems. Given the highly complex situations the EU has to 
encounter, Somalia being a prime example, a more long-term plan is required in order to make 
sure that similar concerns will not arise in the future. In order to accomplish a sustainable long-
term effect, the EU in its military operations in Somalia has mandated a network of actors to 
 166 
address the root causes of the security threats that have arisen and required its involvement as 
part of it global scope of external action.  
With the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is still an integral part of CFSP, and “it shall provide the 
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets”. These assets are 
for missions outside the EU in view of “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security” (Treaty of the EU [TEU] art. 42). With regards to NATO, some military 
CSDP operations are planned and conducted with NATO assets. Other military missions have 
been autonomous and led from one of the EU operational headquarters (as has been the case 
for all operations in Africa). However, cooperation between EU and NATO is often very close 
on the ground, as EU civilian missions cooperate closely with NATO military operations in the 
same theatre. It should be noted that CSDP operations are increasingly working with the 
African Union, including its peacekeeping missions.  
The “comprehensive approach” was initially set out as part of the ESS in 2003 and 
subsequently operationalised through the aforementioned instruments. In essence, this 
approach implies a systematic use of all the EU instruments available from soft power 
(diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, development) to hard power (military) if necessary. This 
overarching strategic approach which was supported by the permanent EU institutions as well 
as the Member States, can tackle not only the short-term crises but also the underlying 
pathologies, thereby countering the causes of the security challenges simultaneously with the 
symptoms. This is considered to be the manner by which the EU is deemed to become an 
effective foreign policy actor. The best to date example of the EU’s comprehensive approach 
can be encountered in the way it has been addressing the situation in the Horn of Africa. The 
issues that have plagued the region are numerous as well as multifarious. They range from the 
effects of natural disasters, struggling with a failed state (Somalia) and smuggling (drugs, 
weapons and human trafficking) to contested borders, insurgency and piracy. In order to cope 
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with the situation and attempt to aid in the resolution of this complex situation, the EU has 
made use of the following tools that have been provided to it both by its institutional setup as 
well as by the Member States: 
1) Developing a strategic framework document for the Horn of Africa, describing the EU’s 
interests and objectives and the necessary actions to be taken; 
2) Appointing an EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, to assist in the 
coordination of the many strands of efforts; 
3) Embarking on EUNAVFOR Atalanta – the first EU naval maritime counter-piracy 
operation under CSDP, working closely with NATO and other naval forces in order to 
deter, prevent, capture and lead to the prosecution of pirates (comprises approximately 
of 1200 personnel from almost all EU MS, 4-7 surface combat vessels and 2-4 maritime 
patrol and reconnaissance aircrafts); 
4) Undertaking a military operation under CSDP to train Somali security forces in Uganda 
(EUTM Somalia) 
5) Deploying a civilian capacity building mission under CSDP to develop a regional 
maritime capacity (EUCAP Nestor) in Somali and the countries of the region so they 
can deal with the challenge of piracy themselves; 
6) Financing to fund the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM; 
7) Making available development funds, not least to improve security and democratic 
governance in Somalia, but also to assist the wider Horn of Africa countries; 
8) Providing humanitarian assistance to assist the people affected by the drought; 
9) Supporting the judiciary in various coastal states so they can assist with the prosecution 
and judgement of pirates; 
10) Undertaking various diplomatic initiatives, in close cooperation with international 
organisations such as the UN and the African Union including high level visits to 
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Somalia to support the transition and the organisation of international conferences in 
Europe. 
The naval component of the EU ‘s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU 
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy 
off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. It was at that time that the Council decided to launch 
its first naval military mission EU Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR). 
The mandate of this operation is based on the direct request by the TFG for support from the 
international community to deal with piracy. The objectives of the missions were thus 
determined as follows: a) the protection of vessels from the WFP delivering humanitarian food 
aid and further the protection of AMISOM shipping, b) the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of actors of piracy and armed robbery, c) the protection of vessels in danger cruising 
off the Somali coast and d) the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia (Council 
Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008). Therefore, the political objective of the 
operation was ‘to improve maritime security in the region’ while its military objective ‘to deter 
piracy and to strengthen the security of main maritime routes (Conseil 2008, 12-13).  
Parallel to the initiative on the naval front, the EU has also attempted to address the 
security concerns onshore and to improve the Somali Government’s effectiveness through 
EUTM. Since the beginning of the mission, the track record appears to be demonstrating a 
rather successful outcome. Many areas that had long been under the control of Al Shabaab, 
including the capital Mogadishu and the strategically import port of Kismayo, were regained 
under the control of the Somali Government. This was achieved mainly through the 
collaboration with AMISOM. EUTM Somalia was launched the 10th of April 2010, with the 
objective of training the Somali security forces. Together with Atalanta and the EUSR, EUTM 
is part of another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 FAC Conclusions 
2011: 8). 
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The Council Conclusions on Somalia (Luxembourg 20 October 2014) (Art. 5) reiterates 
the role and work undertaken by the EUTM Training Mission in Somalia: “which undertakes 
advisory, mentoring and training activities, with the aim to developing the Somali national 
Armed Forces’ structures and their training capacity in Somalia itself”. The subordinate role 
played the EUTM in this instance is emphasize, thereby seceding primacy and acknowledging 
the elements of local initiative. As the conclusions continue in Art 6 of the same document: 
“The EU reiterates its strong and urgent call on other partners to seriously contribute to the 
sustainable and predictable funding of AMISOM and the Somali security forces. It underlines 
the importance of the Federal Government taking on an increased responsibility and ownership 
of the security sector” and “that it is essential that military operations be followed immediately 
by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in the recovered areas and by 
the delivery of basic services, including security” as well as “ that these stabilisation efforts are 
an essential part of AMISOM’s eventual exit strategy” (Council Conclusions on Somalia, 
2014: Art. 6).  Therefore, the EU recognises the contribution of the partners, mostly that of the 
FGS, even though the EU self-identifies itself as having a leading role in the fight against piracy 
as well as its root causes. Additionally, the Council refers to its Chairing the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in 2014 while reinstating its commitment to 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta until the end of 2016. The comprehensive approach in this elaboration 
is completed by EUCAP Nestor, the Maritime Security Programme and the Critical Maritime 
Routes Programme. In the final articles of this document, an illustration of the different 
elements to the multifarious issue that is piracy in Somalia are referred to -drought, human 
trafficking, FGS corruption and accountability of government funding- which again are put 
under a context of securitisation and humanitarian crisis (see section 6.4.1.). 
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5.7 Conclusion: A Normative Evaluation 
The further involvement of the western parties in military operations, seemingly 
abandoning the role of “donor” and taking on that of “supporter”-“security provider” is 
interesting in the scope of normative interests. The fact that the issues in Somalia have drawn 
this much attention both by the UN as well as the EU, provide an initial point of departure in 
our understanding of the normative dynamics at play in the region as well as the country itself.  
As the following chapter will demonstrate, the military operations conducted by the 
EU, although military in essence, are heavily prescriptive in providing civilian support. The 
fact that this support is complemented by the presence of military capabilities is the reason why 
the argument of a holistic-normative actorness (see Chapter 2) is being put forth in the current 
research. The comprehensive approach as a framework is particularly enlightening in this 
aspect. Furthermore, the interrelation of civilian with military power elements and the way they 
have been operationalised, justifies the pertinence of the selected critical frames. 
With reference to effective multilateralism, the issue of locating the source of normative 
diffusion becomes more complicated. The following chapter dealing with the military 
operations separately will not only judge the actorness of the EU itself but will also take into 
consideration the broader framework of contributing actors in the area as well. This will not 
only permit the identification of the dynamic between the donors themselves, but also evaluate 
that between donors and recipients. Furthermore, the link (or invocation) of norms is important 
in this instance. A step further into the examination of normative dynamics will be taken with 
the use of the “partnership-ownership” binary. This will in turn focus predominantly on the 
donor/EU-recipient/Somalia dynamic, thus informing and complementing the understanding 
of the two other frames.  
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Chapter 6 
EU dimension: strategies and sub-strategies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In seeking to understand the catalytic role of the EEAS’ establishment in the evolution 
of the EU as a ‘normative power’ as well as the compatibility of military means within the NPE 
framework and, more broadly, with normative diffusion, this chapter concentrates on the 
illustration of the normative landscape upon which the military operations in Somalia – 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM- are carried out. It will therefore focus on the element of 
“intent” within the proposed framework of analysis (see section 3.3), thereby providing a 
backdrop to the examination of the elements of “action” and “impact” in Chapter 7. The 
presentation of the content analysis will be presented to illustrate the distribution of codes 
within the coded segments. This in turn will lead to the analysis from an NPE standpoint, 
highlighting the normative underpinnings of the strategic documents and sub-strategies through 
the operationalisation of the proposed frames - the comprehensive approach, effective 
multilateralism and the partnership-ownership binary.  
To provide a more comprehensive and detailed understanding of EUNAVFOR and 
EUTM’s normative importance in Chapter 7, the following structure will be followed 
throughout this Chapter. Initially the key EU strategic documents – ESS (2003), EUGS (2016) 
and their respective Implementation plans - will be presented in the light of the employed 
analytical apparatuses, thus providing a broader context to the EU’s actions within CSDP. This 
will illustrate a wider platform upon which the research questions are based, most importantly 
concerning how the EU has evolved as a normative power and whether the establishment of 
the EEAS can be considered a catalytic change to the Union’s actorness within a normative 
understanding. Building on previous discussions concerning the EEAS’ importance as well as 
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shortcomings (see Chapter 4), it will become apparent how the vision of the Lisbon Treaty is 
echoed by the intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The EUGS (2016) and its 
Implementation Plan will demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the EU’s normative 
basis with reference to the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution of the EEAS 
into a pivotal actor bearing most of this normative actorness. 
The EU sub-strategies – JAES (2007), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and 
the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa as well as the Comprehensive Approach (2013) 
(although not a strategic document per se it encompasses an equally broad spectrum and bears 
comparable impact on the operationalisation of EU initiatives) – will follow through a similar 
approach as the aforementioned category. As documents dealing with particular geographical 
regions and areas of action, this section will further narrow the focus of this analysis adding a 
second level of evaluation in normative terms. This will provide more specified insight into the 
employment of the critical frames and identify their pertinence within this thesis. Additionally, 
they provide a link between the broader EU intents in the area of CSDP and those expressly 
presented for Somalia (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, this section will demonstrate how the EU’s 
general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well 
as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime 
nature.  
To allow a more comprehensive account of the strategies’ and sub-strategies’ normative 
interpretation, factsheets, institutional reports and press releases will also be incorporated in 
the content and critical frame analyses (see Appendix 4 – Primary sources index). These will 
support the conclusions drawn with reference to the EU’s actorness. Departing from the 
formats of strategic and operational documents which are mostly formed by the Council, the 
frames will be identified in the rhetoric of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, amongst others, thereby also demonstrating the shared normative underpinnings 
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on an EU-wide level. Therefore, the actorness stemming from the use of the frames in this 
occasion is demonstrative of the EU’s normative nature as an actor in itself, rather than one 
that could be restricted to the EEAS. Additionally, for the purposes of thoroughness, 
supplementary coding concerning the EU’s global actorness (which is also added in Appendix 
3), reference to the EEAS and attribution of credit (described in Chapters 3 and 4) will be 
referred to, to highlight the nuances within the frames, most importantly the partnership-
ownership binary.  
 In bringing together the components outlined in the previous chapters, both of a 
theoretical as well as an empirical nature, the analysis of the coding conducted on the collected 
material will enable a nuanced analysis and discussion to emerge (both in this Chapter as well 
as more broadly in Chapter 8). Building on the basis of a normative understanding, the 
observations in the ensuing elaboration will demonstrate the evolution of the EU’s normative 
actorness through a structured analysis of the coded frames in accordance with the codebook 
(see Appendix 1). Within this process, the role of the EEAS will be identified, thus engaging 
with the argument put forth in this thesis concerning its catalytic role in the EU’s external 
action from an NPE point of view. Additionally, the compatibility of military means with 
normative diffusion will be addressed, thereby speaking to the main theoretical question 
underpinning this research.  
 
6.2 EU Strategies: setting the normative ground 
Within this section the coding of EU strategic documentation will be presented as well 
as the subsequent analysis which emerges from the employment of the critical frames. 
Following the discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the importance of the ESS in terms of its 
contribution to the structure of CSDP, this Chapter will focus on its conceptual impact which 
informed the launch of the EU’s military operations in Somalia, EUNAVFOR and EUTM (see 
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Chapter 7). This will be presented through the lens of the critical frames, highlighting their role 
in the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives. The shortcomings of the ESS (2003) will lead 
to its Implementation Report (2008) and ultimately to the most recent EU strategic document, 
the EUGS (2016), thereby showing how the Union responded to its previous critiques. 
Therefore, the strategic trajectory of the EU as an external actor will be accounted for both 
before and after the creation of the EEAS. With Manners’ (2013:316) forms of normative 
diffusion in mind, particularly ‘informational diffusion’ (see Textbox 1), the ESS and EUGS 
emerge as particularly important. Within this category Manners (2013) places strategic 
communications and explicitly refers to the ESS as important in promoting ideas, such as the 
‘complex causes’ of terrorism and this becomes more apparent, particularly within the 
presentation of the ESS Implementation Report (S407/08, 11 December 2008).   
Through the elaboration of this strategic trajectory, the development of the EU’s 
external action in normative terms will be demonstrated, thereby addressing the main research 
question. By identifying the changes within this process prompted by the EEAS’ establishment, 
what will also be indicated is its role in the overall evolution of the EU as a normative actor, 
thereby speaking to the second point of inquiry within this project. In order to inform the 
analysis of the critical frames, Council Conclusions and EU Parliament Reports, interim 
initiatives within CSDP (European Defence Action Plan – EDAP), progress reports and press 
releases will be included in the content analysis. Thus, a broader understanding of the EU’s 
intents will be set out, laying the ground for the ensuing presentation of the EU sub-strategies’ 
coding. 
6.2.1 The ESS (2003) and ESS Implementation Plan (2008)  
 In 2003 the EU set out its strategic vision in the ESS (2003), which it later refined with 
an Implementation Report (2008). Adapting to the complex nature of threats a comprehensive, 
all-encompassing approach which would employ the whole array of EU resources ranging from 
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diplomatic and trade to development and crisis management instruments (Quille 2010:56) was 
introduced. This ‘comprehensive security’ (Hynek, 2011: 82) bears several similarities to what 
later was named the ‘comprehensive approach’. Although the ESS remained the most complete 
attempt to formulate a comprehensive European foreign policy until the recent EUGS (2016), 
it remained an indication of a strategic approach which did not explicitly specify the importance 
of UN mandates nor did it require the existence of a mandate for military force deployment 
(Matlary, 2006:115). Therefore, it presented a broad level of guidance without an explicit or 
comprehensive series of positions on important issues including goals, practices and means. It 
introduced recommendations, therefore leaving implementation processes and measurement of 
success in a vacuum. Thus, at this stage, the ESS can only be seen as providing a guideline. 
Nevertheless, the main contributions of this document can be identified on two points. 
The first was introducing a nascent version of a ‘comprehensive’ approach to external action 
while the second concerned the ways with which it would cooperate with its international 
partners (ESS, 2003:11) in dealing with “complex problems” (ESS, 2003:1) and “global 
threats” (ESS, 2003:9). The ESS therefore referred to a notion of ‘comprehensive security’, 
underlining the direct connection between peace, development and political stability. It 
explicitly stressed the need for civilian and military instruments to be used together, promoting 
the development of “operations involving both military and civilian capabilities” (ESS, 
2003:13). This understanding was succinctly portrayed in the assertion that “Security is a 
precondition of development” (ESS, 2003:2). Therefore, although an explicit ‘comprehensive 
approach’ did not appear as such until 2013, elements of this concept were included in the ESS. 
This frame is particularly important in normative terms, as it foresees the employment of all 
the means at the EU’s disposal to tackle the challenges it would face. The emphasis of NPE on 
non-coercion – rather than non-coercive means - is the point which separates it conceptually 
from ‘civilian power’. Therefore, drawing on the critiques of normative power (Zwolski, 2012), 
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this thesis supports the notion that any means –including military- can be employed in 
normative diffusion, as long as they are not used in a forceful manner. It is within this 
conceptualisation that the ‘comprehensive approach’ becomes relevant to this research as a 
notion and illuminating as a critical frame. Following this logic, it is important to point out that 
even ten years prior to the Comprehensive Approach (COM, JOIN (2013) 30 final, 
11.12.2013), the idea of combining both military and civilian means in external action existed 
within the EU’s intents. What is also interesting is the fact that the element of coordination in 
the ESS was also related to the creation of horizontal coherence, both between institutions as 
well as their respective policy areas (ESS, 2003:11). The vision created by the Lisbon Treaty 
and reflected in the establishment of the EEAS was precisely to achieve this continuity in terms 
of cohesion internally as well as complementarity externally (see Chapter 4).  Therefore, a 
continuum of intent can be identified, culminating in the establishment of the EEAS 
institutionally and the Comprehensive Approach conventionally.  
 
Chart 6.1 European Security Strategy (ESS): Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
 
*% of the coded segments 
 
Therefore, it is no coincidence that the content analysis of the ESS illustrates the 
dominance of effective multilateralism (51.9%) followed by an implied reference to a 
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comprehensive approach (29.6%) (Chart 6.1). The codification of the latter as ‘implied’ is 
because the term itself is not used within the document, but the elements of the concept are 
present.  
In the delineation of specific strategic provisions, the ESS lacked focus both on 
geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement, namely maritime. Even though 
concerns in some neighbouring regions (Middle East, Balkans) as well as other locations 
(Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula) were raised, the eastern and 
southern neighbourhood, Central Asia, the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa were not explicitly 
provided for despite their importance with relation to the EU’s international role. Furthermore, 
growing concern in the area of maritime piracy was also identified as a “new dimension to 
organised crime which will merit further attention” (ESS, 2003:5). Until the EU Maritime 
Security Strategy (EUMSS, 2014), no comprehensive strategic provisions were made in this 
domain. Although this threat was highly visible in certain geographic areas (i.e. Horn of 
Africa), it raised global concerns, thus demanding coordinated efforts on the same scale. An 
opportunity to address this issue appropriately appeared through the Lisbon Treaty’s provision 
for multilateralism and more specifically as supporting the UN, especially in scenarios 
considered to involve the responsibility to protect.  
From this, the pertinence of the comprehensive approach as a critical frame becomes 
apparent. The ESS, as a first step in the conventional organisation of this concept, introduces 
the combination of military and civilian means as the way forward in CSDP. Furthermore, the 
ESS highlights a parallel between internal and external security. The notion of interconnectivity 
between these two elements is pivotal within the Comprehensive Approach (2013) as well as 
the relevant Action Plan (2015). Additionally, emphasis is put on the centrality of 
multilateralism in the effective operationalisation of the concept. This element is further 
expanded within the sub-strategies focusing on geographic areas (Horn of Africa, 2011) as well 
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as areas of operational engagement (EU Maritime Security Strategy, 2014). Therefore, post-
EEAS, the EU’s effort to compensate for the shortcomings of the ESS is more visible, thereby 
further illustrating the argument set forth in this thesis concerning the catalytic role of the 
EEAS’ establishment in the EU’s normative actorness. Following from the above, the creation 
of the EEAS appeared to be the institutional attempt to coordinate action taken within the 
internal-external security nexus as well as that relating to internal coherence. Although that 
may have been the vision of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and ensuing Council Decision 
establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU), the case of its effective function is a debatable issue, 
both internally as well as externally (see section 4.5) .  
The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 11 December 2008) adds some 
new security challenges, beyond traditional threats, related to climate change, information 
systems and energy resources (ESS Implementation Report, 2008: 1). It also expands on the 
security-development nexus particularly with reference to terrorism and non-proliferation.  
Furthermore, it explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on the EU “security through 
crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 2008:1) 
thereby clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related to 
maritime security. Within the aforementioned phrase, the case of Somalia is essentially 
illustrated. What makes this reference to Somalia even more interesting is the fact that the EU’s 
first maritime operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10 
November 2008), was launched a month before the publication of the Implementation Report. 
Therefore, the importance of the case itself, is raised to a level of strategic importance through 
its incorporation in this document. Additionally, the link presented between state failure and 
criminal behaviour, underlines the interconnected nature of deeply rooted causes with arising 
security threats, and it is this issue which lies at the crux of the Somalian situation.  
 179 
What the Implementation Report contributes to this discussion is the interest of the EU 
to address both levels of the problem. When seen within the context of the ESS’ call for a 
comprehensive approach, one cannot fail to notice the similarities with the current operational 
setting in Somalia, whereby the military initiatives (EUNAVFOR and EUTM) are 
complemented by civilian missions (EUCAP Somalia) in an effort to accomplish both short 
term (security focused) as well as long-term (developmental) results. Further to the elaboration 
on the security-development nexus in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2), the normative underpinnings 
of this conceptualisation emerge. The ESS and its Implementation Report would clearly fall 
under Manners’ (2013:316) ‘informational diffusion’ (see Textbox 1), but the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, engagement and support related to the long-term goals would also 
relate to ‘transference diffusion’ within the framework of NPE. Therefore, the contribution of 
the Implementation Report is not restricted merely to covering the gaps left by the ESS, but 
also compliments its normative significance through the expansion of the EU’s aims as well as 
the links it introduces between them.  
 
Table 6.1 ESS - ESS Implementation Report: Content Analysis Comparative Distribution(%)  
*% of the coded segments 
  European Security Strategy 
(ESS): A Secure Europe in a 
Better World (12/12/2003) 
ESS Implementation Report 
(11/12/2008)  
comprehensive approach\CA implied 29.6 27.3 
comprehensive approach\CA explicit 0 4.5 
comprehensive approach\ TOTAL 29.6 31.8 
effective multilateralism\Multilateralism 
implied 
51.9 38.6 
effective multilateralism\Multilateralism 
explicit 
3.7 6.8 
effective multilateralism\ TOTAL 55.6 45.4 
partnership-ownership\Ownership implied 0 0 
partnership-ownership\Partnership implied 0 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit Ownership 0 2.3 
partnership-ownership\Explicit partnership 14.8 20.5 
partnership-ownership\ TOTAL 14.8 22.8 
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As demonstrated in Table 6.1 the frame of ‘effective multilateralism’ is dominant in 
both the ESS (51.9% implied, 3.7% explicit) and its Implementation Report (38.6% implied, 
6.8% explicit). Interestingly, in both documents the prevalent category is ‘implied 
multilateralism’. This denotes the fact that the term ‘multilateralism’ is not mentioned 
explicitly in the coded segments but rather the concept of it is presented. With due 
consideration of the ESS’ shortcomings, the Implementation Report explicitly addressed the 
need to “strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern 
neighbourhood” and added that “the EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the 
UN” (ESS Implementation Report: 4). Within the Implementation Report the pivotal role of 
regional actors is underlined while the EU is appointed a leading role in “a renewal of the 
multilateral order”, “working with the United States” and its “partners around the world” whilst 
recognising the position of the UN “at the apex of the international system” (Implementation 
Report, 2008:2). Furthermore, the need to deepen the “strategic partnership for better co-
operation in crisis management” between EU and NATO is underlined.  
These statements echo NPE on multiple levels and provide interesting insight not only 
to the EU’s identity but also how it is reflected within its action. Particularly with reference to 
‘procedural diffusion’ (see Textbox 1) which relies on mechanisms such as partnership and 
cooperation, the links to normative power are apparent. Additionally, this form foresees the use 
of possible prestige and status of associating with the EU and other international organisations 
as further apparatuses falling within it. Therefore, the importance of multilateralism and its 
employment within this document increases the pertinence of a normative evaluation, 
particularly seeing that it is combined with the denunciation of coercion: “It is important that 
countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and 
commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
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integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes  are not negotiable. Threat or use of 
military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere.” (Implementation 
Report, 2008: 2, emphasis added). The element of coercion is pivotal in the understanding of 
normative power (see section 2.4.2). It is not only a cornerstone of NPE but also relates to the 
discussion concerning the compatibility of military means for its operationalisation. Direct 
reference to the centrality of the normative element further enhances the presence of this 
approach in the analysis of the ESS as well as the Implementation Report: “The European 
Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it 
established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based 
on our core values.” (Implementation Report, 2008:2).  
 
Chart 6.2 ESS Implementation Report (2008): Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
*% of the coded segments 
 
When examining the Implementation Report, the frame of ‘partnership’ is also more 
visible (20.5% explicit partnership, 2.3% explicit ownership) (Chart 6.2) as opposed to the ESS 
(14.8% explicit partnership) (Chart 6.1). Initially, what is striking is the fact that the frame of 
‘ownership’ is included within the former and, even more so, explicitly. It appears under title 
II ‘Building Stability in Europe and Beyond’ and states that the EU’s security efforts beyond 
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its immediate neighbourhood “will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support 
from neighbouring countries” (Implementation Report, 2008: 7). This statement is interesting 
on two accounts. Firstly, the EU’s intent to expand its involvement further than regions in its 
immediate proximity is explicitly stipulated, thereby demonstrating its self-perception as a 
global actor rather than a regional one. This is also demonstrated in the supplementary coding 
(Appendix 3), which indicate a 6% recurrence of global actorness as a theme amongst the coded 
segments. Secondly, the fact that it underlines ‘ownership’ is telling of the way with which it 
sees itself in relation to the ‘other’, thus speaking to Diez’ (2005) argument regarding the 
formative affect of rhetoric on the EU’s identity construction (see section 2.6). 
 To establish the continuity on a strategic level between the Implementation Report 
(2008) and the EUGS (2016), three supplementary documents have been coded to demonstrate 
the evolution of the frames: the 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on common 
security and defence policy (FAC) (Brussels, 23 July 2012), the Interim Report by the HR: 
Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence (Brussels, 24 July 
2013) and the European Parliament Report on the EU in a changing global environment-a more 
connected, contested and complex world (EUPR)(A8-0069/2016, 29.3.2016). These 
documents have been selected on the grounds that they comprehensively encapsulate the 
concerns and views of the EU’s institutional framework on CSDP, whilst representing both its 
intergovernmental and supranational facets. This is particularly important in illustrating the 
level of internal EU convergence of CSDP priorities, particularly in a post-Lisbon Treaty 
context. Furthermore, the report of the HR/VP under her newly-allocated double-hatted 
position is crucial in understanding the orientation of the EEAS in its initial stages. Table 6.2 
presents the percentage of coded segments covered by each frame within each document.  
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Table 6.2 EU Strategies – supplementary documents: Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
  3183rd Foreign 
Affairs Council 
conclusions on 
CSDP, 23 July 2012 
Interim Report by the HR, 
"Preparing the December 
2013 European Council on 
Security and Defence", 24 
July 2013 
EU Parliament Report, 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, A8-0069/2016, 
29.3.2016 
comprehensive approach\CA implied 33.33 22.58 14.29 
comprehensive approach\CA explicit 11.11 19.35 16.67 
comprehensive approach \TOTAL 44.44 41.93 30.96 
effective multilateralism\Multilateralism implied 44.44 35.48 35.71 
effective multilateralism\Multilateralism explicit 0 0 2.38 
effective multilateralism \TOTAL 44.44 35.48 38.09 
partnership-ownership\Ownership implied 0 0 0 
partnership-ownership\Partnership implied 0 0 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit Ownership 0 6.45 9.52 
partnership-ownership\Explicit partnership 11.11 16.13 21.43 
partnership-ownership \TOTAL 11.11 22.58 30.95 
*% of the coded segments 
 
 From an overview of the percentages (Table 6.2), what becomes visible is a relatively 
stable presence of the comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism overall through 
time. Conversely, the partnership-ownership binary demonstrates a consistent increase, almost 
tripling between the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions (2012) and the EU Parliament Report 
(2016). With the increasing employment of this frame between the ESS (2003) (Chart 6.1) and 
its Implementation Report (2008) (Chart 6.2), but also the significant rise in its appearance 
within the EUGS (2016) (Chart 6.3), a pattern seems to emerge with reference to its 
importance. When looking into the co-occurrence of the frames, a more detailed account 
emerges, particularly with reference to partnership and its use with effective multilateralism 
(Table 6.3). What this demonstrates about the use of these frames within the strategic 
documents, is the reliance of the EU on the concept of partnership in its international 
cooperation. Echoing Diez (2005), this is indicative of the EU’s perception of ‘self’ as well as 
the ‘other’, thereby indicating its commitment to mutual collaboration rather than imposition 
of its self-serving intents. 
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Table 6.3 ESS and Implementation Report, EUGS and Implementation Report: co-occurrence of 
partnership with multilateralism (number of coded segments) 
Code System Multilateralism 
implied 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
Ownership 
implied 
Partnership 
implied 
Explicit 
Ownership 
Explicit 
partnership 
Multilateralism 
implied 
0 1 0 0 0 14 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
1 0 0 0 0 2 
Ownership implied 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Partnership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Explicit Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Explicit 
partnership 
14 2 0 0 0 0 
 
 Furthermore, the comprehensive approach demonstrates a decrease in its use between 
2012 and 2016 whilst it continued to drop even further within the EUGS (2016). Nevertheless, 
within the three documents, it is particularly telling in terms of the connection between the 
EU’s intents and how they are reflected within operations, the role of the EEAS as well as the 
normative underpinnings of this frame within the context of the military operations in Somalia.   
Through the lens of the comprehensive approach, the three documents demonstrate a 
common focus on the coherence of the ‘internal-external’ security nexus. In 2010, the EU 
adopted the Internal Security Strategy (Council, 6870/10, Brussels, 25 February 2010), 
identifying threats and defining internal security policies as well as instruments to address 
them. In addition to external and internal security strategies, the EU has also adopted policy-
specific strategies, including fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Both the internal and the external security strategies promote a 
comprehensive approach to security, putting strong emphasis on horizontal coherence 
(Zwolski, 2012:994).  
Within this theme the HR Interim Report states: “The Union must be able to protect its 
interests by contributing to international security, help resolving crises and projecting power. 
The EU’s call for an international order based on the rule of law needs to be backed up by 
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credible civilian and military capabilities of the right type, when required” (HR Interim Report, 
2013: 2, emphasis added). As outlined by Manners (2008:46) this statement encapsulates 
elements of normative significance seeing that the normative principles promoted by the EU, 
in this case the rule of law, are generally acknowledged as universally acceptable, thus 
acquiring increased significance. Therefore, the need for their examination is reinforced in 
order to avoid following common critiques concerning the EU as an actor promoting cultural 
imperialism (see section 2.5.1). Not only does the EU reaffirm its commitment to its core values 
– the rule of law, but it also underlines the need for the development of means, both of civilian 
as well as a military nature, required to support its intents. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the 
employment of military means does not exclude the existence of normative power, as long as 
they are not used in a coercive manner (Cooper 2003). Through symbolic manifestation, their 
presence can actually facilitate the process of normative diffusion, thus reinforcing Manners’ 
(2006) argument concerning symbolic manifestation (see section 2.4). On this point, the 
projection of power highlighted in this statement bears particular normative importance. This 
is because the shift from capabilities to the image of the EU, in NPE terms, indicates that the 
focus in external action may pivot away from ‘procedural diffusion’ seen in the ESS and leans 
towards ‘overt diffusion’ (see Textbox 1). This change is amplified and transformed within the 
EUGS (2016) under the guise of autonomy. With symbolic manifestation (see Chapter 2) in 
mind, the emphasis on presence hints to the need for recognition. This is also significant within 
a normative understanding, especially with reference to the dynamic diffusion of normative 
power (Kavalski, 2013). This thesis therefore argues that it becomes more pertinent when 
explored through the lens of identity where the recognition as a ‘normative power’ is an 
essential element of being one. 
Building on this, when examined within the frame of the comprehensive approach, 
additional themes concerning the impact of CSDP missions and the importance of strategic 
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coordination emerge. The Council underlines the significance of operational engagement as a 
“tangible expression of the EU’s commitment to promote and preserve peace and stability” 
(FAC Conclusions, 2012:1). It emphasises amongst others the role of the HR in “mobilising 
the different tools at the EU’s disposal….in close cooperation with other international actors” 
(FAC Conclusions, 2012:2) whilst welcoming the “activation of the EU Operations Centre in 
support of the CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa, namely Operation Atalanta, 
EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor, with a view to increasing efficiency, coherence and 
synergies” (FAC Conclusions, 2012:2). On this matter, the HR in her Report reiterates the need 
for a more strategic approach to maritime security and adds that the EU can “build on the 
successes of EUNAVFOR Atalanta” (HR Interim Report, 2013:7) amongst other initiatives.  
The aforementioned summarize the pivotal role of the HR and the EEAS within the 
normative context supported in this thesis but also justify the choice of the military operations 
in Somalia as a case study in this research. On an identity level, the actorness of the EU –
operational engagement- is hereby presented as proof of the EU’s dedication to supporting its 
core norms – peace and stability. Given the normative importance of the comprehensive 
approach as a concept, the role of the HR and the EEAS are recognised as the main actors 
responsible for its achievement. Additionally, the combination of initiatives carried out in 
Somalia under the coordination of the EU Operations Centre (which is part of the EEAS) is 
presented as a positive move towards the achievement of the EU’s ambition in the area of 
operations. Therefore, what is indicated from the above is the pertinence of the military 
operations in Somalia for the examination of the EU’s actorness within a normative power 
context. 
 Within the frame of effective multilateralism, the three documents demonstrate several 
elements which go beyond the previous illustration of the frame in the ESS and its 
Implementation Report. Most obviously, the EEAS is referred to on many occasions 
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particularly with reference to “inclusive multilateral diplomacy” in initiatives “both in the 
neighbourhood and globally” and “positive synergies…between increasingly interlinked 
external action policies and internal policies at EU level” (EU Parliament Report, 2016: 10). 
The Service is therefore recognised as a reference point of coherence within the EU as well as 
between its internal and external security, thus referring to the EEAS’ within the context of the 
comprehensive approach. Within the common segments between ‘effective multilateralism’ 
and ‘partnership-ownership’, the texts underline once more the importance of the EU’s 
partnership with the UN and NATO, whilst adding the AU (FAC Conclusions 2012:3, HR 
Interim Report 2013:2). This therefore demonstrates the new commitment of the Union in 
creating tighter bonds with the African continent, thereby also recognising the change from the 
donor-recipient relations that characterised their interactions previously (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
Additionally, the frame of multilateralism is directly linked to the normative foundation 
of the EU. The EU Parliament Report (2016) is particularly explicit on this link when stating 
that the aim of an efficient multilateral governance should be “strengthening democracy, good 
governance, the rule of law and human rights” (EU Parliament Report, 2016:10) while 
safeguarding “the EU’s values and societal model” (EU Parliament Report, 2016:5) parallel to 
reiterating its role as a global actor. This final point becomes one of the focal elements of the 
EUGS, as demonstrated in the following section. Additionally, the HR Report (2013:2) 
includes the need for civilian as well as military means –thereby implying the comprehensive 
approach- to be employed for the EU’s “call for an international order based on the rule of law” 
(HR Report, 2013:2). Subsequently, what becomes apparent, is the consistent promotion of the 
Union’s normative foundation within CSDP, thereby also indicating its prominence in the way 
it perceives itself within external action.  
 By repeating its vision of becoming a global actor based on the comprehensive use of 
its means in order to achieve normative goals, the EU demonstrates a consistent intent of 
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promoting its normative identity and incorporating elements of it within its strategic 
documentation. This trajectory begins before the Lisbon Treaty within the ESS and is further 
refined and emphasised by the Implementation Report as well as its initiatives in the area of 
CSDP leading to the EUGS. Although the basis of its promoted multilateralism remains 
relatively unchanged, in the period following the establishment of the EEAS new partners have 
been added to the cornerstones of its strategic endeavours – the UN and NATO. Focus is clearly 
shifting towards an EU global actorness while regions relatively neglected within the ESS - 
predominantly in Africa – are brought to the fore. The evolution of the EU’s normative intents, 
culminating in its aim of becoming more autonomous as an international actor, while 
simultaneously maintaining its commitment to effective multilateralism, are also demonstrated 
by the EUGS. 
 
6.2.2 The European Union Global Strategy (2016) and Implementation Plan (2016) 
The EUGS explicitly sets out a new trajectory for the EU as a global presence in the 
area of external action. With the majority of its action officially organised under the remit of 
the EEAS, it sets a very particular set of goals which demonstrate a new direction, separate 
from that of a conventional civilian actor and point towards what is argued in this thesis as a 
normative actorness. Echoing the contributions of Stivachtis (2007) and Sjursen (2006), the 
explicit reference to the values and principles (particularly democracy and good governance) 
of the EU as well as its commitment to international law (particularly international 
humanitarian and human rights law) in both the EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan 
further support the relevance of NPE as well as the pertinence of normative power in the 
examination of external action (see section 2.4.2).  
From the outset of the document, the HR puts an emphasis on what she calls the EU’s 
“principles”, “interests” and “priorities” (EUGS 2016:3). Importance is set on the “diplomatic 
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network” of the EU (EUGS 2016:4) and the role undertaken by the EU in the areas of the 
finance and trading primarily, but also within a context of responsibility in the world as a whole. 
The latter point become more visible in the supplementary coding of ‘global actorness’, 
indicating a recurrence of  five time over 56 pages (see Appendix 3). What is further stressed 
is the “major role, including as a security provider” and the importance of partnerships as the 
aims of the Global Strategy. A broader meaning is attributed to the term “Global” which 
transcends the geographical sense and includes the “the wide array of policies and instruments” 
promoted in the Strategy (EUGS 2016:4). What this actually refers to, is the importance of 
effective multilateralism which is identified as a cornerstone of the EU’s actorness throughout 
its strategic documents. The EUGS further explicitly demonstrates the importance of norms 
within its provisions, consistently promoting a “rules-based global order with multilateralism 
as its key principle” (EUGS 2016: 8) as a priority. 
In the document’s foreword, the HR stresses the EU’s intent to separate itself from the 
‘civilian power’ it is commonly related with. She more explicitly expands upon this comment 
by underlining the importance of the military operations parallel to the civilian missions while 
underlining the benefit of both to the EU’s “own security” and its “partners’” (EUGS 2016:4). 
In the scope of normative power, this statement is crucial. The main argument of this thesis 
concerns the potential of normative power coexisting with the use of military means as well as 
the identity it constructs which makes it separate from that of a ‘civilian power’. This intent 
which, in this thesis, has been seen to be evolving in the military operations in Somalia, now 
becomes an explicitly stated direction the EU is operationalising through the Global Strategy.  
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Chart 6.3 A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) (2016) 
 
*% of the coded segments 
 
Expanding on this, the comprehensive approach as a critical frame also becomes 
prominent in this document (33% implied, 4.2% explicit, Chart 6.3) because the combination 
of civilian as well as military means are once again referred to within the context of an effective 
EU actorness. The competencies to align the two now lie within the remit of the EEAS, given 
that the relevant instruments which are tasked with the formulation of the strategic planning of 
CSDP -mainly PSC, EUMS and CPCC and CMPD- changed after the Lisbon Treaty (2007) 
(see Chapter 4). When seen in conjunction with the vague long-term goals set by the ESS, the 
EUGS provides a more concrete framework within which the aims of external action are 
promoted, geared towards an explicit operationalisation of the comprehensive approach while 
utilising international partners under the oversight of the EEAS.  
With reference to this frame the EUGS makes another interesting conceptual 
contribution by including a commitment to expanding “the meaning and scope of the 
‘comprehensive approach’” (EUGS 2016:10). According to the document, what will be 
included is the involvement of the EU in a manner that prevents conflict, investing in 
stabilisation while remaining focused on assuring a long-term resolution. This expansion will 
 191 
again be supported by effective multilateralism and “deep and durable regional and 
international partnerships” (EUGS  2016:10). The Implementation Plan (2016) further details 
the steps that have to be taken both in aligning the civilian and military tools within CSDP as 
well as the need to provide assistance to strengthen the EU’s partners in order to overcome 
“hybrid threats” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:3). Therefore, a link is provided between the 
comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and partnership, thus underlining the 
centrality of the frames in the operationalisation of the EU’s external action. The pertinence of 
this link is also important in normative terms given the explicit reference to values within the 
EUGS (2016:14): ““Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting 
our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our 
interests.” This speaks to Tocci’s (2008) definition of normative power as one incorporating 
the elements of intent, action and impact, thereby also reinforcing the relevance of the 
analytical framework of this thesis.   
 
Table 6.4 From ESS to EUGS Implementation Plan: Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
  European 
Security Strategy 
(ESS): A Secure 
Europe in a 
Better World 
(12/12/2003) 
Implementation of 
ESS (11/12/2008)  
A Global Strategy for 
the European Union's 
Foreign And Security 
Policy (EUGS) 
(6/2016) 
EUGS Implementation 
plan (14/11/2016) 
comprehensive approach\CA 
implied 
28.6 27.3 33.3 32.8 
comprehensive approach\CA 
explicit 
0 4.5 4.2 0 
comprehensive approach\TOTAL 28.6 31.8 37.5 32.8 
effective multilateralism 
\Multilateralism implied 
51.9 38.6 29.2 15.5 
effective multilateralism 
\Multilateralism explicit 
3.7 6.8 16.7 3.4 
effective multilateralism\TOTAL 55.6 45.4 45.9 18.9 
partnership-ownership 
\Ownership implied 
0 0 0 0 
partnership-ownership 
\Partnership implied 
0 0 0 1.7 
partnership-ownership \Explicit 
Ownership 
0 2.3 0 0 
partnership-ownership \Explicit 
partnership 
14.8 20.5 16.7 46.6 
partnership-ownership \TOTAL 14.8 22.8 16.7 48.3 
*% of the coded segments 
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Unlike the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008), the EUGS (2016) 
demonstrates a more balanced employment of the critical frames (Chart 6.3). The 
comprehensive approach (33% implied, 4.2% explicit) together with effective multilateralism 
(29.2% implied, 16.7% explicit) still comprise the majority of the coded segments. 
Nevertheless, they are not disproportionately overwhelming. When looking at the number of 
occurrences though, this impression changes. The comparative table is quite helpful on this 
point (Table 6.4). Although the frequency of the partnership-ownership frame usage is identical 
in the ESS and EUGS documents (4 times), in the context of the texts’ sizes (ESS 14 pages, 
EUGS 57 pages) it becomes apparent that this frame has been underemployed. In terms of 
content, the EUGS attributes similar importance to the EU’s ‘partnership’ with NATO as the 
ESS (“We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO”, EUGS, 
2016: 7) while most references are directed towards the EU’s global actorness. On these 
occasions, the document states that the “EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but 
responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external 
partnerships” (EUGS, 2016: 11) and that it “will engage in a practical and principled way, 
sharing global responsibilities” with its “partners and contributing to their strengths” (EUGS, 
2016:7). Therefore, contrary to the ESS wherein partnership was linked to a concept of 
‘othering’ (Diez, 2005), partnership in the EUGS is employed in a fashion more akin to 
effective multilateralism or in conjunction with it, therefore echoing  Tocci’s (2008) argument 
that normative powers are substansively ‘other empowering’ (see section 2.6). 
When examining the supplementary coding carried out with reference to ‘global 
actorness’ (See Chapter 3), this impression is verified (see also Appendix 3). Table 6.5 shows 
the code relations between effective multilateralism and partnership-ownership demonstrate 
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that all the segments under the first frame also appear in the second. Furthermore, an overlap 
is also present between ‘global actorness’ with the two frames. This convergence of frames 
denotes the orientation of the EU to constructing an identity of shared responsibility with its 
international counterparts. This framing of its multilateral engagement speaks to several 
elements within the normative power understanding. Initially, echoing Diez’ (2005) argument 
that representation is an important precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out, 
in this case, by the EU. Additionally, with the overlapping frame of partnership, Tocci’s (2008) 
other-empowering thesis is also manifest. Therefore, within this conceptualisation, the EU 
appears to be demonstrating a normative actorness sequence that underpins an intent to become 
recognised as a global actor amongst equals, thereby also disqualifying the potential to be 
engaging in a self-serving mission civilisatrice (see Manners 2006; section 2.5.1) 
 
Table 6.5 EUGS: Co-occurrence of partnership – multilateralism – global actorness code 
relations (number of coded segments) 
Code System effective 
multilateralism \ 
SUM 
Multilateralism 
implied 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
partnership
-ownership 
\ SUM 
Ownership 
implied 
Partnership 
implied 
Explicit 
Ownership 
Explicit 
partnership 
Global 
actorness 
TOTAL  
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 6 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
TOTAL 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 7 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Ownership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Partnership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
Ownership 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
partnership 
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
partnership-
ownership \ 
TOTAL 
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Global actorness 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
TOTAL  0 6 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 16 
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What the EUGS also validates is the argument put forth in this research concerning the 
intent of the EU to forge an autonomous yet cooperative actorness on the basis of the critical 
frames of effective multilateralism and the comprehensive approach. According to the HR “The 
Strategy nurture the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union” in order to 
“promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values” which are 
“best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism” (EUGS 2016:4). 
Within this statement the link between effective multilateralism on the basis of the EU’s 
normative standing is underlined. Furthermore, the intent of the EU to assert itself as a separate 
identifiable presence in external action is also important within the scope of normative 
actorness. The fact that the foundation for the actions to follow within the document are set 
upon a normative foundation is telling of the new trajectory that is intended to be paved through 
this Strategy. In the closing remarks of the foreword, the HR stresses once more the importance 
of the “unity in action across our policies” (EUGS 2016: 5) while also underlining the need for 
tighter cooperation between Members States. This is also important in supporting the argument 
that the EU is promoting a separate even more coherent external actorness which transcends 
the aggregate of individual states ones (Nunes 2011; Kratochvil 2011; see section 1.3).  
Echoing Kavalski (2013:250) emphasis on the importance of a normative power 
appearing to be one rather than being one, the element of ‘presence’ becomes of critical 
importance at this point. As far as presence and actorness are concerned, two key elements 
emerge; willingness and tighter cooperation. Firstly, the document outlines and explicitly 
introduces the willingness of the EU to act in a more autonomous fashion while still remaining 
committed to its international partners. This stronger autonomous presence is now introduced 
as “an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system” (EUGS 
2016:10). The balance between forming and sustaining an autonomous presence is repeated in 
the Implementation Plan whereby the “EU’s strategic autonomy entails the ability to act and 
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cooperate with international and regional partners wherever possible, while being able to 
operate autonomously when and where necessary” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4). 
According to the EUGS, it will be accomplished through enhanced cooperation as well as a 
broader involvement of the EU within an expanded “comprehensive approach”, with an 
overwhelming emphasis on the role of the EEAS in the success of the endeavour. What is 
interesting to note about the language which is employed for the presentation of the EU’s role 
in the multilateral efforts is that it is centred around “partnership” rather than “cooperation”. 
This becomes more apparent in the Implementation plan where in one sentence the term is used 
three times: “In carrying forward its actions, the EU will work with partners and actively 
enhance its partnerships, while strengthening its own ability to take responsibility and share 
the burden with our partners in security and defence.” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4) 
Tighter cooperation is the second interesting point of this document. In view of the 
more potent role which is being sought within this Strategy, the external action will also be 
made more cohesive. This is explicitly stated in the “Vision to Action” section which 
underlines the pivotal importance of the EEAS and the HR in the successful operationalisation 
of this Strategy. More specifically: “A strong EEAS working together with other EU 
institutions lies at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include 
policy innovation such as the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ and joint 
programming in development, which must be further enhanced” (EUGS 2016: 49). The 
Implementation Plan reiterates this increased importance of the EEAS in the “Implementing 
the Level of Ambition” section where the Service is explicitly referred to almost all the 
provisions within it (Implementation Plan, 2016:4). The tasks it will undertake are stressed and 
presented in detail with particular emphasis being put on the role of the EDA, PSC and EUMC. 
What becomes apparent in this Strategy is that the EEAS is recognised explicitly as the part of 
the EU framework which will essentially lead it into the new era which it foresees in external 
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action. This not only demonstrates the increasing importance of the Service but also its clear 
connection to the three frames (effective multilateralism, the comprehensive approach and 
partnership) as well as to the highly normative character of CSDP initiatives to follow.   
 
6.3 EU sub-strategies: refining the scope of the EU’s normative intents 
Building on the examination of the EU strategic documentation, this section will 
concentrate on the EU sub-strategies, namely – EU Strategy for Africa (2005), Joint Africa-
EU Strategy (2007), Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) and EU Maritime Security 
Strategy (EUMSS) (2014). Following the same structure as the previous section, the key 
documents will be presented and discussed through the analysis of the critical frames. Given 
their narrower thematic scope concerning the EU’s strategic interests in particular geographic 
areas as well as areas of practice within external action, these documents will allow a more 
specific account of the EU’s strategic concerns. Still dealing with the element of ‘intent’, the 
analysis in this section will emanate from the previous discussions on the EU strategic 
documents and further depict the employment of the critical frames in a narrower scope. Whilst 
expanding on the insight they provide, these documents are also thematically specific, thereby 
allowing a more detailed account of the critical frames’ employment as well as their 
examination through an NPE lens. In view of emerging conceptual trajectories within the vision 
of the EU towards becoming an effective international actor, the sub-strategies will advance 
the understanding and add a second level to the evaluation of the EU’s actorness in normative 
terms. More specifically, the Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) will demonstrate the 
effects of the frame’s codification as well as to how it incorporates the concepts of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’.  Furthermore, JAES and the Gulf of Aden 
Strategy will draw on the EU’s general strategic concerns and demonstrate how they are 
specifically operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly 
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with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature. This final point 
will be also be examined through the EUMSS and its focus on the maritime security domain. 
In order to conceptually complete the exploration of the frames, relevant Action Plans, 
Roadmaps as well as institutional conclusions and press releases will be included in the coding. 
Furthermore, the supplementary themes identified in Chapter 3 will be introduced wherever 
pertinent, to complete the illustration of the emerging intricacies within the critical frames. 
Throughout this section, the role of the EEAS’ establishment will also be evaluated in terms of 
its contribution to the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. 
 The exploration of ‘intent’ as presented in the proposed analytical framework (see 
Chapter 3) will thereafter be complete, thus having demonstrated its importance in the 
evaluation of the EU’s normative actorness. Following the more niche insight provided within 
this section, the Chapter will proceed with the EU documents relating to Somalia specifically 
as well as with the pivotal Somali Compact (2013).  
 
6.3.1. From the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) to the 4th EU-Africa Summit Roadmap (2014-
2017) 
Following the discussion on the changes occurring within the bilateral relation between 
the EU and Africa in Chapter 5, this section will present the coding carried out on the key 
documents. Starting from the European Strategy for Africa (2005), the evolution of the EU’s 
intents will be demonstrated, particularly with reference to partnership and the dynamics of 
‘othering’ within it. Drawing from the theoretical elaboration in section 2.6 concerning the 
perception of normative power by ‘others’ as well as the importance of reflection by the 
normative power itself, this section will illustrate how it has been incorporated within the 
selected texts as well as how it has evolved over time. Another link that will be drawn will be 
the connection between the frame of partnership-ownership with effective multilateralism.  
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Table 6.6 From EU Strategy for Africa (2005) to 4th EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 2014-2017: 
Content analysis distribution (%) 
 
Code System EU Strategy for Africa, 
COM (2005) 489 final, 
12.10.2005 
Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy (JAES) 
2007 
JAES Action 
Plan 2011-
2013 
4th EU-Africa 
Summit 
Declaration 2014 
4th EU-Africa 
Summit Roadmap 
2014-2017 
comprehensive approach 
\ CA implied 
21.4 12.1 11.76 10.71 26.67 
comprehensive approach 
\ CA explicit 
9.5 1.7 5.88 3.57 0 
comprehensive approach 
\ TOTAL 
30.9 13.8 17.64 14.28 26.67 
effective multilateralism 
\ Multilateralism implied 
9.5 44.8 32.35 67.86 40 
effective multilateralism 
\ Multilateralism explicit 
0 1.7 5.88 0 0 
effective multilateralism 
\ TOTAL 
9.5 46.5 38.23 67.86 40 
partnership-ownership \ 
Ownership implied 
0 3.4 2.94 0 0 
partnership-ownership \ 
Partnership implied 
0 0 2.94 0 6.67 
partnership-ownership \ 
Explicit Ownership 
14.3 5.2 0 3.57 6.67 
partnership-ownership \ 
Explicit partnership 
45.2 31.0 38.24 14.29 20 
partnership-ownership \ 
TOTAL  
59.5 39.6 44.12 17.86 33.34 
*% of the coded segments 
 
From an overview of Table 6.6, multilateralism has been the dominant frame in most 
texts followed by partnership from JAES (2007) onwards. What this indicates is that after 
introducing the new type of relations between the EU and Africa, departing from the previous 
donor-recipient dynamic (see section 5.3.3), the EU followed a more practical path establishing 
partnership within multilateral obligations. By doing so, it shared the responsibility of action 
with the international community but also with the African partners themselves. This latter 
point was achieved through the promotion of ownership. This diplomatic tight-rope walking in 
normative terms will be further expanded in Chapter 8. Ultimately, this section will set the 
ground for the ensuing sections which will focus on the thematic sub-strategy related to 
maritime security, the EU Maritime Security Strategy, thereby completing the examination of 
intent both on a regional as well as thematic-security level. 
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Despite criticisms on the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) centring around the fact that it 
had retained a unilateral donor-client approach (see for example Lomé 1975-1995; and 
Cotonou 2000) and that it reflected a too biased European priority agenda, which would not be 
conducive to forging African ownership, it presents some interesting insight on the frame of 
partnership. The language employed in this document is overtly of a normative nature, 
particularly echoing the other-empowerment (Tocci 2008). Furthermore, it provides the first 
definitions for ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’. Within the definition of partnership, the donor-
recipient past of the EU-Africa is rejected and “equality, partnership and ownership” (EU 
Strategy for Africa, 2005:3) are presented as shared basic principles. Nevertheless, within its 
definition of ownership the document states that “to turn the principle of ownership into policy, 
budget support should increasingly become the main aid delivery mechanism” (EU Strategy 
for Africa, 2005:19). Additionally, direct use of ‘contagion diffusion’ (see Textbox 1) is visible 
in the following statement: “The EU can offer Africa lessons learned from its experience of 
continental integration, regional and social cohesion, institution-building and policy 
development” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:19). Furthermore, the EU appears to engage in 
this conventional expression of partnership by “assuming its leading responsibility in 
partnership with other international players and with the UN” (EU Strategy for Africa, 
2005:20), thus supporting the critiques of Haastrup (2013) and Rutazibwa (2010) on the role 
of the EU as mentor on the basis of othering. Basing its importance on the common values 
(democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance), mutual recognition and 
accountability (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:2) of the two continents, the EU Strategy for 
Africa ultimately presents some common themes with the more recent documents examined in 
this section but only with reference to their normative foundation.  
The determination of central objectives within JAES (2007) (see Chapter 5) indicate an 
intent on behalf of the EU to evolve its relationship with Africa into a political partnership that 
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goes beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development 
cooperation) and embraces a number of global concerns. Two fundamental dynamics which 
appearing within it concern deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world 
community. JAES (2007) solidifies the relations between EU and Africa based on the principle 
of ‘a partnership of equals’. This phrase later changes in the 4th EU Summit Declaration 
(2014:1) to “shared principles of equal partnership and joint ownership” (emphasis added), 
further highlighting the bond between the two continents both in shared benefits as well as in 
responsibilities. By treating Africa as a single entity, the JAES focuses on eight thematic 
partnerships which include peace and security and democratic governance. The focus on the 
latter two is overtly influenced by the normative foundation of the EU seeing that, according 
to NPE, they are concerned with three (democracy, sustainable peace and good governance) of 
its nine substantive normative values (Manners, 2002). Their introduction within a regional 
agreement is also pertinent in normative terms, particularly with reference to the diffusion of 
normative power. According to Manners’ (2013:315) six forms of diffusion (see Textbox 1), 
the institutionalisation of relationships between the EU and third parties, including inter-
regional cooperation agreements and political partnerships, fall within the category of 
procedural diffusion. Arguably, the main form of diffusion in the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) 
was transference diffusion, seeing that the previous engagement of the EU with Africa was 
based on the provision of aid and assistance, rather than being a political partnership of equals. 
This change in diffusional form can be explained when seen through the broader strategic 
initiatives of the EU in the same period, namely the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report 
(2008). A similar shift also occurred from informational diffusion in the ESS to procedural 
diffusion in its Implementation Report (section 6.2.1). Therefore, an argument can be made 
that these alterations in preferred forms of action are not a coincidence but rather the result of 
shifts within the EU’s identity, still within a normative understanding. Although in the strategic 
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document it appears that this shift coincided with a higher resort to the frame of partnership, 
the same is not the case on the level of strategies, at least not the ones in this section. 
Section III entitled “NEW APPROACHES” of the JAES (2007) sets the new direction 
upon which the relations between the EU and Africa were going to be based upon. It is this 
section that emphasises the acknowledgment and reaffirmation of the partnership-ownership 
binary. Emphasis is put on the reinforcement of local leadership (regional and continental) 
whilst simultaneously repeating the essential role of "partnership" within a context of 
multilateralism, highlighting the ‘self’ with relation to the "other". On this point, it is also 
interesting that as the first document to set the grounds for the political cooperation between 
the two continents, JAES demonstrates the EU’s reflexive ability as an actor in the way it 
constructs its conventional obligations whilst setting the framework for future cooperation. 
This also demonstrates the influence of the ‘other’ (in this case Africa) thus in proposing in 
essence a dynamic rapport in the decision and operationalisation of the action to be taken in 
the continent. In normative terms, this is not only demonstrative of the EU-self’s role in this 
partnership, but also of the reacting ‘other’ in the sense that past differences are explicitly 
acknowledged, nevertheless their bridging is suggested in a context of a conventional 
agreement.   
The partnership was concluded to guide important transformations, such as conflict 
prevention, good governance and food protection. Within the EU’s “Africa EU Strategic 
Partnership 2 Unions, 1 Vision, Summit Edition” (2014) report, the Somali conflict was 
explicitly referred to and the commitment to bringing it to an end reasserted. The presented 
goals for the this were “to stabilise the internal situation and to promote timely post-conflict 
reconstruction and development efforts. To these ends, we will continue working together in 
support of a strengthened AMISOM, as well as of the Somali Security Forces, extending 
support to the TFG in the framework of a reinvigorated comprehensive political strategy” 
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(Africa EU Strategic Partnership 2 Unions, 1 Vision, Summit Edition 2014:12). The 
importance of an “effective multilateralism” within multilateral institutions as the main fora 
for international cooperation is highlighted, particularly with the goal of maintaining “peace 
and security, human rights and democracy and on global governance” (Africa EU Strategic 
Partnership 2 Unions, 1 Vision, Summit Edition 2014:13).   
Elements that inform the context of partnership in JAES appear to be the ever tighter 
institutional cooperation of the two parties on a political level, the need to address “common 
challenges”, the treatment of Africa as one, the promotion of “holistic approaches” to 
development processes (see De Zutter 2010) and make the Joint Strategy a permanent platform 
for information sharing, participation and mobilisation of civil society actors both with the EU 
and Africa (JAES, 2007:3). Ownership therefore, or onus of the action that will ensue, therefore 
also depends on the contribution of sub-state actors that will inform the outcome. This is 
important within the understanding of effective multilateralism. Although this term is assumed 
to imply the cooperation of the EU, AU, UN as well as state actors, in this case it includes 
explicitly civil society: “Ongoing dialogue with civil society, the private sector and local 
stakeholders on issues covered by this Joint Strategy will be a key component to ensure its 
implementation”. (JAES, 2007:3). In the footnote of this section “the context of this Joint 
Strategy, the term non-state actors is understood as comprising: (i) private sector, (ii) economic 
and social partners including trade union organisations and (iii) civil society in all its forms 
according to national characteristics” (JAES, 2007:3). The incorporation of non-state entities 
demonstrates the expansion of the ‘effective multilateralism’ frame whilst attempting to 
broaden the spectrum of normative ‘receivers’. Drawing on Ruggie (1998), norms are justified 
on the grounds of their underlying socially constructed interests. Therefore, by engaging with 
the broadest possible pool of parties, the EU could potentially achieve social reform from the 
base in redefining interests and preferences (Elgström 2011) whilst advocating the inclusion of 
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social stakeholders in decision-making. In turn this could echo the EU’s commitment to 
promoting democracy and social solidarity, two of its core normative principles (Manners 
2002).  
Within the Strategic Priorities, particularly on the subject of peace and security, JAES 
underlines the foundation on the promotion of “holistic approaches” to security that cover all 
the stages of conflict, from prevention to long-term peace building and sustainable 
development in order to eradicate the root causes of the conflicts (JAES, 2007:4); this element 
is particularly pertinent to the case-study of Somalia. Within this section the element of 
partnership is once again prominent, this time though complemented by ownership. The 
leadership of the AU, particularly through the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), is stressed while the EU appears as the key partner in supporting the creation of 
appropriate conditions for the maintenance of lasting peace and stability (JAES, 2007:5). The 
support of the EU and its member states is identified in in their “expertise, financial and human 
resources”, while the AU and the instruments it has set up are the key coordinators or enactors 
of the relevant initiatives (JAES, 2007:5).  
The JAES Action Plan 2011-2013 introduces the role to be undertaken by the EEAS, 
within the frame of the EU’s partnership with Africa. The first initiative within the Political 
Dialogue subsection allocates the “Completion and implementation of the political dialogue 
framework by establishing systematic and structural linkages...between the new EU (EEAS) 
structures, the AUC and RECs peace and Security Departments. The objective is to increase 
the involvement at this political level in reviewing actions already undertaken, and on 
providing increased political guidance for the future” (JAES Action Plan 2011-2013:7). The 
creation of the EEAS is also recognised as a contributing factor to the strengthening of the EU 
Delegations’ role in African capitals (JAES Action Plan 2011-2013:10), thereby supporting the 
argument put forth in this thesis concerning the Service’s catalytic role in the evolution of the 
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EU’s actorness. Furthermore, the role of these delegations is set within “ensuring effective EU 
coordination and in promoting awareness and ownership among Member States” (but is also 
considered key for the Action Plan’s implementation JAES, Action Plan 2011-2013: 10). This 
therefore situates the EEAS in a crucial position, tessellating between the frames of 
multilateralism and ownership. In turn, this links to the importance of the Service in normative 
terms, given the importance of the frames’ concepts in the same terms.  
In the “Sub- Partnership on Peace and Security - Political dialogue” Section of the text, 
recognition of the limited operational support provided with respect to the security and crisis 
management initiatives is reaffirmed. Referring to the Horn of Africa and Sahel the text states, 
that increasingly the "neighbours of the neighbours" are being affected. By incorporating the 
Horn of Africa into the "neighbourhood" paradigm and the extended normative foundation 
underlining neighbourhood policy set by the EU, the African region is brought closer to the 
interests of the EU thereby further extending its commitments to the broader geographical area.  
The 4th EU Summit Declaration retains the normative tone but also adds the ways with which 
the EU will contribute predominantly through its missions: “Within the framework of the EU's 
comprehensive approach to tackling conflicts and its causes, and building on experiences of 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, such 
as….Somalia….work in close collaboration with Africa, in the framework of the APSA, in 
support of African led peace operations and, more generally, African efforts…through the 
provision of advice, mentoring and training. Additionally, the supply of equipment is an option, 
either as a complement to CSDP missions and operations or as part of stand-alone measures.” 
(2014:3). This statement succinctly encapsulates the relationship of the EU with Africa, 
particularly in operational cooperation. The ‘comprehensive approach’ is presented as the basis 
for the EU’s involvement instead of any normative reference to its core values. The 
comprehensive approach has thus evolved to encompass not only the employment of all means 
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at the EU’s disposal but also indicated the connection of internal with external security (see De 
Zutter 2010; section 2.5.1). Consequently, this statement departs from previous highly 
normative pronouncements and implies the EU’s concern of being affected rather than 
demonstrating solidarity and support. Set within a CSDP context, the statement highlights the 
non-coercive means of the EU’s involvement and downplays its operational contribution by 
suggesting the supply of equipment. Therefore, once again the provisions that are considered 
for the operational level, although not explicitly normative, remain appropriate for a normative 
actor/power. This observation is further corroborated by the EU Summit Declaration (2014:3) 
which states “We agree to support these efforts to enhance African capacities in the field of 
peace and security through the range of means at our disposal, with a particular focus on 
capacity - building.”  
The sub-strategies with Africa therefore enable a better understanding of the EU’s 
actorness within a continent to continent basis. Following the broader strategic endeavours 
which were presented previously, this section has identified the prominence of ‘partnership’ as 
pivotal in understanding the EU’s actorness in normative terms. The EEAS has emerged as the 
linking agent in the operationalisation of the Union’s intents but also the carrier of the 
‘comprehensive approach’. Most importantly, the frame of ‘partnership’ has appeared crucial 
throughout the two continents’ relations, whilst the language the EU employs and the means 
of support it foresees are largely oriented to financial support or training. Combined with the 
extensive employment of normative rhetoric, this demonstrates the commitment of the Union 
to the use of non-coercive means of support, thus speaking to the main question of this thesis. 
The EU appears to be a consistent normative actor both in its intents as well as in the framing 
of its actions. Within the frames it employs, the EU has always reflected its normative 
foundation as well as echoed it in its subsequent presentation of intents. With reference to its 
relations with Africa, this element has been dominantly manifesting through ‘partnership’. 
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6.3.2 The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU Maritime Security Strategy 
(2014)  
 Pursuant to the previous elaboration on the scope of EU relations with Africa, the focus 
now narrows to that of maritime security, more generally, as well as the EU’s fight against 
piracy in the Horn of Africa more specifically. For this reason, the coding conducted on the EU 
Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) (2014) and its subsequent Action Plan (17002/14, 2014) 
will be presented through the lens of the critical frames employed in this thesis. To further the 
insight provided by the analysis of those frames, Council Conclusions concerning counter 
piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa as well as relevant press releases and factsheets will be 
coded to demonstrate in more detail the normative underpinnings of the EU’s actorness within 
maritime security in the region. This section will therefore narrow the analysis, further 
completing the illustration of the EU’s actorness in normative terms as well as pinpointing the 
significance of the EEAS’ establishment within its evolution. Ultimately, the examination of 
the military operations will complete the normative landscape of this research by incorporating 
‘action’, thus responding to the second question of this thesis which concerns the compatibility 
of military means with the NPE framework.  
In order to contextualise EUMSS provisions regarding EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the 
regional policy for the Horn of Africa (2010) will be explored prior to the analysis of the EU’s 
strategic vision for maritime security, codified in the EUMSS (2014). Initially focused on 
development, the Commission Recommendation on measures for self-protection and the 
prevention of piracy and armed robbery against ships, (2010/159/EU, 11.3.2010) set the basis 
for the ensuing Council Conclusions in November 2011 (EU strategic framework for the Horn 
of Africa) tackling more political problems in the wake of piracy attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia. The latter aimed at aligning various external policy programmes and instruments 
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towards five objectives: good governance and human rights; peace-building; preventing the 
insecurity spilling over from the Horn onto other regions and, in its latest version, vice versa; 
economic development and poverty reduction; and cross-border political and economic 
cooperation, especially through the role of the African Regional Economic Communities.  
The highly normative nature of the aims becomes apparent, seeing that the 
aforementioned objectives echo the substantive normative principles of the EU (Manners, 
2002). The same applies for the foreseen areas of engagement in support of regional and 
country level environments: conducive to peace, security and justice, good governance based 
on democratic principles of inclusion, rule of law and respect for human rights and equality 
(Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:4). What is thereby also demonstrated is the basis of its 
multilateralism in the Horn on two levels, regional and country- specific (Council of the EU, 
16858/11, 2011:5). Amongst the international partners mentioned in this document, the most 
prominent are the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the African Union 
(AU) and the UN.  
EU engagement in Somalia is also outlined in this document, whereby the focus is set 
on the financial support of the local-regional authorities rather than the military operations it 
carries out in the country. More specifically, the EU emphasises its humanitarian support from 
ECHO and the funding it provides for the Transitional Federal Institutions through 
“cooperative activities in the governance sector managed by the UN and civil society, for the 
African Union (AU) mission (AMISOM) through the African Peace Facility” (Council of the 
EU, 16858/11, 2011:11) and frames EUNAVFOR as its contribution “to containing piracy” 
and EUTM as supporting the “training of Somali National Security Forces in partnership with 
Uganda and the US” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:11). This is a stark contradiction with 
the most recent vision presented in the EUGS, aiming at the establishment of autonomous 
presence in its external action (see section 6.2.2). Nevertheless, the emphasis on ownership and 
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fair burden sharing within the region itself has remained the same. What is thus demonstrated 
is the continuing commitment of the EU in the support for what JAES (2007) phrase “equal 
partnership and joint ownership”. Therefore, the dominance of effective multilateralism in this 
document (52.63% of coded segments) is not coincidental (see Table 6.7).  
 
Table 6.7 The EU’s fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa and EUMSS (2014): Content 
Analysis Distribution (%) 
Code System Commission 
Recommendation 
on measures for 
self-protection 
and the 
prevention of 
piracy and armed 
robbery against 
ships, 
2010/159/EU, 
11.3.2010  
Council 
Conclusions 
- Horn of 
Africa, 
16858/11, 
14.11.2011 
3124th FAC 
Conclusions 
on the 
Horn of 
Africa,  
14/11/2011 
Council 
Decision, 
appointing the 
EUSR for the 
Horn of Africa, 
2011/819/CFSP, 
8/12/2011 
Council 
PRESSE 
Fight 
against 
piracy: 
Council 
launches 
EU action 
to 
strengthen 
maritime 
capacities 
in the horn 
of Africa, 
18321/2/11 
REV 3, 
12/12/2011 
Counter 
piracy 
efforts for 
2014, EEAS 
PR, 
131223/04, 
23.12.2013 
EEAS Press 
Release EU 
to lead 
international 
counter 
piracy 
efforts in 
2014, 
131223/04, 
23/12/2013 
HR COM, 
Join(2014) 9 final, 
Joint 
Communication 
to the European 
Parliament and 
the Council, For 
an open and 
secure global 
maritime domain: 
elements for a EU 
maritime security 
strategy, 6.3.2014 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
implied 
25 12.28 21.74 25 40 0 23.53 30 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
explicit 
0 5.26 4.35 0 20 0 5.88 5 
comprehensive 
approach \ 
TOTAL 
25 17.54 26.09 25 60 0 29.41 35 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
implied 
75 52.63 45.65 50 2 50 64.71 45 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
0 0 2.17 0 40 0 0 5 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
TOTAL 
75 52.63 47.82 50 40 50 64.71 50 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Ownership 
implied 
0 0 2.17 25 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Partnership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
Ownership 
0 7.02 8.70 0 0 0 0 2.50 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
partnership 
0 22.81 15.22 0 0 0 5.88 12.50 
partnership-
ownership \ 
TOTAL 
0 29.83 26.09 25 0 50 5.88 15 
*% of the coded segments 
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The EU’s efforts in Somalia are further outlined within the context of the 
comprehensive approach: “The EU will seek to make its engagement in the Horn more 
effective through consistent, coherent and complementary use of its instruments, reinforcement 
of its political coordination, and by focusing clearly on the underlying challenges of the 
region.” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:13). The inclusion of tackling the underlying 
causes of conflict is increasingly important within a normative understanding and relates to the 
long-term effect of the developmental efforts of the EU parallel to short-term security 
initiatives (see section 4.5).  The role of the EEAS comes across prominently in this frame as 
well seeing that of the EUSR, who is tasked to contribute to “developing and implementing a 
coherent, effective and balanced EU approach to piracy encompassing all strands of EU action” 
(FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2011: 2) as well as the “coherence, quality, impact 
and visibility of the EU’s action in the region” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:13). This 
last provision touches upon two different forms of normative diffusion whilst, simultaneously, 
applying to the comprehensive approach. The contribution of the EUSR – as the main EU 
interlocutor with the AU and IGAD, does not only concern the maintenance of cohesion 
between the different aspects of the EU’s involvement in the region but also requires that these 
efforts are visible. Therefore, the normative significance of the EUSR’s mandate is not only a 
matter of procedural diffusion but also overt diffusion (see Textbox 1). This element is 
particularly importance seeing that this vision is one of the main endeavours of the EUGS (see 
section 6.2.2), thereby demonstrating a continuum of intent on a strategic level. Furthermore, 
the fact that the EEAS is indirectly involved in the accomplishment of the EU’s visibility, 
demonstrates the actual inclusion of the Service as a normative agent rather than a presence 
that enables the normative process.   
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A very telling portrayal of the EU’s operationalised normative intents underpinning the 
launch of a capacity building maritime mission in the Horn of Africa can be found within 
Council PRESSE (18321/2/11, 12/12/2011:1): “The new mission has two main tasks: 
strengthening the sea-going maritime capacities in the countries in the region (with the 
exception of Somalia) and, in Somalia, the training of a coastal police force as well as the 
training and protection of judges. Specific activities to execute those tasks are to give expert 
advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security; coast guard 
training to develop the ability to enforce laws on the sea; and procurement of the necessary 
equipment.” This mandate encapsulates and operationalises the normative principles the EU 
has been promoting throughout its strategic initiatives more broadly, as well as those more 
specifically in the region. What is also highlighted by the incorporation of this mission within 
“the EU’s comprehensive approach to fight piracy and instability in this region” (Council 
PRESSE, 18321/2/11, 12/12/2011:1), is the intricate connection between the frame and the 
operationalisation of normative intents through it.  
The HR in her Joint Communication to the Parliament and the Council (JOIN (2014) 9 
final, 6.2.2014) summarises the role and importance of EUNAVFOR Atalanta whilst 
highlighting the pertinence of the frames employed in this thesis: “The Gulf of Aden has 
become an important area for cooperation, due to the presence of international partners 
protecting vulnerable shipping and fighting piracy. The EU’s presence in the Gulf of Aden 
through EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, combined with the extensive support provided by 
other EU cooperation instruments, has a positive effect on other policy areas and fosters better 
civil-military cooperation. The success of Operation Atalanta combined with the longer-term 
cooperation actions should be preserved to ensure that any future resurgence of piracy is 
avoided.” (JOIN (2014) 9 final:2). Concerning multilateralism, the importance of international 
partners is stressed from the outset whilst underlining the mandate of the operation, primarily 
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in providing security for aid and secondarily in combatting piracy. Simultaneously, emphasis 
is put on the comprehensive approach in terms of EU internal instruments as well as in terms 
of combined civil-military means. Lastly, the importance of providing long-term impact by 
countering the root causes of piracy is stipulated, thus speaking to Stavridis (2001) and Mitzen 
(2006) concerning the relevance of a normative understanding in the combination of military 
and civilian initiatives.    
 
Table 6.8 EUMSS and EUMSS Action Plan: Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
Code System EUMSS (Council, 
11205/14, 24 June 2014) 
EUMSS Action Plan 
(17002/14) CSDP/PSDC 744 
(16/12/2014) 
EUMSS Responding together 
to global challenges - A guide 
to stakeholders (17/08/2016)  
comprehensive approach \ CA implied 30.56 20.59 26.32 
comprehensive approach \ CA explicit 22.22 5.88 10.53 
comprehensive approach \ TOTAL 52.78 26.47 36.85 
effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism 
implied 
36.11 67.65 57.89 
effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism 
explicit 
2.78 2.94 5.26 
effective multilateralism \ TOTAL 38.89 70.59 63.15 
partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied 0 0 0 
partnership-ownership \ Partnership implied 2.78 0 0 
partnership-ownership \ Explicit Ownership 0 2.94 0 
partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership 5.56 0 0 
partnership-ownership \ TOTAL 8.34 2.94 0 
*% of the coded segments 
   
The EUMSS is presented as a policy framework, intended to provide continuity 
between the internal maritime order and the global one but also to effectively coordinate the 
means at the EU’s disposal in serving this purpose. Therefore, as demonstrated in Table 6.8, 
the comprehensive approach appears as the dominant frame within the Strategy itself. The 
Action Plan provides a different image. Focusing more on the cooperation of the EU with its 
international partners while asserting an intent to act autonomously, it comes as no surprise 
that the most employed frame in this case is effective multilateralism (70.59% of coded 
segments). Unlike most of the post-EEAS era documents which have been coded in this 
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research, the Maritime Strategy underutilises the frame of partnership. Nevertheless, this 
Strategy is expressly meant to be complementary to broader initiatives, wherein the relations 
with partners will be covered. Therefore, the “principles enshrined and the objectives identified 
in this Strategy should be embedded in the implementation of existing and future regional EU 
strategies, such as those for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea” (EUMSS, 2014: 4) 
From the outset, the EUMSS (2014) situates its importance within the context of the 
comprehensive approach. Demonstrating its relevance to the ESS’ conceptualisation of the 
frame (see section 6.2.1) which connects internal and external security, the EUMS is also 
presented as a means of projecting the internal maritime security order of the EU onto a global 
domain (EUMSS, 2014:2). Simultaneously, the Strategy underlines its importance as a political 
framework so as to “comprehensively address maritime security challenges through the 
employment of all relevant instruments…across civilian and military authorities and actors” 
(EUMSS, 2014:3), thus echoing the importance of the comprehensive approach in the 
coordination of all means at the EU’s disposal. The Action Plan reiterates the EUMSS’ 
foundation on a “cross sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, 
and maritime multilateralism - including the decision-making autonomy of the EU” (EUMSS 
Action Plan, 2014:2) thereby demonstrating an interconnection of the two frames -the 
comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism. What is interesting in this instance is 
the explicit demonstration of an intent to retain separate actorness parallel to international 
engagements. The same attempt to mitigate the two elements of external action is also seen in 
the most recent strategic endeavour, the EUGS (see section 6.2.2). Additionally, seen in 
conjunction with the explicit intent to “secure the maritime security interests of the EU and its 
Member States against a plethora of risks and threats in the global maritime domain” (EUMSS, 
2014: 3) one cannot fail but reflect upon whether the EU’s international endeavours stem from 
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a genuine commitment to its core norms or whether it utilises its normative standing to promote 
its own interests (Manners 2008). 
Within the section devoted to External Action (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014:3), the 
document further specifies the initiatives that will be undertaken in a coordinated approach on 
maritime security issues in international fora and with third countries. What is further clarified 
in this part of the text are the immediate, medium and long term goals, depending on their 
intended delivery. This not only demonstrates the perceived urgency of the challenges faced 
but also the hierarchy of the focus it sets for their resolution. Within this same ‘Workstrand’ 
the goals that are included also identify the ‘Lead Actors’ responsible for their achievement, of 
course with respect to their competences and legal mandates. The EEAS is identified as 
responsible for the majority of the initiatives identified (5/7) thus demonstrating the gradual 
increase in its importance as part of the EU framework. 
The frame of effective multilateralism is expanded upon in the immediate and medium 
term goals, wherein the roles of the EEAS as well as the cooperative relations in maritime 
security between the EU and other actors are identified. The exclusive competence for the 
development of “strategic dialogue with relevant regional and international stakeholders and 
third countries on maritime security to sustain and further develop the promotion of rules-based 
governance at sea” is hereby foreseen for the EEAS (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, 
para 1.1.1:3). The overall delineation is therefore undertaken by the EEAS but complemented 
in the identifying “the areas of commonality and complementarity between the EU and the UN 
in its bodies to develop an improved partnership in the field of maritime security, with a view 
to the development of joint regional maritime capacity-building activities” (EUMSS Action 
Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.1.2:3) with the Member States. Therefore, as far as the overall 
operationalisation is concerned the EU holds the primary responsibility, but within the 
framework of a multilateral engagement with the UN, Member States are also involved to 
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determine the elements of military capabilities. This is not only indicative of the of the ascribed 
role to the EEAS’ overall normative character, but also its dependence from the Member States 
when it comes to carrying out the mandates that have been set up for maritime security.  
What is also interesting in this provision is the employment of the ‘partnership’ frame. 
Throughout the policy concerning relations with Africa (see EU Strategy for Africa 2005, 
JAES 2007 and subsequent EU-Africa Summit Roadmaps) and initiatives that are carried out 
in the region (either broadly or more case-specifically), the partnership frame is always used to 
underline the relationship between the EU and the local powers. As mentioned previously, this 
is directly linked on a normative level with the empowerment of the African contribution to 
the resolution of the challenges at hand, thereby not following the usual “superior self” – 
“inferior other” paradigm (see Diez, 2005). In this case, the incorporation of partnership can 
be read as hinting to the parallel and equal involvement of the EU and the UN in maritime 
security. This becomes even more interesting as a rhetoric choice seeing the autonomous 
involvement of the EU in operations, such as Somalia and the Horn of Africa. In turn, the 
interpretation of this particular choice can be seen as a reaffirmation of the EU’s own presence 
in the maritime security sector. Lastly, the EUMSS introduces another element that supports 
the normative power thesis. Section 1.2 (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.2:4), 
focuses on the enhancement of the EU’s visibility in the maritime domain. This is not foreseen 
in this document as a long-term goal, which would in turn indicate the secondary nature of this 
concern, but as one of immediate-medium term. Within this research the issue of the EU’s 
visibility has been highlighted throughout as relevant to its actorness via the EEAS. 
In the ensuing paragraphs of this section the relations between the EU and other 
international actors is identified. Stress is put on the efforts for coordinating EU and NATO 
initiatives in the area of maritime security, identifying complementarity as well as developing 
enhanced cooperative relations. This is particularly telling of the direction the EU was taking 
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at the time, especially in view of the more recent policy (see section 6.2.2 on the EUGS). Within 
the framework of effective multilateralism, the EU appears to be strengthening its cooperation 
with NATO from its western partners, although not neglecting the importance of the local 
regional powers. The ties with NATO do, however, indicate a further concern of the EU with 
its military capabilities despite its highly normative nature as an actor.  
According to the EUMSS: “Taking into account the EU’s comprehensive approach, 
plan and conduct regular maritime security exercises with third countries and 
international/regional organisations, in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) operations and missions or EU exercises in adjacent sea basins and to other areas of 
interest, in accordance with the EU exercise policy” (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, 
para 1.2.1:4). The ensuing paragraphs of this section reiterate the EU’s concern in conducting 
workshops, seminars and conferences as well as a communication campaign with an aim of 
sharing its regional strategies and initiatives but also facilitating their implementation. What 
becomes apparent is the commitment of the EU in maintaining a highly civilian actorness, not 
only with reference to the means it employs, but also with the role it undertakes within the 
frame of multilateral cooperation. Emphasis on the EU being mostly involved in the strategic 
planning and dissemination of relevant knowledge indicates its highly normative self-portrayal. 
In the sections to follow, this normative identity becomes more apparent with particular 
reference to ownership. In paragraph 1.4.1 the document states: “Whilst ensuring local 
ownership, priority should be given to countries and regions where the lack of maritime 
security capacity has a direct impact on the security and economic prosperity of the EU and its 
citizens including on ports/regions with major trade flows to the EU and on countries/regions 
of transit and origin of migration flows”. These provisions essentially point to the case of 
Somalia although it is not explicitly mentioned until the following paragraph on effective 
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multilateralism, which unequivocally targeted the Horn of Africa (EUMSS Action Plan 2014, 
ANNEX, para 1.4.2:5).  
The EUMSS Action Plan can be seen as a key text that has defined the EU’s military 
action internationally but most importantly its overall actorness. Although the scope of this text 
is defined to a narrow area of application, the rhetoric frames employed are indicative of the 
EU’s intents as well as its evolving identity through military operations. The three frames 
selected for this thesis appear throughout the document. As far as the operationalisation of these 
intents is concerned, the EU appears to be concerned with pursuing them in a complementary 
fashion through its operations. The main point of reference remains effective multilateralism 
(see Table 6.4). Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach as well as the establishment of a 
partnership-ownership relation with third countries complete the full image of the EU’s 
actorness, which comes across distinctly normative. Moreover, the outline of its future ventures 
further reinforces this research’s argument that the EEAS becomes more pivotal in the relations 
of the EU as a global actor, thus paving the way for a new type of actorness in the post-Lisbon 
era. 
This section thus completes the examination of sub-strategies which focus on the intents 
of the EU with respect to its relationship with Africa more broadly, as well as its particular 
engagement with countering piracy in the Horn of Africa more specifically. The strategic vision 
constructed through this analysis on maritime security, specifically its codification in the 
EUMSS, demonstrates an increased interest in the area of maritime security but also contributes 
to the illustration of the normative landscape for the naval operation in Somalia – EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta.  
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6.3.3 The Comprehensive Approach (2013) and Action Plan (2015) 
 
Within this section, the coding and frame analysis of The Comprehensive Approach 
(CA) (2013) and its implementation Plan (2015) will be presented. The approach taken with 
this document will be different from that with the other sub-strategies. Seeing that the 
comprehensive approach has been examined as a frame throughout this research, within this 
section the elaboration will focus on the conceptual contribution of the document to the frame 
itself as well as how it incorporates the concepts of ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-
ownership’. It will thus be approached within the scope of the case studies of Somalia and the 
broader Horn of Africa. Furthermore, links will be draw with its normative significance, 
thereby demonstrating its pertinence in the examination of the EU’s normative power as well 
as the role of the EEAS’ establishment in its evolution. 
 
 Table 6.9 The Comprehensive Approach (2013) and its Implementation Plan: Content Analysis 
Distribution (%) 
*% of the coded segments 
 
Code System EUCOM, JOIN(2013)30 final, 
11.12.2013, EU Comprehensive 
Approach 
EU Action Plan CA 2015 Council 7913/15, 
14/4/2015 
comprehensive approach\CA implied 30 10.53 
comprehensive approach\CA explicit 40 31.58 
comprehensive approach\TOTAL 70 42.11 
effective 
multilateralism\Multilateralism 
implied 
23.33 47.37 
effective 
multilateralism\Multilateralism explicit 
3.33 0 
effective multilateralism\TOTAL 26.66 47.37 
partnership-ownership\Ownership 
implied 
0 0 
partnership-ownership\Partnership 
implied 
0 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit 
Ownership 
0 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit 
partnership 
3.33 10.53 
partnership-ownership\TOTAL 3.33 10.53 
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From an overview of the coded segments (see Table 6.9), the dominance of effective 
multilateralism becomes apparent, second of course to the comprehensive approach. 
Nevertheless, what can also be observed is the limited use of the partnership-ownership frame. 
This could be justified by the fact that partnership itself is dependent on the niche relationships 
outlined in strategic documents, or documents of strategic significance. Therefore, an 
overarching provision on this frame would demonstrate the disregard of the EU for the nature 
of the challenges it is facing as well as the underlying complexities that could be entailed. 
Furthermore, as observed in the analyses presented in this chapter, the frame of comprehensive 
approach deals with the coordination of internal with external practices. It further regards the 
full use of tools at the disposal of the EU in a coherent manner for the purposes of achieving a 
specific goal. According to De Zutter (2010), a normative power is a political entity whose 
norms guide both those practices. Additionally, Zwolski (2012:994) observes that the EU 
supports its security environment internationally through the advancement of effective 
multilateralism and good governance through a comprehensive approach. Therefore, from the 
aforementioned, what can be deduced is that the EU is in fact a normative actor simply through 
the comprehensive approach it follows in its external action. This is important theoretically for 
the purposes of this thesis’ main research question but also in the identification of the EEAS 
within the trajectory of the EU’s evolving normative actorness. The CA and its Action Plan 
respond to this precise point of enquiry and therefore addresses the theoretical questions that 
underpin this thesis.  
 The CA from the outset identifies in the Lisbon Treaty the “principles, aims and 
objectives of the external action of the European Union” (CA, 2013:2). The consistency 
between the different areas of EU external action are reflected institutionally in the HR and the 
establishment of the EEAS. Within this context, the CA (2013:2) stipulates that “the EU has 
both the increased potential and the ambition – by drawing on the full range of its instruments 
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and resources- to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic”. 
In this dense statement, the document eludes to the conceptualisation of normative power 
argued within this thesis; this includes the employment of all the tools at the EU’s disposal, 
both military and civilian in nature, in external action with the caveat of the former not being 
employed in a coercive fashion. The document goes on to acknowledge that the notion of the 
comprehensive approach is not a new one and that it had already been operationalised in many 
cases, including that of the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2). It nevertheless, underlines that 
the principles governing this approach have yet to become “systematically, the guiding 
principles for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict prevention 
and crisis resolution” (CA, 2013: 2). The inclusion of all stages of the conflict cycle or external 
crisis, from prevention to the support of sustainable long-term development, are required in 
this approach. The emphasis put on the long-term impact as well as on sustainability directly 
refer to the relevant core normative principles identified by Manners (2002). Another important 
element is included in this initial presentation of the concept, regarding the identification of the 
HR commitment in applying the concept of comprehensive approach both in the EU’s external 
policy as well as its action. This point directly reflects the analytical approach taken within this 
thesis, concerning the continuity of intent and action (see Chapter 3).  
 The following section underlines the importance of the EU’s visibility and global role 
within the context of the comprehensive approach. More specifically, the document states that 
comprehensiveness “refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and 
resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (CA, 
2013: 3) within which the potential of the EEAS is explicitly mentioned. According to the 
document, this is the way by which the EU can better “define and defend its fundamental 
interests and values” as well as “promote its key political objectives” (CA, 2013: 3), thus 
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directly referring to the importance of norms as well as the arguments of Kavalski (2013) and 
Manners (2006) concerning presence and normative actorness (see section 3.4). 
 An important conceptual connection is demonstrated further in the text, that between 
security and development. As the document stipulates this nexus is “a key underlying principle 
in the application of an EU comprehensive approach” and therefore “responses must be 
context-specific and driven by reality and logic of real life situations encountered” (CA, 
2013:4). This point is reiterated in the Action Plan (2015:2) which states that “EU policy and 
action should always take into account the country or regional context and the political realities 
and needs on the ground”. What is therefore underlined is the needed coherence between the 
two areas of responsibility which, as discussed in section 4.5.2, are extensively critiqued within 
the EEAS context as dysfunctional. This is due to the complexity of the issues the EU has to 
face in its external action, seeing that the majority of challenges it is called to encounter are 
within developing countries. Therefore, the comprehensive approach serves another purpose 
with regards to the timeframe set for the operationalisation of initiatives which also indicates 
the urgency for tackling the issues that arise. Seeing its pertinence to the security-development 
nexus, this approach attempts to link short-term crisis management/conflict resolution efforts 
with longer-term security sector reform and state-building efforts in order to ensure the 
sustainability of its results wherever the EU conducts its operations (Smith, 2013:38). Within 
this, the role of the comprehensive approach is to a large extent an issue of bridging and 
coordinating the EU's development cooperation agenda, which is mostly by civilian 
instruments and the Commission, with its foreign security policy agenda, which is dominated 
by EU Member States with reference to military/policing capabilities and the EEAS regarding 
strategic design and oversight. As Smith (2013:38) asserts “the comprehensive approach is 
largely about linking the EU's new CSDP policing/military capabilities to its longstanding 
expertise in using civilian and economic foreign policy tools”. The cooperation of the two 
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instruments is further emphasised in the document (CA, 2013: 10): “Close cooperation, in 
particular between the High Representative and the Commission, is also vital on the various 
global issues where the external aspects of internal EU policies have a growing foreign and 
security policy dimension”, whereby the coherence between the internal and external practices 
is again critical.  
 The solution to the aforementioned tension, according to the CA (2013:6) is the 
adoption whenever possible of overarching strategic document with a regional focus, such as 
that of the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2). Within these initiatives another interpretation of 
the comprehensive approach is served, that which connects the internal practices with the 
external ones (CA, 2013:9), thus speaking to De Zutter’s (2010) definition of a normative 
power. What becomes apparent, therefore, is the connection of NPE characteristics of 
normative powers with the comprehensive approach. This observation is reinforced within the 
CA (2013:8), which reiterates the centrality of core normative principles (Manners 2002) –
namely sustainable peace and development- within the EU’s responses. 
 The Implementation Plan reiterates all of the aforementioned points raised within the 
CA. An interesting addition with reference to effective multilateralism appears in the third 
section of the document under “Cases” wherein Somalia is explicitly addressed. Within this 
section focus is on the Somali Compact (2013) as a text defining the areas of coordination 
between the FGS, the EU and the international partners. Interestingly enough, the local 
stakeholders are not included, although in the text itself they hold a prominent part. As a crucial 
addition to the Somali Compact, this group was added to demonstrate the incorporation of the 
population in the decision-making process at the time. Naturally, their incorporation was an 
important contribution to the frame of multilateralism, seeing that they were represented in the 
meetings with the international partners (see section 6.3.2).  
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Furthermore, the three CSDP missions in the area are mentioned, within the context of 
the EU’s development cooperation framework. An interesting element in this section concerns 
the visibility of the Union’s actions both in a regional as well as in a state level. Particularly 
the EUSR for the Horn of Africa is presented as key in enhancing “the coherence, impact and 
visibility of the EU regional approach” (CA Action Plan 2015: 8). This speaks to Kavalski’s 
(2013) argument on the increased importance of a normative power being perceived as such 
rather than being one.     
As witnessed in the Horn of Africa, and especially in Somalia, it has become 
increasingly apparent that piracy can be effectively dealt with only when maritime operations 
are complemented by parallel efforts at land. As Overhaus (2013:512) contends, the Treaty of 
Lisbon created “the prospect for better dealing with conflicts at the intersection of security and 
development” particularly through the creation of the EEAS. This research identifies this 
particular potential of the EU’s external action within NPE in theory and within the military 
operations in Somalia in practice. Normative power’s ability to combine military means with 
non-coercive use (see Chapter 2) for the operationalisation of the EU’s intents largely in the 
area of development (see Chapter 4) demonstrates the pertinence of NPE when exploring 
external action and echoes this thesis’ argument that the creation of the EEAS is a catalyst in 
the establishment of the EU’s normative power. 
The need for a combination of means at the disposal of the EU is required to attain the 
effectiveness of its short-term (security) and long-term (development) goals – thus 
operationalising its “comprehensive approach”. As an international actor, it is required to 
cooperate with the other actors in the areas of interest as well as the recipient countries of its 
aid, hence demanding “multilateralism” in its action in order to achieve effective coordination.  
Theoretically, normative power provides the opportunity for a long-term solution to be put in 
place through the diffusion of its intents. On a practical basis, the EU is demonstrating 
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continuity through the implementation of its military means within the context of its operations 
in Somalia (see sections 7.3). The creation of the EEAS establishes a basis for a coherent 
operationalisation of the EU’s normative ambitions seeing that it is tasked with the oversight 
of the strategic planning as well as the operational practice on the ground, but also bears the 
weight of representation –presence- especially through the role of the EUSR. Therefore, the 
EEAS in theory as well as in practice is the institutional reflection of the comprehensive 
approach. Echoing De Zutter (2010) as well as Kavalski (2013), the emphasis in the CA as well 
as in the Action Plan demonstrate conceptual overlaps with normative power. Therefore, what 
can be argued, is that the EEAS in this logic is a normative actor and thereby infuses this 
element in the external action of which it is responsible for.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Within this chapter the coding and subsequent analysis of the strategic documents and 
sub-strategies demonstrating the EU’s ‘intent’ with regard to the operationalisation of the 
critical frames within the EU’s military initiatives was presented. Following the discussion in 
Chapter 4 concerning the role of the EEAS and its contribution to the structure of CSDP on a 
conceptual basis, and Chapter 5 which provided an overview of the political changes in 
Somalia, including the EU’s broader initiatives in Africa, this Chapter focused on the 
conceptual impact which informed the launch of the EU’s military operations in Somalia, 
EUNAVFOR and EUTM. This was presented through the lens of the critical frames, 
highlighting their role in the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives.  
The strategic trajectory of the EU as an external actor was accounted for, both before 
and after the creation of the EEAS, highlighting its impact on the critical frames as well as the 
overall actorness of the EU in external action. With Manners’ (2013:316) forms of normative 
diffusion in mind (see Textbox 1), the ESS and EUGS emerge as particularly important. Within 
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this section, the strategic communications proved essential in the promotion of ideas which 
informed the development of the EU’s external action in normative terms.  
Starting with the ESS (2003), arguably the most important guideline for external action 
the EU had for more than a decade, one can identify the beginning of a normative strain being 
created. This ultimately culminated in the latest grand-strategic document, the EUGS (2016). 
Whilst both documents appear to overall promote ‘effective multilateralism’ as a frame, they 
include significant divergence in relation to ‘partnership-ownership’. Introducing a nascent 
version of a ‘comprehensive’ approach to external action, the ESS also focused on the ways 
with which it would cooperate with its international partners (ESS, 2003:11) in dealing with 
“complex problems” (ESS, 2003:1) and “global threats” (ESS, 2003:9). The ESS therefore 
referred to a notion of ‘comprehensive security’ even though it was lacking focus both on 
geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement. 
As demonstrated in Table 6.1 the frame of ‘effective multilateralism’ is dominant in 
both the ESS (51.9% implied, 3.7% explicit) and its Implementation Report (38.6% implied, 
6.8% explicit). With the increasing employment of this frame between the ESS (2003) (Chart 
6.1) and its Implementation Report (2008) (Chart 6.2), but also the significant rise in its 
appearance within the EUGS (2016) (Chart 6.3), a pattern seems to emerge with reference to 
its importance. When looking into the co-occurrence of the frames, a more detailed account 
emerges, particularly with reference to partnership and its use with effective multilateralism 
(Table 6.3). What this demonstrates about the use of these frames within the strategic 
documents, is the reliance of the EU on the concept of partnership in its international 
cooperation. Echoing Diez (2005), this is indicative of the EU’s perception of ‘self’ as well as 
the ‘other’, thereby indicating its commitment to mutual collaboration rather than imposition 
of its self-serving intents. Interestingly, in both documents the prevalent category is ‘implied 
multilateralism’. This denotes the fact that the term ‘multilateralism’ is not mentioned 
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explicitly in the coded segments but rather the concept of it is presented. With due 
consideration of the ESS’ shortcomings, the Implementation Report explicitly addressed the 
need to “strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern 
neighbourhood” and added that “the EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the 
UN” (ESS Implementation Report: 4). The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 
11 December 2008) also explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on the EU “security 
through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 
2008:1) thereby clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related 
to maritime security 
With reference to the comprehensive approach, the EUGS makes another interesting 
conceptual contribution by including a commitment to expanding “the meaning and scope of 
the ‘comprehensive approach’” (EUGS 2016:10). According to the document, what will be 
included is the involvement of the EU in a manner that prevents conflict, investing in 
stabilisation while remaining focused on assuring a long-term resolution. This expansion will 
again be supported by effective multilateralism and “deep and durable regional and 
international partnerships” (EUGS 2016:10). What the EUGS also validates is the argument 
put forth in this research concerning the intent of the EU to forge an autonomous yet 
cooperative actorness on the basis of the critical frames of effective multilateralism and the 
comprehensive approach. Echoing Kavalski (2013:250) emphasis on the importance of a 
normative power appearing to be one rather than being one, ‘presence’ becomes of critical 
importance at this point. As far as presence and actorness are concerned, two key elements 
emerge: willingness and tighter cooperation. Firstly, the document outlines and explicitly 
introduces the willingness of the EU to act in a more autonomous fashion while still remaining 
committed to its international partners. This stronger autonomous presence is now introduced 
as “an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system” (EUGS 
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2016:10). The balance between forming and sustaining an autonomous presence is repeated in 
the Implementation Plan whereby the “EU’s strategic autonomy entails the ability to act and 
cooperate with international and regional partners wherever possible, while being able to 
operate autonomously when and where necessary” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4). 
According to the EUGS, it will be accomplished through enhanced cooperation as well as a 
broader involvement of the EU within an expanded “comprehensive approach”, with an 
overwhelming emphasis on the role of the EEAS in the success of the endeavour. What is 
interesting to note about the language which is employed for the presentation of the EU’s role 
in the multilateral efforts is that it is centred around “partnership” rather than “cooperation”. 
This becomes more apparent in the Implementation plan where in one sentence the term is used 
three times: “In carrying forward its actions, the EU will work with partners and actively 
enhance its partnerships, while strengthening its own ability to take responsibility and share 
the burden with our partners in security and defence.” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4) 
The EUGS, therefore, explicitly sets out a new trajectory for the EU as a global presence 
in the area of external action. With the majority of its action officially organised under the remit 
of the EEAS, it sets a very particular set of goals which demonstrate a new direction, separate 
from that of a conventional civilian actor and point towards what is argued in this thesis as a 
normative actorness. Echoing the contributions of Stivachtis (2007) and Sjursen (2006), the 
explicit reference to the values and principles (particularly democracy and good governance) 
of the EU as well as its commitment to international law (particularly international 
humanitarian and human rights law) in both the EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan 
further support the relevance of NPE as well as the pertinence of normative power in the 
examination of external action (see section 2.4.2).  
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The EU sub-strategies – Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security 
Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – dealing with particular 
geographical regions and areas of action, further narrow the focus of this analysis adding to the 
evaluation in normative terms, providing more specified insight into the employment of the 
critical frames and identifying their pertinence within this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter 
demonstrated how the EU’s general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its 
relations with Africa as well as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, 
particularly those of a maritime nature.  
The EUMSS Action Plan can be seen as a key text that has shaped the EU’s military 
action internationally but most importantly its overall actorness. Although the scope of this text 
is defined to a narrow area of application, the rhetoric frames employed are indicative of the 
EU’s intents as well as its evolving identity through military operations. The three frames 
selected for this thesis appear throughout the document. As far as the operationalisation of 
intents is concerned, the EU appears to be concerned with pursuing them in a complementary 
fashion through its operations. The main point of reference remains effective multilateralism 
(see Table 6.4). Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach as well as the establishment of a 
partnership-ownership relation with third countries complete the full image of the EU’s 
actorness, which comes across distinctly normative. Moreover, the outline of its future ventures 
further reinforces this research’s argument that the EEAS becomes more pivotal in the relations 
of the EU as a global actor, thus paving the way for a new type of actorness in the post-Lisbon 
era. By identifying the changes prompted by the EEAS’ establishment, its role was indicated 
in the overall evolution of the EU as a normative actor, thereby speaking to the second point 
of inquiry within this project.  
 
 
 228 
Chapter 7 
Somalia, EUNAVFOR and EUTM: case-specific dimension 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will proceed with the EU’s documentation relating to Somalia. Although 
they may not be strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these 
documents have elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis will be further 
honed down to the use of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, 
building on its introduction in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) will 
add the perspective of the Somali side (‘impact’) in the dialectic diffusion of normative power 
(see Chapter 2). Therefore, both sides to the normative process will be accounted for thus 
completing the conceptualisation of NPE and, more specifically, how it is reflected in the 
impact of the EU’s relations with Somalia. 
Finally, the documentation related to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta and EUTM, will conclude this chapter, thereby completing the illustration of the EU’s 
normative actorness within a normative setting. This section will focus on the fluctuations (or 
lack thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the mandates, 
highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the 
emerging comparison between the two operations will contribute to the construction of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall 
actorness in normative terms. Thereby, the element of ‘action’ will complete the conceptual 
framework proposed in Chapter 3. The role of the military operations themselves will be 
presented as part of the normative actorness of the EU, as well as how this is situated within 
the operationalisation of the frames. The mandates as well as the multilateral distribution of 
power will be highlighted, thereby setting the foundation for the ensuing discussion in Chapter 
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8. The function of the regional and country forces allocated by the international conventional 
relations will also inform understandings of the adopted critical frames. Therefore, wherever 
pertinent to the current research, the role of AMISOM and the Somali state authorities will be 
introduced to further demonstrate the operationalisation of multilateralism as well as the 
partnership-ownership binary. 
 
7.2 EU documents relating to Somalia and the Somali Compact (2013): case-specific 
normative diffusion and impact 
 
 Building on the context provided through the content and frame analyses of the EU 
strategies and EU sub-strategies, this section will draw on the elaboration carried out in the 
previous chapter regarding EU-Africa policy and the Somali Compact and present the coding 
carried out on Council Conclusions relating to Somalia. Their purpose is twofold: on the one 
hand they are adopted under the Foreign Affairs Council formation, therefore focus on the EU's 
external action, which includes foreign policy, defence and security, development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid. They therefore complement the elaboration of the concepts dealt with in 
the EU’s strategic documents and sub-strategies. Furthermore, these documents span 
chronologically from the year of the EEAS’ establishment (2010) and go up to one year after 
the conclusion of the Somali Compact (2013). The selected documents also include the Somalia 
New Deal Conference Communiqué (2013) as well as the HR’s statement in order to 
encapsulate the views of the EEAS within the selected timeframe.  
 The period between 2010 and 2013 encompasses key moments in the EU’s evolution 
as an international actor, particularly with reference to its engagement in Somalia. From an 
institutional standpoint, 2010 marks the establishment of the EEAS, argued by this thesis to be 
a catalyst in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. From an operational standpoint, this 
timeframe encapsulates the parallel activities of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the launching of 
 230 
EUTM in 2010, thus provisions for both can be found in the selected Council Conclusions. 
Lastly, the timeframe of the selected documents will allow the examination of the dynamic 
norm diffusion between the EU and Somalia, thus demonstrating the former’s reception as a 
‘normative actor’.  
Consequently, this elaboration will demonstrate how the frames have been employed 
in EU documents relating to Somalia to inform the operationalisation of its normative identity. 
Additionally, through their application on the Somali Compact (2013), the areas within which 
the EU has been recognised as a normative actor will be identified. Echoing the theoretical 
arguments of Diez (2005) and Kavalski (2013) (see section 2.6), this section will explore the 
EU’s promoted normative aims and illustrate their convergence with those reflected by the 
Somali side, thereby addressing the element of ‘impact’ within the proposed analytical 
framework for this thesis (see section 3.3). In doing so, an evaluation of the EU’s norm 
diffusion in Somalia will occur, thus highlighting successes and failures.  
 
7.2.1 EU documents relating to Somalia: critical frames in norm diffusion 
 
The Council Conclusions on Somalia demonstrate an irregular employment of the 
frames, demonstrated in Table 7.1. Although effective multilateralism appears to be used in 
equal proportion to the comprehensive approach in 2010, it becomes the dominant frame 
employed in 2012 and 2014. This is not only the case in the FAC Conclusions but also in the 
EEAS’ Communiqué as well as the HR’s statement in 2013. Furthermore, the frames of 
ownership appear to be consistently employed by both the EEAS and FAC with the exception 
of the HR and 2014 conclusions. Therefore, although not conclusively, effective 
multilateralism seems to be the central frame in all documents while ownership also appears to 
be consistently applied. In view of the dynamics created by the employment of partnership and 
ownership within the relations of the EU with Africa, more broadly (see section 6.3.1), and the 
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Horn of Africa region (see section 6.3.2), more specifically, what can be concluded is that this 
binary will provide interesting insight in the country specific case of Somalia too. 
 
Table 7.1 EU documents relating to Somalia: Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
 
Code System 3023rd FAC 
Conclusion on 
piracy off the 
coast of Somalia 
14 June 2010 
FAC 
conclusions on 
Somalia 3166, 
14 May 2012 
Statement by 
the EUHR 
Catherine 
Ashton, 
A436/13, 28 
Aug 2013 
Somalia New Deal 
Conference 
Communique, 
16/9/2013 
FAC Council 
conclusions on 
Somalia 20 
October 2014 
comprehensive approach\CA 
implied 
18.18 0 50 20 26.67 
comprehensive approach\CA 
explicit 
27.27 14.29 0 0 6.67 
comprehensive approach \ 
TOTAL 
45.45 14.29 50 20 33.34 
effective 
multilateralism\Multilateralism 
implied 
45.45 42.86 50 53.33 60 
effective 
multilateralism\Multilateralism 
explicit 
0 0 0 0 0 
effective multilateralism \ TOTAL 45.45 42.86 50 53.33 60 
partnership-
ownership\Ownership implied 
0 21.43 0 6.67 0 
partnership-
ownership\Partnership implied 
0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit 
Ownership 
9.09 21.43 0 13.33 0 
partnership-ownership\Explicit 
partnership 
0 0 0 6.67 6.67 
partnership-ownership \ TOTAL 9.09 42.86 0 26.67 6.67 
*% of the coded segments 
 
In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council (3023 FAC /14 June 2010) acknowledged the 
multi-faceted nature of piracy and identified the root causes of piracy. It therefore called upon 
the High Representative to propose a comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa in an 
effort to reinforce the stability of Somalia which required a comprehensive approach in the 
region linking security policy with development. This arguably more strategic approach 
accentuated the importance of regional multilateralism within the Horn of Africa and 
underlined the importance of “building on Somali ownership and addressing the underlying 
security and developmental challenges in Somalia” (3023 FAC /14 June 2010:1). 
Simultaneously it invited the HR and the Commission to make a proposal in order to achieve 
better cooperation with the regional partners. What becomes apparent is that the scale of the 
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case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa calls for substantial multilateral as well as EU 
coordination. The HR/VP is given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate 
European action, thereby setting her and the EEAS at the epicentre of operationalising the 
comprehensive approach. What also becomes apparent is the interconnectivity of the frames 
employed, geared to towards achieving a long-term goal. As far as the actorness of the EU is 
concerned, in this document it appears that the EU takes a back seat in dealing with the 
resolution of the challenges in the area. Therefore, the invocation of ownership on this occasion 
can be perceived as reluctance to act, rather than ‘other’-empowering support (Tocci, 2008).   
In the 3166th Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Somalia (2012) (FAC 9596/12, 
14 May 2012) the EU indirectly positions itself once again in a supporting role rather than a 
leading one. From the very beginning of the text responsibility “for the design and delivery of 
a political solution lies with Somalis themselves” (FAC 9596/12, 14 May 2012:1). This can be 
considered as an indirect reference to ownership. The transference of responsibility on the local 
community of course has implications on effective multilateralism together with partnership-
ownership. On the one hand the EU demonstrates its commitment to the normative 
underpinnings of the binary whilst on the other hand demonstrates reticence to implicate itself 
in any action. This is to say that by remaining true to establishing its involvement on ownership, 
which it has reaffirmed on multiple occasions, it almost exempts itself form direct engagement 
on the ground. This simultaneously sets the premise for the ownership of the political solution 
and execution of the intended mandate while detaching the EU from the responsibility of the 
endeavour's outcome. The question of whether this reticence demonstrated by the EU is an 
indication of adherence to its core normative basis or a diplomatic guise that excuses it from 
utilising military power will be further expanded upon in the following Chapter. 
In paragraph 4 the involvement of the EU is explicitly set out, confirming the 
aforementioned concerns: “The EU will continue its significant support to AMISOM consistent 
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with a Somali-led strategy to stabilise the country and encourages AMISOM to continue 
developing its capacity to protect civilians and their human rights. The EU calls upon other 
donors to contribute to sustainable funding for AMISOM and to provide force enablers that 
will allow the mission to operate effectively.” (FAC 9596/12, 14 May 2012:2). What is 
therefore underlined is the financial support of the EU without determining its contribution in 
military means or its active engagement in supporting the forces during conflict. What is also 
reiterated is the dominant and primary role of AMISOM as well as its leadership in the 
operations on the ground. The EU thus remains a civilian actor when supporting the efforts in 
Somalia while at the same time providing capacities in order to justify its role and establish a 
resonating credibility of its involvement. In the following paragraph the EU underlines the 
importance of ultimately handing security responsibilities to Somali authorities, thereby 
supporting its claims to advancing local ownership, to enhance the international support to the 
Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) “in cooperation with AMISOM, Uganda, the US and 
other relevant actors.” Therefore, an overlap between the frames of multilateralism and 
ownership is constructed. Although remaining normatively consistent, the EU demonstrates a 
lack of pro-active engagement, thereby allowing the interpretation of its military missions to 
be compatible with the character of NPE (see section 2.4.1)    
In Article 5, the FAC (Luxembourg 20 October 2014) reiterates the role and work 
undertaken by the EUTM: “which undertakes advisory, mentoring and training activities, with 
the aim to developing the Somali national Armed Forces’ structures and their training capacity 
in Somalia itself”. The supporting role played by the EUTM in this instance is emphasized, 
thereby seceding primacy and acknowledging local initiative. Therefore, the pertinence of 
ownership is thus emphasised. Furthermore, within the same frame, the EU “underlines the 
importance of the Federal Government taking on an increased responsibility and ownership of 
the security sector” (FAC Conclusions, 2014: 2). By recognising the contribution of its 
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partners, mostly that of the FGS, the EU manages to retain its normative commitment to 
effective multilateralism intact. Nevertheless, it also demonstrates its secondary role on the 
operational front, even though it self-identifies as having a leading role in the fight against 
piracy within its effort in the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2).  
The statement by the HR (6/9/2013) and the Communiqué following the adoption of A 
New Deal for Somalia provide no further insight into the pertinence of the frames than the FAC 
Conclusions. On both occasions, the ownership of the local forces as well as the commitment 
of the EU to providing comprehensive support to AMISOM and the FGS are repeated. 
Therefore, the EEAS and Council appear to exhibit the same level of reticence in this occasion. 
Nevertheless, this insistence on ownership can be seen on a theoretical basis as supporting the 
case for the EU’s normative power based on Tocci’s (2008:9-13) assertion that normative 
powers are other-empowering. Although this might appear as a very convenient excuse for the 
EU’s demonstrated lack of initiative, it nevertheless is justifiable on a theoretical level.  
 
7.2.2 The Somali Compact (2013): norm diffusion from the receptive side   
Following the discussion in section 5.1.3, the coding of the Somali Compact will be 
presented to demonstrate how the frames were employed within the document to reflect “a new 
political, security and development architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, 
its people, and the international community” (The Somali Compact, 2013:3). From this initial 
statement, the centrality of multilateralism and the comprehensive approach are visible. This 
is corroborated by the content analysis (see Chart 7) which further illustrates the extensive 
employment of ownership (20% of the coded segments) and partnership (24% of coded 
segments). The objective of this document was to align the international assistance to the 
country’s own peace and state-building priorities. The election of the new President as well as 
the increasing prospects of donor countries contributing peacebuilding affected this initiative. 
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The innovations introduced by JAES (2007) with respect to the relations between the EU and 
Africa, as well as the broadening of the partnership spectrum to include non-state actors in 
consultations (see section 6.3.1), influenced the needs within Somalia and thus impacted on the 
spectrum of instruments covered by the comprehensive approach as well as the scope of 
effective multilateralism to include non-state actors.  
 
Chart 7 The Somali Compact (2013) 
 
 
*% of the coded segments 
 
 The expanded scope of multilateralism to include citizens, civil society and multi-
stakeholders (The Somali Compact, 2013:3) within the consultation period, demonstrates the 
shift in the documents focus away from a government/developmental orientation. The Compact 
reinforces the role of the Somali people and introduces them as part of the multilateral process 
together with the government and the international community (Somali Compact, 2013:4). This 
enhancement of the societal level is followed by provisions within the frame of ownership, 
which can be summarized in the phrase of “Development is Somali-owned and Somali led” 
(Somali Compact, 2013: 13). 
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 Although the provisions within this text concern the internal structure of the Somali 
state and include the Constitutional reforms which will lead to a “greater alignment of 
international aid, reduction of fragmentation and increased Somali ownership” (Somali 
Compact, 2013:4), the question of whether EU normative impact can be detected remains. 
Although arguably the principles that underpin these changes to reflect good governance can 
be attributed to EU influence on the basis of “Africa and Europe are bound together by a 
community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the 
rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the 
constitutive texts of our respective Unions” (JAES, 2007:1), the element of recognition is still 
lacking to be considered an indication of normative diffusion. 
 Nevertheless, this recognition of the EU’s influence can be seen in the Annex of the 
Compact. Within this section the milestones for both the FGS and Somaliland are outlined, 
stating strategic objectives, governmental responsibilities and whether there is support from 
international partners. Therein, the UN and AMISOM are explicitly mentioned as supporting 
the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) concerning security (Somali Compact 
2013:32) and justice (Somali Compact 2013:33). Although coordination with other 
international partners is foreseen in these sections, therefore including the EU, it is interesting 
that it is only explicitly mentioned in the areas of justice and inclusive politics (Somali Compact 
2013:39), the environment (Somali Compact 2013:42) and health, education and civil service 
and public finance sectors (Somali Compact 2013:43). Taking into consideration the nature of 
these areas, one can speculate that the EU is recognised as a normative actor.  
 In view of the FAC Conclusions presented in the previous section and the reticence the 
EU demonstrated in the way it framed its involvement within Somalia, it is not surprising to 
see that its influence is not recognised within the Somali Compact. Nevertheless, this does not 
detract from the normative power of the EU overall, but is merely indicative of its shortcomings 
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in being a visible international actor within areas such as security and defence. Therefore, this 
justifies the sequence of recent occasions –most prominently within the EUGS (see section 
6.2.2) - in which the need for an autonomous EU presence is called for. 
 This section thus concludes the examination of the EU’s ‘intents’ within the proposed 
analytical framework as well as the perceived ‘impact’ (see section 3.3). The coding of the 
documents relating to the military operations in Somalia – EUNAVFOR and EUTM- will be 
presented next, thereby completing the analytical framework proposed with the element of 
action. 
 
7.3 Documentation relating to EU military operations in Somalia: EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
and EUTM  
Drawing from the normative landscape structured throughout the EU strategies, sub-
strategies and EU documents relating to Somalia, the focus of this analysis now turns to 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM. This will complete the illustration of the EU’s normative 
actorness within a normative setting by contributing the element of ‘action’ to the proposed 
framework from section 3.3. It is here that the fluctuations (or lack thereof) of the critical 
frames’ presence throughout the versions of the mandates emerges, highlighting the changes 
in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the evolving comparison between 
the two operations will contribute to the construction of a more comprehensive understanding 
of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall actorness in normative terms.  
 
7.3.1 EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
The naval component of the EU ‘s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU 
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy 
off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. It was at that time that the Council decided to launch 
 238 
its first naval military mission EU Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR). 
The mandate of this operation is based on the direct request by the TFG for support from the 
international community to deal with piracy. The objectives of the missions were thus 
determined as follows: a) the protection of vessels from the WFP delivering humanitarian food 
aid and further the protection of AMISOM shipping, b) the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of actors of piracy and armed robbery, c) the protection of merchant vessels in 
danger cruising off the Somali coast and d) the monitoring over areas off the coast of Somalia, 
in which dangers to maritime activities could arise (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 
10 November 2008). Therefore, the political objective of the operation was ‘to improve 
maritime security in the region’ while its military objective ‘to deter piracy and to strengthen 
the security of main maritime routes.  
According to Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, two levels are identified within 
which coordination would be sought. These levels also inform the frame of multilateralism 
within the operation itself. At a strategic level, close cooperation with the UN, the African 
Union (AU), the TFG and neighbouring countries. At an operational level, ship-owners’ 
organisations, the relevant UN departments and the WFP are identified. Furthermore, the 
mandate explicitly mentions the US-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) and NATO as 
privileged partners in the fight against piracy (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). Together 
with nine other countries with similar operations in the area such as China, India and Russia, 
this endeavour is a prime example of operational coordination. With reference to 
multilateralism, the operation mandate also provides that Atalanta would “liaise with 
organisations and entities, as well as States Working in the region to combat piracy and armed 
robbery” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). This particular responsibility could be 
perceived as normatively important given its connection with the preservation of the 
international legal order. EUNAVFOR Atalanta has, therefore, been able to align itself with 
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the aforementioned actors, of course within the remit decided upon by the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) which is responsible for the political and strategic direction of the EU 
military operation.  
The content analysis for the mandates and documentation regarding EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta did not prove to be illustrative of the frames’ use within them (see Table 7.2). The 
structured analysis carried out throughout this chapter, starting from the EU strategic 
documents and resulting in the operational mandates, has proven to be essential in the 
contextualisation of the operational provisions. According to Zwolski (2012:994), the EU 
endeavours to support its security environment internationally through the promotion of 
effective multilateralism and good governance via a comprehensive approach. This became 
more apparent in the JAES (2007) and later reflected in its FAC Conclusions (3023 FAC / 13 
June 2014) wherein the EU reiterated its commitment to local ownership and combatting the 
root causes of the challenges faced. The employment of the  partnership frame thereby assumes 
a key role and highlights an emergent pattern throughout the levels of EU documentation, 
whether in providing broader guidance on CSDP or focusing on particular regions (JAES, Horn 
of Africa). Continuously presenting itself as other-empowering (Tocci 2008), the Union 
arguably can be considered to accumulate characteristics of a ‘normative power’, at least on a 
theoretical level. The EEAS has been allocated a central role in assuring the harmonisation 
between the internal and external trajectories of its initiatives, thus always allowing the EU to 
achieve a level of coherence between the internal and external trajectories of its action, echoing 
De Zutter (2010).  
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Table 7.2 EUNAVFOR Atalanta: Content Analysis distribution (%) 
Code System Council 
Joint 
Action 
2008/ 
851/ 
CFSP, 
10 
Novem
ber 
2008 
EUSOM
, 
L.10/29
, 
15.1.20
09 
Counci
l 
Decisio
n 2012 
/174 
/CFSP, 
23 
March 
2012 
Factshee
t: 
EUNAVF
OR 
Somalia, 
16 Oct 
2012, 
EUNAVF
OR/42 
PSC 
Decision 
ATALANTA
/4/2012 
(2012/808/
CFSP), 
18.12.2012 
PSC 
Decision 
ATALANTA/
1/2013, 
(2013/159/
CFSP), 
22.3.2013 
Council 
Decision, 
2014/827/ 
CFSP,Renew
ing 
ATALANTA 
Extension 
of 
Atalanta, 
13274/16, 
25/10/201
6 
EUNAV
FOR: 
12/201
8, CEU 
691/16
, 
28/11/
2016 
Factsheet 
EUNAVFOR 
Somalia, 
EEAS 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
explicit 
0 0 33.3 33.3 0 0 0 0 100 50 
comprehensive 
approach \ 
TOTAL 
0 0 33.3 33.3 0 0 50 0 100 50 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
implied 
100 66.7 66.7 66.7 100 100 25 0 0 50 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
TOTAL 
100 66.7 66.7 66.7 100 100 25 0 0 50 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Ownership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Partnership 
implied 
0 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
Ownership 
0 16.7 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
partnership 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
TOTAL 
0 33.4 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 
*% of the coded segments 
 
The internal division of responsibilities regarding the conduct and planning of the 
operation can be considered important within the concept of the comprehensive approach. In 
the initial mandate of 2008 –before the Lisbon era and the establishment of the EEAS- the 
framework of interacting EU bodies which undertook the responsibility of different 
organisational aspects of the operation, were required to function in a coherent manner, thereby 
assuring the smooth function of the operation. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) was 
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responsible for sending reports to the PSC “regarding the conduct of the EU military operation” 
(Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art 6. Para 3) which would in turn receive reports from 
the EU Operation Commander. This demonstrates a mechanism demanding the coordinated 
effort of internal means, therefore could fall within the comprehensive approach concept 
introduced by the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008) (see section 6.1.1).  
An interesting provision in the first mandate regards the authorisation by the UNSC, of 
course with due respect of the conditions set by international law, allowing Atalanta to “take 
the necessary measures, including the use of force” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 
Article 2 Para d, emphasis added) in the execution of its duties. This explicit permission to 
utilise force has been questioned by Germond and Smith (2009:583) underline: “the advocates 
of an ESDP naval mission framed this option as not just a measured response to a known threat, 
but also as an opportunity to increase the EU’s scope of action and spread European/EU 
values”. This emphasis is important on a normative level seeing that although the intents by 
member states could have been self-serving, the inclusion of this threat in the only strategic 
document at the time which would guide the action of the EU’s external action, identified the 
importance of the underlying norms that would be diffused through its operationalisation. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the importance of norms in carrying out military operations 
also indicates the coexistence of the two elements despite the theoretical contradiction (as 
elaborated upon in Chapter 2). As they go on to emphasise: “the operation goes well beyond 
the traditional Petersberg-type ESDP tasks” since Atalanta “exercises the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state’s territorial waters in order 
to protect the EU’s and its Member State’s interests in addition to protecting the population of 
the state in question through the delivery of humanitarian aid” (Germond and Smith, 2009:573). 
This demonstrates a further departure from the previous practice that has been witnessed in the 
other military operations in which the EU has been involved. 
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The Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) of 23 March 2012 amended the original 
mandate of Atalanta by extending the area of operations to include Somali internal waters and 
land territory but also underlined the need to set conditions under which “persons suspected of 
intending…to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy” (Council Decision 
2012/174/CFSP, Art 12 Para 1) shall be transferred to the competent authorities. These changes 
bear significance to effective multilateralism as well as the range of the comprehensive 
approach. As far as the first is concerned, the extension of Atalanta’s jurisdiction into the 
sovereign Somali territorial waters and part of the mainland denotes the closer cooperation and 
coordination that would have to be achieved with the country’s judicial and police forces. 
Another important element with concern to multilateralism lies within the question of 
jurisdiction over the suspected pirates/armed robbers, which in turn would determine the 
avenues of cooperation needed for the transfer of said offender. An observation can be made 
at this point regarding the absence of partnership and ownership, both implied or explicit. 
Although reference to those frames or the concepts that underpin them is not identified within 
the mandates themselves, it can be surmised from the broader context within which they are 
situated. Drawing from the provisions in the “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa” 
(16858/11, 14/11/2011) as well as more broadly from the JAES (2007), the cooperation with 
regional authorities mentioned above would still imply respect to the principles of “equal 
partnership and shared ownership” (4th EU Summit Declaration, 2014:1, see section 6.3.1). 
Most importantly, this change is significant with reference to the comprehensive 
approach. In extending the jurisdiction of Atalanta to seizing vessels on shore adds to the 
element of prevention foreseen in the mandate. It also shows the even tighter relationship 
provided for the naval operation with the other operational activity of the EU in Somalia. The 
Factsheet on EUNAVFOR (16 October 2012) is particularly illustrating in this respect “The 
EU’s objective in Somalia is to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful, stable and 
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democratic country, trigger sustainable development and eradicate the root causes of piracy” 
(EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4) especially seeing that the normative underpinnings of the 
EU’s endeavours are once again underlined. Commitment to the normative core principles (see 
section 2.1) is emphasised within the comprehensive approach, thus demonstrating their 
intricate link. In the same section, the fit of EUNAVFOR with the EU’s other initiatives 
comprising this approach (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor) is highlighted, as well as its 
relation to external actors (AMISOM) within the same concept. In turn this links to the 
conceptual definition of the comprehensive approach within the ESS (2007) and the 
Implementation Report (2008), regarding the interconnectedness of the internal and external 
trajectories of coordination (see section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). This argument is further reinforced 
by the explicit reference to “an integrated and complementary manner with EU humanitarian 
and development aid” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4) as well as the situation of the naval 
efforts within a regional context, thereby pointing to the relevance of the provisions presented 
in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (16858/11, 14/ November 2011) as well as 
the JAES (2007) (see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.1 respectively).  
The role of the EEAS also becomes prominent in the amendment of the Council 
Decision (2012/174/CFSP) amending EUNAVFOR’s mandate. In view of the Service’s 
establishment in 2010 and the restructuring of the EU’s institutional framework as a result of 
that, the previously mentioned PSC and EUMC now fall within the remit of the EEAS’ 
authority (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the appointment of and EUSR to the Horn of Africa in 
2011, again under the oversight of the Service, to best coordinate the components of the 
comprehensive approach in Somalia “thus supporting regional and international efforts to 
achieve lasting peace, security and development” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4), underlines 
the central role allocated to the EEAS. These changes would entail the inclusion both of a 
strategic as well as a political nature, in defining the direction of the EU military operation with 
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respect to the former, and situating Atalanta within the broader regional needs and initiatives, 
with respect to the latter.  
The next amendment to EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate (Council Decision 
2014/827/CFSP, 21 November 2014) foresaw the extension of the operation’s activities until 
12 December 2016. Most importantly, for the first time in the Council Decisions delineating 
its role, the document explicitly recognises Somali ownership as the basis for the operation 
within an “integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia” (Council 
Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014). According to the document: “the EU will take forward its 
integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia, on the basis of Somali 
ownership and responsibility, close coordination with other actors and coherence and synergies 
between EU instruments, in particular between its Common Security and Defence Policy 
missions and operations” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, preamble para. 5). This 
excerpt summarises the further incorporation of the operation within the frames, but also 
demonstrates their interconnected nature. The document also focuses on the need to tackle the 
root causes of piracy whilst expanding on Atalanta’s mandated tasks. Both of these changes 
carry normative significance. The alleviation of the root causes, rather than the eradication of 
the symptoms – security threats, implies the aim of tackling the conditions that create the threat 
itself. As presented in Chapter 5, the underlying causes of piracy stem from the chronic state 
instability as well as the internal fragmentation of Somalia. Furthermore, the corruption of 
government and subsequent lack of trust by the population, also spilling into the international 
donors, have exacerbated illegal activity. Therefore, the EU’s engagement with changing the 
root causes implies the promotion of social solidarity, rule of law and good governance, three 
of nine principle norms according to NPE (Manners 2002). Thus, the link of addressing the 
root causes is inextricably linked to the diffusion of normative power.  
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To this end the document adds secondary tasks to Atalanta which contribute to “anti-
piracy law enforcement while improving the efficiency of its intelligence-led counter-piracy 
operations” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, preamble para. 8). More specifically it 
includes responsibility of personal data collection of persons under suspicion for piracy and 
armed robbery to assist their identification (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1, 
par 2(g)). Subsequent to collection, this data is shared with EUROPOL and with Somali entities 
as well as private companies operating on their behalf, ultimately leading to “better 
understanding their activities and capacities and de-conflict operations at sea” (Council 
Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1, para 2 (k)). Lastly, Atalanta is called to contribute 
to the “logistical support, provision of expertise or training at sea” (Council Decision 
2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1 para 2 (l)), assisting EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM Somalia and 
the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, thereby informing the frames of comprehensive approach by 
enhancing the coordination of the EU’s efforts as well as effective multilateralism between the 
concerned parties.  
Subsequently, what becomes apparent is the extension of Atalanta’s responsibilities 
into tasks of a non-forceful nature. Although formally a military operation, EUNAVFOR 
contributes more to the efforts against piracy within a civilian-mission resembling capacity 
than one associated with the use of coercion. It’s role in the repression of piracy is diminished 
to the benefit of its actions in the prevention of the phenomenon. With the normative foundation 
and justification of these alterations in mind, EUNAVFOR is presented more as a diffuser of 
said norms rather than a military force with a narrowly defined securitizing mandate. Therefore, 
this conceptualisation of a military operation can be seen as compatible with the NPE structure 
(see section 2.4.2) and echoes Manner’s and Diez’ (Diez and Manners, 2007:178; Diez 2005) 
assertion that military power can be also be beneficial for spreading civilian values. Further 
speaking to Larsen’s (2002) argument, irrespective of the presence of military capabilities –
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EUNAVFOR in this case- the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power, thereby 
rendering Atalanta an example of the EU’s normative identity manifesting in its actorness.  
 Within the scope of operations carried out in Somalia, the comprehensive approach as 
well as effective multilateralism are found at the core of the EU’s efforts to eradicate the threats 
faced within the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Strategies which directly affect and 
guide the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives were constructed in the light of the EEAS’s 
appearance within the framework of external action, underline the importance of the 
aforementioned frames not only in understanding the EU’s actorness but also subsequently the 
character attributed to the EEAS in which appears at the crux of internal and external 
multilateralism. As illustrated in Chapter 2 and supported throughout this thesis, normative 
power is seen as a separate type of power which can also include military presence if that is 
not complemented by coercive action. In the ensuing section, the critical frames will be 
elaborated upon within the context of EUNAVFOR Atalanta.  
The EU’s response to piracy off the coast of Somalia is confirmation that the security 
instruments within the policy framework are located within CSDP in the post-Lisbon period 
but also branch out to other areas (Zwolski, 2012:69). According to Ehrhart and Petretto 
(2013:185) the kingpins of piracy may have strategically withdrawn from their naval activities, 
nevertheless the possibilities of a future resurgence of criminal activity is not impossible. The 
UN Security Council supported this view (S/2013/413: 22) by stating that once international 
naval actors withdraw and ship owners feel secure in reducing the private protection on board 
their vessels, there is an expectation that piracy will pick up once more.  
 The most important contribution of the Comprehensive Approach was the inclusion of 
a long-term plan which would ensure the alleviation of the security threats in the area. The 
subsequent reorientation and increased focus on the role of the EEAS demonstrated its 
importance within the current guise of CSDP. This becomes even more apparent when 
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reviewing the evolution of EUNAVFOR and EUTM. Given their particular combination within 
the comprehensive approach as well as effective multilateralism, it becomes apparent that 
engagement in Somalia will continue to be a case that will act as a test for the efficiency of 
CSDP as well as the EEAS in bringing together the elements which will ultimately lead the EU 
to becoming a recognised global normative actor. In turn this case will also act as a proof of 
concept concerning the EU’s normative power, given that this element is underlined within the 
EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan (see section 6.2.2). The fact that its mandate has been 
extended until December 2018 (Council Decision 13274/16, 25 October 2016) is testament to 
the continuing relevance of the case made. 
 The evolution of EUNAVFOR’s role appearing through the consecutive amendments 
to its mandate illustrate the parallel increase in its civilian responsibilities under the strategic 
and political oversight of the Service. It can be argued that the establishment of the EEAS, an 
important change to CSDP’s evolution, affected these alterations to Atalanta’s tasks and thus 
acted catalytically towards the its emergence as a norm-diffusing agent rather than a traditional 
military operation. In turn, this realisation speaks to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, 
the EU becomes more visibly a normative actor judging from its external action efforts in 
Somalia. This argument is further supported by the analysis of frames presented throughout 
this chapter. Secondly, through the examination of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, military means can 
arguably be compatible with the NPE framework and act in a conducive manner to normative 
diffusion. This has been demonstrated on the level of ‘intent’ through the critical frame analysis 
of the EU strategic documents and sub-strategies, as well as on the level of ‘action’, through 
the examination of EUNAVFOR’s mandate.  
 The following section will add the last piece of this puzzle by examining the second 
military operation in Somalia, EUTM. This will add a second point of exploration thereby 
allowing the comparison between the EU’s military endeavours in Somalia together with 
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determining their significance within a normative context. Through the examination of the 
frames as well as their normative underpinnings, this final piece of analysis will complete the 
operational exploration of the EU’s military operations in Somalia and ultimately, lead to the 
conclusion of remarks with reference to their pertinence in the examination of the Union’s 
actorness as a constitutive element of the Union’s overall ‘normative power’ identity.  
 
7.3.2 EUTM Somalia 
Within the scope of its comprehensive approach to supporting the Somali Security 
sector, the EU launched a military training operation in 2010 – EUTM. The aim of this mission 
was to act in parallel to the naval component of its military efforts (EUNAVFOR) and 
contribute to the training of Somali security forces. According to the document which set up 
this operation (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP), the EU’s decision to increase its engagement 
for the promotion of peace and development in the country resulted from UNSC Resolution 
1872 (2009) which stressed the importance of the “re-establishment, equipping and retention 
of Somali security forces”. This initiative would be “part of a larger and coherent framework 
involving close EU cooperation” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para 3) as well 
as coordination with international partners, most prominently the AU, the UN and US. The 
importance of AMISOM’s role was also underlined in the same section. Together with Atalanta 
and the EUSR, EUTM is part of another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 
FAC Conclusions 2011: 8). The mission operated from its headquarter in the Ugandan capital 
of Kampala until the first months of 2014, while training was carried out in the western part of 
the country. The mission also served as a liaison office in Nairobi (Kenya). In the first months 
of 2014, the headquarters of EUTM were relocated to the Somali capital Mogadishu, together 
with all advisory, monitoring and training. In time it focused further on self-training capacities 
of the SNSF and transferring EU training to local actors (Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP). 
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What becomes apparent from the outset is the foundation of this operation on the 
comprehensive approach –through its complementarity with EUNAVFOR- and effective 
multilateralism –within the framework of its coordinated efforts with international partner. This 
will be demonstrated in the ensuing critical analysis of the frames as well as the examination 
of their normative significance. This section will act as the final piece of elaboration concerning 
the EU’s military engagement in Somalia, thus concluding the presentation of ‘action’ within 
the analytical framework of this thesis. Together with EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM will 
demonstrate the operationalisation of the frames within the particular context of its mandate. 
Furthermore, it will allow the comparison between the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia, 
thus allowing for a more comprehensive illustration of this facet of external action. In turn, 
through the normative evaluation of the EU’s actions, a conclusion will be reached with regard 
to the main research question concerning the EU’s normative actorness as well as to whether 
military means can be compatible with the diffusion of norms. 
Conversely to the document portrait of EUNAVFOR (see Table 7.2), EUTM is more 
diverse in the depiction of the critical frames (see Table 7.3). Most importantly, it highlights 
the appearance of ownership as well as the consistent use of ‘partnership’ within its mandates 
together with a dominant recurrence of effective multilateralism. Given the number of 
international stakeholders engaged within this mission, it doesn’t come as a surprise that the 
coordination of their efforts is a central element of the mandates. What also emerges from the 
first mandate is the prior involvement of regional state actors (Uganda) in an effort to change 
the security sector landscape of Somalia. 
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Table 7.3 EUTM Somalia: Content Analysis Distribution (%) 
  Council 
Decision 
EUTM 
2010/96/CF
SP, 
15/2/2010 
Council 
Decision 
2011/483/C
FSP, 
28/07/2011 
Press 
Release: 
EUTM 
Somalia 
Information 
Brief 
8/5/2012 
Council 
Decision 
2012/83
5/CFSP, 
21/12/20
12 
Council 
Decision 
2013/44/C
FSP, 
22/1/2013 
Factshe
et, 
EUTM 
Somalia
, 
Decem
ber 
2013 
Council 
Decision 
(CFSP) 
2015/441, 
16/3/201
5 
Factshee
t: CSDP- 
EUTM 
Somalia 
April 
2016 
Council 
Decision 
(CFSP), 
2016/22
39, 
12/12/20
16 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
implied 
0 0 0 0 33.3 37.5 33.3 0 0 
comprehensive 
approach \ CA 
explicit 
16.7 0 0 0 0 12.5 0 33.3 0 
comprehensive 
approach \ TOTAL 
16.7 0 0 0 33.3 50 33.3 33.3 0 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
implied 
50 66.7 0 0 50 37.5 33.3 33.3 0 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
Multilateralism 
explicit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
effective 
multilateralism \ 
TOTAL 
50 66.7 0 0 50 37.5 33.3 33.3 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Ownership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 8.3 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Partnership 
implied 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
Ownership 
0 0 0 0 0 0 33.3 0 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
Explicit 
partnership 
33.3 33.3 100 0 8.3 12.5 0 33.3 0 
partnership-
ownership \ 
TOTAL 
33.3 33.3 100 0 16.6 12.5 33.3 33.3 0 
*% of the coded segments 
 
  
 Within the foreword of the initial mandate of EUTM (Council Decision 
2010/96/CFSP), the role of the mission is broadly outlined as covering the need “to support the 
training of the Somali security forces” and emphasised that when “the EU planning for the 
delivery of training would be implemented, the EU trainers would be expected to follow 
harmonised and approved curricula” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 8). The 
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context of this harmonisation becomes clearer in paragraph 11 of the same document which 
indicates the fit of the mission within a pre-existing framework of activities at that time. The 
military mission would “contribute to the training of Somali security forces in Uganda where 
Somali forces are already being trained” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 11). 
In the same paragraph, the role of this mission would also allow for the better coordination of 
EU action with AMISOM. Therefore, what immediately emerges from the very beginning, is 
the centrality of effective multilateralism. The mission becomes the actual medium of 
coordination rather than part of the effort itself. Furthermore, traces of the comprehensive 
approach are also visible. In facilitating coordination between the two international parties, 
EUTM also contributed to internal coordination being harmonised with its external trajectory. 
This element was highlighted as part of the concept within ESS (see section 6.2.1) and, within 
the current context, is being effectively operationalised whilst interwoven with the frame of 
effective multilateralism. The importance of multilateralism is further enhanced in this 
paragraph wherein the Council explicitly provided for the training to be “part of a wider 
international effort” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 11). 
In this mandate the delineation of tasks is highly indicative of EUTM’s nature, which 
appears to be a stark departure from that of a traditional military operation. Within this 
allocation of responsibilities, the EU’s identity emerges as distinctly normative in nature when 
viewed through the forms of diffusion it employs (see Textbox 1). According to Article 1 
(Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP): “The Union shall conduct a military training mission, here- 
in after called ‘EUTM Somalia’, in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens. In 
particular, the EU military mission shall be to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable 
perspective for the development of the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somali 
security forces through the provision of specific military training, and support to the training 
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provided by Uganda, of 2 000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including 
appropriate modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned officers.” This 
provision is very dense in the way it illustrates the role of the operation as well as the 
subsequent identity of the EU that is reflected within it. From a preliminary observation, the 
aim of the military training is different from that in the foreword. In this occasion, the goal is 
to strengthen the TFG –provide long-term political change- rather than contribute to the Somali 
Security Sector –potentially short-term security support. This implies the EU’s priority in 
safeguarding the functioning of government demonstrates its perception of self within this 
operation as an actor promoting core normative principles of good governance and sustainable 
development (Manners 2002) rather than one participating in a security endeavour. Therefore, 
the EU portrays itself as a civilian actor despite the military nature of the initiative (Larsen 
2002). This point is reinforced by the invocation of UNSC Resolution 1897 (2009) from which 
the EU initiative stemmed, which underlines its “respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia” (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, 
preamble para 1). Through a normative lens, Manners’ (2008:46) submission that the EU 
promotes normative principles that are generally acknowledged with the UN system to be 
universally acceptable becomes pertinent. In promoting such normative justification (via 
reference) the EU increases the value of the norms it promotes thus further reinforcing the 
procedural diffusion which is employed in this instance (see Textbox 1). The emphasis put on 
the wellbeing of the people is also important in this assessment, in view of its thematic 
resemblance to the focus that is prevalent in the Somali Compact three years later (see section 
6.4.2). In turn this highlights the continuity of intents the EU promotes, thus indicating their 
origin stemming from the EU’s identity rather than being temporary rhetoric devices of ad hoc 
diplomatic utility.  
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Additionally, the troops receiving specialised training as well as the financial 
commitments of the EU towards them are also indicative of its civilian-oriented actorness 
within this operation. As mentioned in the foreword, the EU’s plan to support the trained forces 
would extend to after they returned to Mogadishu (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, preamble 
para 11), thereby demonstrating its long-term commitment rather than a short-term 
contribution. What is striking in the same paragraph is the EU’s undertaking of the “funding 
and payment of the salaries of the soldiers” (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, preamble para 
11). This point is not only important in terms of its support to the security reform support, but 
also indicative of the Union’s nature and self-perception. The transference diffusion employed 
in this instance (see Textbox 1), reaffirms Larsen’s (2002) submission that the EU continues to 
portray itself as a civilian power, despite the presence of military means. Moreover, Article 1 
(Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP) specifies the ranks receiving the mandated training, but also 
the higher ranks receiving specialised training. This further underlines the EU’s intent to 
achieve a long-term effect, which it explicitly identifies as “comprehensive and sustainable” 
(Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 1), in that alongside the troops –responsible for 
security provision- the officers -providing strategic direction on the ground- will be trained as 
well.  
Lastly, Article 5 (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP) addresses the EUTM’s political 
control and strategic direction. The PSC, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, 
will be providing this direction and report to the EUMC at regular intervals. The latter is 
responsible for the proper execution of the mission (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 
6, para 1). In view of EUTM commencing in the post-Lisbon era, yet before the start of the 
EEAS’ activities, the element of internal cohesion also becomes apparent with the same 
contextual importance as in the case of EUNAVFOR (see section 4.5.1). 
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This contribution towards training within the higher ranks of the forces is expanded in 
Article 1 of the operation’s first amending and extending Council Decision (2011/483/CFSP 
of 28 July 2011), which stated that “Training will focus on developing Command and Control 
and specialised capabilities and on self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to 
transferring EU training expertise to local actors”. This echoes Elgström (2011:459) in the 
ability of actors to “redefine interests and preferences”, only in a the more specified social 
microcosm of the military. In this capacity, the EU would have the ability to indirectly 
influence the activities within the security sector, whilst simultaneously remaining non-
coercive in practice. An important addition in this amendment is the incorporation of an intent 
to “integrate different militias and clan forces into the NSF” (2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, 
preamble para. 6). This further underlines the pertinence of Elgström’s (2011) view and speaks 
to the particular problems of the country’s internal fragmentation (see Chapter 5).  
The objective of EUTM is, therefore, aimed at ultimately providing the Somali state 
with the ability to train their armed forces, so they can protect their own state and people as 
well as to provide a long-term sustainable result which would withstand potential resurgence 
of the threats. From a normative power standpoint, this long-term result goes beyond the 
security concerns usually undertaken by military operations and sets the ground for the 
transference of skills. In turn, it extends into the frame of “ownership”. Although this frame 
does not explicitly appear within the original mandate, the role of the EU as well as that of the 
other international actors is framed as a “partnership” in the first amending mandate 
(2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, preamble para. 9), therefore implying a relationship of equals 
rather than one of a superior-intervener with a weaker-host (Diez 2005). The main goal is stated 
as “transferring EU training expertise to local actors…in line with agreed TFG requirements” 
(Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011: Art 1 par 1). Therefore, essentially, the 
intent, the action as well as the impact of EUTM is of a non-coercive nature whilst 
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simultaneously accomplishing to contribute substantially in a military fashion to the 
elimination of the threats in Somalia. Although the efforts of the EU were aimed at providing 
assistance and addressing the root causes of the security threats (namely piracy and terrorism), 
EUTM provided an impetus of resolving internal fragmentation by integrating militias and clan 
forces into SNSF (Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, preamble paragraph 6). This initiative 
was further expanded in the Somali Compact (2013) which added a level of internal 
cooperation between the TFG and Somaliland (see Chapter 5). Even though the EU has 
promoted its commitment to the protection of the Somali people as the reason for the military 
training mission, it can be argued that other concerns might lie behind the objective of the 
mission, such as the risk of Somalia developing into a base for Somali extremists and terror 
organizations (see Ehrhart and Peteretto 2013:184-185). Such a development would surely 
have an impact on the government and citizens of Somalia, but would also impact the EU in 
the form of a possible terrorist attack, as well as an increase in the piracy and boarding of 
European merchant vessels. 
Within the remit of the comprehensive approach, the EU managed to integrate the 
initiatives of diverse actors which aimed at training the Somali security forces within EUTM. 
Somali soldiers’ first-hand training has been taking place only at the EUTM camp (initially in 
Uganda and more since 2013 in Mogadishu) with coordinated activities of the Ugandan 
Government, the UN, the USA and the AU. Nevertheless, according to Ehrhart and Petretto 
(2013:184-185), the security governance in Somalia demands a more radical change in security 
structures rather than the training of the soldiers. The fact that the soldiers are selected from 
within and trained for the Somali Government is highly problematic, seeing that their role will 
be serving the political leadership in Mogadishu rather than the general population. As 
mentioned previously in Chapter 6, the fact that the distrust of the people in the government 
combined with the general distrust in the function of the elites in higher levels of government, 
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would only diminish security for the people. This also affects the the population’s impression 
of the EU, seeing that the government has been perceived as extensively corrupt and Western 
supported (see Chapter 5). 
 The third Council Decision (2013/4/CFSP, 22/1/2013) amending and extending 
EUTM’s mandate, introduces new insight to the analysis of the frames, following a completely 
basic second amending Council Decision (2012/835/CFSP, 21/12/2012). Article 1 para. 2 
(2013/4/CFSP) foresees the operation relocating all its advisory, mentoring and training 
activities to Mogadishu whilst taking out the clause explicitly mentioning the Somali citizens. 
Instead, the new mandate refers to the military operation’s contribution to “the building up and 
strengthening of the Somali National armed Forces (‘SNAF’) accountable to the Somali 
National Government, consistent with Somali needs and priorities” (2013/4/CFSP, Article 1, 
para 1). What becomes apparent is the shift of scope from the needs of the population to those 
of the state. This is a particularly interesting alteration seeing that the Somalia Compact, which 
was adopted, later that year demonstrated the reverse course (see section 6.3.2). In view of the 
Somali election in 2012, the governmental structure had relatively stabilised thereby allowing 
it to undertake its responsibilities. In turn this signals the end of the period calling for the 
increased support of the international partners, as outlined in the initial EUTM mandate 
(Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP). Nevertheless, the CSDP EUTM factsheet of December 
2013, still makes reference to the EU’s support “towards improving the living conditions of 
the population” (Factsheet, EUTM Somalia 2013: 2). It is worth noting that this phrase appears 
under the title of “The European Union’s Comprehensive Approach to Somalia”, thereby 
linking this matter directly to the relevant frame.  
Within the same section of this document the role of the EU is explicitly mentioned as 
that of “major sponsor of AMISOM…both financially and on planning and capacity building” 
(EUTM Factsheet 2013: 2). This leads to the conclusion that the EU remains a civilian actor 
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when supporting the efforts in Somalia, even though its military operations, while at the same 
time providing capacities in order to justify its role and establish a resonating credibility for its 
involvement. Therefore, the focus of its self-presentation is on the benefits and support through 
its military training mission while completely avoiding actual engagement of military 
capacities on the ground, thus establishing itself as a facilitating power that is founded on 
training and financial support rather than hard power. This indicates the EU’s resolution to 
upholding its normative non-coercive practices, whilst demonstrating the symbolic importance 
of a military operation which engages in a civilian power strategic function, thus echoing the 
views of Whitman (2002), concerning the civilian character of the EU remaining irreducible to 
its military power, as well as Larsen (2002) on the EU’s self-portrayal as a civilian power.   
The final issue that is called for at this point concerns the role of the HR, and the EEAS 
subsequently, in the three most recent EUTM mandates. Although the 4th and 5th mandates - 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015 and Council Decision (CFSP), 2016/2239, 
12/12/2016- provide no further insight to the operation, they reiterate the EU’s commitment to 
the comprehensive approach as well as to effective multilateralism. From the 3rd mandate 
(2013/44/CFSP, 22/1/2013) and henceforth the structure of strategic and political guidance 
outlined in the launch of EUTM was incorporated into the structure of the HR. Therefore, in 
terms of internal coherence between the concerned instruments as well as representation within 
coordinated efforts with international partners, the HR and EEAS assume a key position. 
Echoing to De Zutter’s (2010:1111) definition of a normative power as a “political entity whose 
norms guide its internal and external practices” while emphasising the element of coherence 
between the two, it appears that the HR is that normative actor within EUTM. Furthermore, 
with Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis on the appearance of an actor as a normative power in mind, 
the HR has been identified by the Somali Republic as central to the EU’s efforts in the country. 
This is evidenced within the 3rd EUTM mandate (2013/44/CFSP, preamble para 6) whereby 
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the Somali Government requested the “HR to continue the Union’s engagement in support of 
Somalia”. Therefore, one can argue that the HR and subsequently the EEAS can be considered 
as the source of the EU’s normative diffusion, at least when referring to the case of the military 
operations in Somalia.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Building on the basis of the strategic documents and sub-strategies, this chapter focused 
on: a) the niche exploration of ‘intent’ through the EU documents relating to Somalia 
specifically as well as with the pivotal Somali Compact (2013), and b) the element of ‘action’ 
through the documentation relating to the EU’s two military operations in Somalia – 
EUNAVFOR and EUTM.  
The period between 2010 and 2013 covered by the documentation encompasses key 
moments in the EU’s evolution as an international actor, particularly with reference to its 
engagement with Somalia. From an institutional standpoint, 2010 marks the establishment of 
the EEAS, argued by this thesis to be a catalyst in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. 
From an operational standpoint, this timeframe encapsulates the parallel activities of 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the launching of EUTM in 2010, thus provisions for both can be 
found in the selected Council Conclusions. Lastly, the timeframe suits the examination of the 
dynamic norm diffusion between the EU and Somalia, thus demonstrating the former’s 
reception as a ‘normative actor’. Echoing the theoretical arguments of Diez (2005) and 
Kavalski (2013) (see section 2.6), this section also reflected the Somali side (through the 
Somali Compact), thereby addressing the element of ‘impact’ within the proposed analytical 
framework for this thesis (see section 3.3).  
The Council Conclusions on Somalia demonstrate an irregular employment of the 
frames, demonstrated in Table 7.1. Although effective multilateralism appears to be used in 
 259 
equal proportion to the comprehensive approach in 2010, it becomes the dominant frame 
employed in 2012 and 2014. Therefore, although not conclusively, effective multilateralism 
appears to be the central frame in all documents while ownership also appears to be consistently 
applied. Similarly to the conclusions drawn from the previous chapter, what can be surmised 
is that the binary of effective multilateralism with partnership-ownership is crucial in the 
country specific case of Somalia too. 
In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council (3023 FAC /14 June 2010) acknowledged the 
multi-faceted nature of piracy and identified the root causes of piracy. It therefore called upon 
the High Representative to propose a comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa in an 
effort to reinforce the stability of Somalia which required a comprehensive approach in the 
region linking security policy with development. This arguably more strategic approach 
accentuated the importance of regional multilateralism within the Horn of Africa and 
underlined the importance of “building on Somali ownership and addressing the underlying 
security and developmental challenges in Somalia” (3023 FAC /14 June 2010:1).  
The HR/VP was thereby given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and 
coordinate European action, setting her and the EEAS at the epicentre of operationalising the 
comprehensive approach. What also becomes apparent is the interconnectivity of the frames 
employed, geared towards achieving a long-term goal. As far as the actorness of the EU is 
concerned, in this document it appears that the EU takes a back seat in dealing with the 
resolution of the challenges in the area. Therefore, the invocation of ownership on this occasion 
can be perceived as reluctance to act, rather than ‘other’-empowering support (Tocci, 2008).   
What is subsequently underlined is the financial support of the EU without determining 
its contribution in military means or its active engagement in supporting the forces during 
conflict. What is also reiterated is the dominant and primary role of AMISOM as well as its 
leadership in the operations on the ground. The EU thus remains a civilian actor when 
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supporting the efforts in Somalia while at the same time providing capacities in order to justify 
its role and establish a resonating credibility of its involvement.  
In the statement by the HR (6/9/2013) and the Communiqué following the adoption of 
A New Deal for Somalia, ownership of the local forces as well as the commitment of the EU 
to providing comprehensive support to AMISOM and the FGS are repeated. Therefore, the 
EEAS and Council appear to exhibit the same level of reticence in this occasion. Nevertheless, 
this insistence on ownership can be seen on a theoretical basis as supporting the case for the 
EU’s normative power based on Tocci’s (2008:9-13) assertion that normative powers are other-
empowering. Although this might appear as a very convenient excuse for the EU’s 
demonstrated lack of initiative, it nevertheless is justifiable on a theoretical level.  
The Somali Compact (2013) from its initial statement, highlights the centrality of the 
partnership-ownership binary. This is corroborated by the content analysis (see Chart 7) which 
further illustrates the extensive employment of ownership (20% of the coded segments) and 
partnership (24% of coded segments). The objective of this document was to align the 
international assistance to the country’s own peace and state-building priorities, therefore 
creating a connection between the binary and effective multilateralism. The innovations 
introduced by JAES (2007) with respect to the relations between the EU and Africa, as well as 
the broadening of the partnership spectrum to include non-state actors in consultations (see 
section 6.3.1), influenced the needs within Somalia and thus impacted on the spectrum of 
instruments covered by the comprehensive approach as well as the scope of effective 
multilateralism to include non-state actors.  
In view of the FAC Conclusions presented in the preceding section and the reticence 
the EU demonstrated in the way it framed its involvement within Somalia, it is not surprising 
to see that its influence is not recognised as a visible international actor within areas such as 
security and defence. Therefore, this justifies the sequence of recent occasions –most 
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prominently within the EUGS (see section 6.2.2) - in which the need for an autonomous EU 
presence is called for. 
The evolution of EUNAVFOR’s role appearing through the consecutive amendments 
to its mandate illustrate the parallel increase in its civilian responsibilities under the strategic 
and political oversight of the Service. It can be argued that the establishment of the EEAS, an 
important change to CSDP’s evolution, affected these alterations to Atalanta’s tasks and thus 
acted catalytically towards the its emergence as a norm-diffusing agent rather than a traditional 
military operation. In turn, this realisation speaks to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, 
the EU becomes more visibly a normative actor judging from its external action efforts in 
Somalia. This argument is further supported by the analysis of frames presented throughout 
this chapter. Secondly, through the examination of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, military means can 
arguably be compatible with the NPE framework and act in a conducive manner to normative 
diffusion. This has been demonstrated on the level of ‘intent’ through the critical frame analysis 
of the EU strategic documents and sub-strategies, as well as on the level of ‘action’, through 
the examination of EUNAVFOR’s mandate.  
The naval component of the EU ‘s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU 
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy 
off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. The objectives of the operation under the initial 
mandate (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008) were: a) a political 
objective, geared towards the improvement of maritime security in the region and b) a military 
objective to deter piracy and to strengthen the security of main maritime routes. With reference 
to multilateralism, the operation mandate provides that Atalanta would “liaise with 
organisations and entities, as well as States Working in the region to combat piracy and armed 
robbery” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). 
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The content analysis for the mandates and documentation regarding EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta did not prove to be illustrative of the frames’ use within them (see Table 7.2). In the 
context of the EU’s evolution as an external actor though (as outlined in Chapter 4) the internal 
division of responsibilities regarding the conduct and planning of the operation can be 
considered important within the concept of the comprehensive approach. In the initial mandate 
of 2008 –before the Lisbon era and the establishment of the EEAS- the framework of 
interacting EU bodies which undertook the responsibility of different organisational aspects of 
the operation were required to function in a coherent manner, thereby assuring the smooth 
function of the operation.  
An interesting provision in the first mandate regards the authorisation by the UNSC, of 
course with due respect of the conditions set by international law, allowing Atalanta to “take 
the necessary measures, including the use of force” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 
Article 2 Para d, emphasis added) in fulfilling its duties. This explicit permission to utilise force 
has been questioned by Germond and Smith (2009:583) who underline: “the advocates of an 
ESDP naval mission framed this option as not just a measured response to a known threat, but 
also as an opportunity to increase the EU’s scope of action and spread European/EU values”.  
This demonstrates a further departure from the previous practice that has been witnessed in the 
other military operations in which the EU has been involved. 
The Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) of 23 March 2012 amended the original 
mandate of Atalanta by extending the area of operations to include Somali internal waters and 
land territory but also underlined the need to set conditions under which the extension of 
Atalanta’s jurisdiction into the sovereign Somali territorial waters and part of the mainland 
denotes the closer cooperation and coordination that would have to be achieved with the 
country’s judicial and police forces. Another important element with concern to multilateralism 
lies within the question of jurisdiction over the suspected pirates/armed robbers, which in turn 
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would determine the avenues of cooperation needed for the transfer of said offender. An 
observation can be made at this point regarding the absence of partnership and ownership, both 
implied and explicit. Most importantly, this change is significant with reference to the 
comprehensive approach but also shows the even tighter relationship provided for the naval 
operation with the other operational activity of the EU in Somalia (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP 
Nestor), as well as its relation to external actors (AMISOM) within the same concept.  
The role of the EEAS also becomes prominent in Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) 
amending EUNAVFOR’s mandate. In view of the Service’s establishment in 2010 and the 
restructuring of the EU’s institutional framework as a result of that, the previously mentioned 
PSC and EUMC now fall within the remit of the EEAS’ authority (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
the appointment of and EUSR to the Horn of Africa in 2011, again under the oversight of the 
Service, to best coordinate the components of the comprehensive approach in Somalia “thus 
supporting regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and 
development” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4), underlines the central role allocated to the 
EEAS.  
The next amendment to EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate (Council Decision 
2014/827/CFSP, 21 November 2014), for the first time in the Council Decisions delineating its 
role, the document explicitly recognises Somali ownership as the basis for the operation within 
an “integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia” (Council 
Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014). Subsequently, what becomes apparent is the extension of 
Atalanta’s responsibilities into tasks of a non-forceful nature. Although formally a military 
operation, EUNAVFOR contributes more to the efforts against piracy within a civilian-mission 
resembling capacity than one associated with the use of coercion. 
EUNAVFOR is therefore presented more as a diffuser of said norms rather than a 
military force with a narrowly defined securitizing mandate. Therefore, this conceptualisation 
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of a military operation can be seen as compatible with the NPE structure (see section 2.4.2) 
and echoes Manners’ and Diez’ (Diez and Manners, 2007:178; Diez 2005) assertion that 
military power can be also be beneficial for spreading civilian values. Further speaking to 
Larsen’s (2002) argument, irrespective of the presence of military capabilities –EUNAVFOR 
in this case- the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power, thereby rendering Atalanta 
an example of the EU’s normative identity manifesting in its actorness.  
Within the scope of its comprehensive approach to supporting the Somali Security 
sector, the EU launched a military training operation in 2010 – EUTM. The aim of this mission 
was to act in parallel to the naval component of its military efforts (EUNAVFOR) and 
contribute to the training of Somali security forces. The importance of AMISOM’s role was 
also underlined in the same section. Together with Atalanta and the EUSR, EUTM is part of 
another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 FAC Conclusions 2011: 8). 
What becomes apparent from the outset is the foundation of this operation on the 
comprehensive approach –through its complementarity with EUNAVFOR- and effective 
multilateralism –within the framework of its coordinated efforts with international partner.  
Conversely to the document portrait of EUNAVFOR (see Table 7.2), EUTM is more 
diverse in the depiction of the critical frames (see Table 7.3). Most importantly, it highlights 
the appearance of ownership as well as the consistent use of ‘partnership’ within its mandates 
together with a dominant recurrence of effective multilateralism. Given the number of 
international stakeholders engaged within this mission, it does not come as a surprise that the 
coordination of their efforts is a central element of the mandates. What also emerges from the 
first mandate is the prior involvement of regional state actors (Uganda) in an effort to change 
the security sector landscape of Somalia. 
Within the foreword of the initial mandate of EUTM (Council Decision 
2010/96/CFSP), the role of the mission is broadly outlined as covering the need “to support the 
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training of the Somali security forces” and emphasised that when “the EU planning for the 
delivery of training would be implemented, the EU trainers would be expected to follow 
harmonised and approved curricula” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 8). 
Therefore, what immediately emerges from the very beginning, is the centrality of effective 
multilateralism. The mission becomes the actual medium of coordination rather than part of 
the effort itself. Furthermore, traces of the comprehensive approach are also visible. In 
facilitating coordination between the two international parties, EUTM also contributed to 
internal coordination being harmonised with its external trajectory. Lastly, Article 5 (Council 
Decision 2010/97/CFSP) addresses the EUTM’s political control and strategic direction. The 
PSC, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, will be providing this direction and 
report to the EUMC at regular intervals. The latter is responsible for the proper execution of 
the mission (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 6, para 1). In view of EUTM 
commencing in the post-Lisbon era, yet before the start of the EEAS’ activities, the element of 
internal cohesion also becomes apparent with the same contextual importance as in the case of 
EUNAVFOR (see section 4.5.1). 
The objective of EUTM is, therefore, aimed at ultimately providing the Somali state 
with the ability to train their armed forces, so they can protect their own state and people as 
well as to provide a long-term sustainable result which would withstand potential resurgence 
of the threats. From a normative power standpoint, this long-term result goes beyond the 
security concerns usually undertaken by military operations and sets the ground for the 
transference of skills. In turn, it extends into the frame of “ownership”. Although this frame 
does not explicitly appear within the original mandate, the role of the EU as well as that of the 
other international actors is framed as a “partnership” in the first amending mandate 
(2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, preamble para. 9), therefore implying a relationship of equals 
rather than one of a superior-intervener with a weaker-host (Diez 2005).   
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What becomes apparent in the third Council Decision (2013/4/CFSP, 22/1/2013) 
amending EUTM’s mandate is the shift of scope from the needs of the population to those of 
the state. This is a particularly interesting alteration seeing that the Somalia Compact, which 
was adopted, later that year demonstrated the reverse course (see section 6.3.2). Although the 
4th and 5th mandates - Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015 and Council Decision 
(CFSP), 2016/2239, 12/12/2016- provide no further insight to the operation, they reiterate the 
EU’s commitment to the comprehensive approach as well as to effective multilateralism. From 
the 3rd mandate (2013/44/CFSP, 22/1/2013) and henceforth the structure of strategic and 
political guidance outlined in the launch of EUTM was incorporated into the structure of the 
HR. Therefore, in terms of internal coherence between the concerned instruments as well as 
representation within coordinated efforts with international partners, the HR and EEAS assume 
a key position.  
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Chapter 8 
Discussion: EU Normativity through critical frames 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has sought to understand the role of the EEAS’ establishment in the 
evolution of the EU as a normative power within its external action. In examining the 
operationalisation of the EU’s normative actorness through the critical frames of the 
“comprehensive approach”, “effective multilateralism” and the “partnership-ownership 
binary” in its military operations in Somalia –EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia- this 
research also addressed the compatibility of military means with the NPE framework on a 
theoretical level. The documents dealt with in Chapters 6 demonstrate the centrality of norms 
within the operational intent as well as the actions of the EU. What becomes apparent is that 
the military nature of the engagement in Africa, the Horn of Africa and more specifically in 
Somalia, hinges on the symbolic presence of the means employed rather than the nature of the 
action on the ground. On one hand this is demonstrated by the principle actors that are 
mandated for the preparation as well as delivery of the foreseen initiatives. The EU, especially 
through the EUGS, has explicitly identified the EEAS as the main actor when it comes to the 
undertaking of its engagement beyond its borders, particularly in actions related to CSDP. 
Although this may seem the case for the entirety of external action (as outlined in the Lisbon 
Treaty), when looking into the rhetoric surrounding military operations in Somalia and more 
specifically the critical frames that are employed in the operationalisation of the initiatives, the 
following elements become prominent: a) the unwillingness of the EU to resort to military 
force, b) the pivotal role of operational cooperation with international regional and state actors, 
c) the intent to engage in a more essential long-term fashion in resolving the challenges faced 
rather than eradicating the immediate problems (comprehensive approach), d) the interlinked 
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nature of military operations with civilian tasks (particularly in EUNAVFOR) as well as the 
infusion of military means with civilian goals, e) the apparent hesitation of the EU to come 
forth as the primary responsible for the action on the ground together with the establishment of 
local ownership, f) the increasingly multifaceted role of the EEAS, in mitigating the gap 
between the operationalisation of military initiatives with the highly non-coercive nature of the 
practice in Somalia.  
As can be seen from the strategic texts between the EU and Africa, the frames assume 
a central position. Within the military initiatives of the EU, military means are employed 
nevertheless, that occurs in a non-coercive way resembling more to a civilian nature. This 
trajectory, conceptualised within the “comprehensive approach”, proves the pertinence of the 
holistic nature of the EU’s external action, as argued by Zwolski (2012) and discussed in 
Chapter 2. The second frame of effective multilateralism appears regularly, if not always, 
beside the comprehensive approach. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the need for 
the EU to draw its normative power from the increased legitimation of its partners, particularly 
the UN and NATO, or the foundation of its normative power on precisely its engagement in 
cooperation with other actors.  
In the first explanation, the EU does not possess a normative power of its own in its 
external actorness or it is in the process of creating one, whereby it is utilising existing 
normative appeal from more established -or normatively potent- actors in the area until it is 
able to promote its own. From the second interpretation, the conclusions that can be drawn can 
follow multiple routes: i) the EU appreciates the importance of cooperation in itself when 
dealing with challenges of a global nature while not focusing on the element of employed 
means within this cooperation, ii) the EU seeks to share responsibility of its actions and their 
impact. The second stream of understanding bodes well with the third frame of ownership-
partnership in the sense that the EU, by employing this frame, comes across simultaneously as 
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underlining the importance of local primacy over its own. Nevertheless, this would also create 
a subsequent challenge towards the normative intents, that is to say, whether the EU actually 
values the importance of local ownership or is it acting in this way to avoid responsibility and 
potential blame for its ineffective actions.  
Partnership-ownership is more unclear in its normative importance particularly when 
viewing the delicate nature of the dynamics it implies between international engagement and 
the inclusion of local powers in the operationalisation of initiatives in Africa. As outlined in 
Chapter 5, the political setting of Somalia is mainly characterised by three challenges: internal 
fragmentation between the areas of the FGS, Somaliland and Puntland; the perennial corrupt 
behaviour of consecutive government, usually accompanied by distrust in the international 
actors as supporters of the incumbents; the overwhelming security concerns linked to the Al-
Shabaab, piracy and clan-based militias. 
The focus of this examination has been the case of Somalia, as particularly 
representative of the way the three proposed critical frames appear in the official 
documentation concerning operational engagement. What has been highlighted is the nature of 
the EEAS’ role in mitigating the gap between the normative intents outlined in the strategic 
documentation and the non-coercive actions mandated to the military means employed, 
together with the ways it employs forms of normative diffusion (Manners 2013). The argument 
presented throughout is that the dominant character of the EU in its engagement in Somalia is 
that of a normative power which employs military means as its primary way of asserting 
presence which is of a civilian nature (Larsen 2002). Following this, the increasing importance 
of the EEAS in this endeavour has been highlighted whilst focusing on the way it manages to 
combine intent-action-impact in the area of external action thus reinforcing the EU’s normative 
global actorness.  
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8.2 Sources of normative power: critical frames 
The EU appears to base its normative projection on the back of UN Resolution 
provisions, its own strategic texts (predominantly the ESS, the CA and the EUGS) as well as 
its cooperation with NATO. While maintaining the intents that have been incorporated in the 
strategic documents, the EU promotes its presence in the field via proxy in the case of Somalia 
through the empowerment of the SNSF and AMISOM. It remains mainly a civilian power in 
essence, while making sure it enhances its visibility through the better combined use of the 
means at its disposal, thus engaging in a comprehensive approach (3124 FAC Conclusions on 
the Horn of Africa, 2011: 8). This balance is facilitated by the vague nature of the prescriptions 
in its strategic documents which is usually open to interpretation in as much as the ultimate 
practicalities on the ground are concerned. Subsequent minor decisions therefore which refer 
to the larger strategic documents (such as the ESS) reflect the unclear language concerning the 
operationalisation of its involvement. Nevertheless, the gaps in the operational responsibility 
are covered within the regional sub- strategies (in this case the Horn of Africa Strategy, the 
EUMSS, JAES and the Roadmaps which ensued) and further defined in the case of Somalia 
with bilateral arrangements with the EU (A New Deal for Somalia Communiqué, Brussels 
Conference, 16 September 2013) as well as internal policy documents such as the Somali 
Compact (see Chapters 5 and 6). The idea of a normative actor is therefore reinforced by the 
fact that it retains its non-coercive nature while employing military means thus allowing it to 
appear highly engaged with the norm-recipient, Somalia. This is accomplished through the 
rhetoric which it maintains, combining the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism 
and the binary of ownership-partnership. The latter is pivotal in bringing the rhetoric of the EU 
together in its relations with Africa as well as Somalia more specifically. The dual 
interpretation of this binary is essential in the way the EU formulates its overall diplomatic 
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conduct with Somalia as it simultaneously demonstrates engagement while allowing for it to 
separate itself from the ultimate repercussions the operations have in the country. 
As Olsen (2011:252) argues, the establishment of the Peace Facility was the result of 
the desire on behalf of the EU to avoid direct military involvement in Africa. Instead the AU 
would have to take responsibility for African security. Two main concerns of the EU towards 
Africa were specified to avoid deploying European troops on the continent, yet it provided 
financial assistant to African peace and conflict management operations (JAES 2007 and 
Somali Compact 2013 Addendum:32-33, 38-40) and contributed to capacity building with the 
African partners through training of African troops to perform peace and security operations 
(EUTM). 
AMISOM’s activity is simultaneously empowered through the attribution of ownership 
over the actions on the ground whilst the role of the EU is restricted to support (FAC Council 
conclusions on Somalia 20 October 2014: 3 para. 8) as well as training of the officers through 
EUTM. On the other hand, the relinquishing of ownership over the mission is also explicitly 
mentioned within the operational mandates. This in turn works on two conceptual levels with 
reference to normativity: it empowers AMISOM -therefore the EU is other-empowering- while 
simultaneously remaining committed to its actions in a normative fashion. On the other hand 
the EU disempowers itself as an actor with adequate hard power (based on the critiques 
provided by the more realist contributors to the argument) which nevertheless can support its 
actions as a civilian actor particularly when considering Hyde-Price’s (2008:29) suggestion 
that it should act more as a ‘calculator rather than a crusader’. Therefore, depending on the 
reading of the initiatives both sides of the argument can be supported. It is interesting that the 
EU claims its increased interest in resolving the threats in the Horn of Africa whilst relying on 
the legitimacy of UNSCR decisions concerning multilateral action and simultaneously urges 
the further involvement of AMISOM (based on ‘ownership’). This demonstrates the unclear 
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long-term plans of the EU as far as its international actorness is concerned. The EUGS 
(2016:28) presents an interest towards increasing the EU’s presence in the region, while 
absolving itself of the potentially unwanted repercussions that may come with the use of force. 
What also appears to be the case is that the EU is attempting to increase its global visibility, 
thus reinforcing Kavalski’s (2013) argument concerning the importance of being perceived as 
a normative actor rather than being one, while juggling with the notion of a 
comprehensive/holistic approach, resembling to the normative actorness (Chapter 2). Given its 
apparent resolution to maintain a diplomatic identity rather than that of a military or even purely 
civilian power (EUGS 2016: 4), the EU is attempting to take advantage of the symbolic 
presence of its military power without the unwanted potential impact it may have as a force of 
coercion, thus speaking to the conceptualisation of the symbolic manifestation of military 
power (Manners 2006). 
According to Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008:607), in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
EU demonstrates its intent to empower African countries by referring to them in a framework 
of solidarity – the partnership-ownership binary. At the same time, though, this attempt to 
empower Africa displays crucial limits concerning the effectiveness of the EU’s attempts to 
promote norms and the international image of the EU itself. What Scheipers and Sicurelli 
(2008:607) argue, which is an observation also upheld in this thesis, is that these limits might 
constrain the process of EU identity construction as a normative power. This hindrance in 
identity construction is hinged upon the pivotal dynamics of ‘othering’ that are essential in the 
empowering process of the EU (Diez, 2005) but is also further linked to the EU’s failure in 
comprehensively accounting for all the mechanisms of normative diffusion, more specifically 
cultural filter (see section 7.4).  
The introduction of the partnership-ownership binary appeared prominently in JAES 
and has since been employed consistently in the EU’s CSDP mandates for Africa. This frame 
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is uniquely important to the EU relations with Africa and constitutes one of the major sources 
of contention when analysing its normative power through its military operations. As illustrated 
by the examples within Chapter 6, othering has a strong connotation of dis-empowering the 
other while at the same time empowering the self –the EU- inasmuch as the other is depicted 
as inferior (Diez, 2005). The concept of empowering has a strong link with social relations and 
constitution. It is related to the idea of ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’, and thus considers 
‘how social relations define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are 
socially empowered to undertake’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005:46) 
As with othering in general, empowering is identity-based, but in contrast to 
disempowering the ‘other’, it aims at increasing the recognition and the status of an actor by, 
for instance, depicting it as equal or even similar to the ‘self’. As Barnett and Duvall (2005:47) 
explain, the practice of empowering is not restricted to discourses of identity construction. 
Rather, it involves a variety of practices and power resources, such as the transfer of knowledge 
and expertise, the provision of enhanced development chances and/or trade opportunities and 
the transfer of material resources. Empowering others can also be pursued for strategic reasons; 
for instance, an actor A can aim at increasing the stability of a country or a region B, the 
instability of which would be detrimental to A’s interests. This self-portrayal echoes the 
‘emphasis on the normative power of non-material exemplification found in the contagion of 
norms through imitation and attraction’ (Manners 2006b:176). It indicates, however, that the 
EU is at times merely ‘miming’ normative power, since self-portrayal and action differ. It is 
also a sign of a specific paradox within the mechanism of empowering: whilst empowering 
aims at treating the other on an equal basis, it actually emerges from a relationship of inequality. 
The ‘empowerer’ has both the initiative and superior (symbolic and material) resources – 
without the latter, empowering would not work. In order for it to work, however, this inequality 
has to be concealed as far as possible. 
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8.3 Forms of diffusion and the EEAS 
As outlined in the Chapter Three, Manners structures the normative power of the EU 
around six main forms of diffusion (Manners 2002: 244-246). One of the founding normative 
bases of the EU has also been rule of law (Manners 2002:240) and sustainable development 
and good governance as “minor norms” (Manners 2002: 242). From these avenues of norm 
communication, the EU appears to be resorting heavily – if not exclusively- on contagion, 
informational diffusion, transference and overt diffusion (see Textbox 1) in its relationship with 
Africa and particularly with Somalia (see section 6.4.1). In line with these modes of diffusion 
it presumes its own existence as a virtuous example stemming from its history (Manners 2001), 
operationalises its normative intents through policy documents (Manners 2006), engages in 
extensive inter-regional cooperation, provides EU development aid and organises official 
meetings with its counterparts respectively. It is within this line of action that the three 
examined critical frames manifest and organise the whole array of its involvement in the case 
of Somalia. Although the aforementioned norms are prominent in the rhetoric promoted within 
the EU’s external action, this thesis has focused on their operationalisation through the critical 
frames, thus demonstrating their normative significance rather than the extent to which the 
norms themselves are referred to. In seeking to evaluate the actorness of the EU through a 
normative lens, the coding of the frames is more suited for the purposes of this research than 
indicating the extent to which norms are deployed. Within this understanding, and following 
the analysis is Chapter 6, effective multilateralism is not only testament to the EU’s belief in 
the international society and building cooperative bridges with its international counterparts, 
but also the way it manages its own action on the ground with reference to military operations. 
The comprehensive approach, although extensively relied on and unequally formulated, 
provides the bridge between the ‘substantive’ nature of the military operations and the 
‘symbolic’ diffusion of the mandates’ normative basis which, aside from the organisational 
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elements of each operation, refer to the overall direction prescribed within the strategies. 
Lastly, the partnership-ownership binary as a diplomatic apparatus, introduced within the inter-
regional relationship between the EU and Africa, allows the EU to promote and establish itself 
as a partner with the other international powers but also leaves space for the empowerment of 
the local forces. This latter point can be either seen as a strategic move to dismiss the potential 
rise of accusations of neo-imperialism, whilst demonstrating the virtuous intent of the EU to 
aid local government in creating a long-term result prosperity (Manners, 2008).  
Supporting Langan’s (2011:265) call for a critical reformulation of Europe’s 
‘normative power’, this thesis confirms his findings. The actual normative power of the EU 
does not rest in its ability to shape non-Europeans’ “hearts and minds” and “redirect their policy 
agendas towards humanitarian goals” (Langan 2011:265) but is rather understood as its ability 
to mask and entrench policy agendas that promote EU interests under the guise of it values. 
The ultimate goals of the EU seem to be to “publicly legitimise, and to self-rationalise” (Langan 
2011:265) by promoting its military policy within a framework of development aid and ‘other-
empowerment’ (see JAES section 6.3.1 and EUTM section 6.5.2).   
Since the establishment of the EEAS, the EU has been undertaking a series of actions 
which it perceives as pertinent in order to cover the gaps of its internal incoherence and self-
reflexive failure. The creation of the Service acted as a twofold attempt to bring together its 
institutional structure, mainly between the Commission and the Council (see section 4.5.2). At 
the same time, the Lisbon Treaty elevated the role of the High Representative to provide an 
outward coherent head of what it named ‘external action’ which brought together the 
previously separated areas of CFSP and CSDP. In its particular relations with Africa, the JAES 
(2007) provided the basis for the creation of a bond between the individual countries which 
were of particular concern for the EU’s own benefit, including Somalia. The EUMSS, drawing 
most of its importance and direction from the vague ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report 
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(2008), delineated in fairly convenient terms the security concerns of the EU by expanding the 
scope of its engagement with piracy from Somalia to the entire region of the Horn of Africa 
(EUMSS, 2014:4). The relevant strategy that was operationalised, identified the particular 
interest the EU had in the region while demonstrating the convergence of its development 
initiatives within a framework of security provision. This overlapping, yet not completely 
fitting, combination was manifested through the two military operations in Somalia as well as 
a civilian mission – EUCAP NESTOR- although the latter obviously acted as symbolism of 
the EU’s broader civilian role as opposed to the very explicit military-security concern in 
Somalia. The fact that the promoted intent coordinated the sundry efforts in the region to 
provide a comprehensive response which included all types of available means – both civilian 
and military- whilst calling for a concerted effort including the affected countries is indicated 
by the prominence of the comprehensive approach. What must also be underlined is the 
increased reference to the EEAS within the pursuant Action plan, thus signifying the increasing 
responsibility of the Service to coordinate the different elements of operationalisation as 
presented within the frames of the EUMSS. The Somali Compact which broadened the range 
of perceived by the EU critical partners in its engagement, led to its good-governance driven 
support for a democratically elected government. 
Throughout this line of operationalised norms, the EU failed to account for what could 
be considered the most essential element in a ‘normative power’ evaluation: the recognition of 
its influence by the local community which can only be accomplished by a successful account 
of ‘cultural filter’. The fact that the strategies of the EU still remain quite vague in their 
prescriptive elements, although admittedly become more specific in the allocation of duties to 
its own instruments (culminating with the EUGS), demonstrates the blind eye the EU has taken 
in what should be considered the aim of its actions: longstanding ownership of successful local 
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initiatives. It is this exact point which proves the inefficiency of the EU in its external action, 
whilst not detracting from the overall weight it has set on its normative foundation. 
Recognising its superiority as a civilian power, the EU has attempted to project its 
involvement and power through the assignment of military means. Nevertheless, the fact that 
this line of action is proof of emulation rather than initiative stemming from self-awareness, is 
reflected in its rhetoric with partners that tessellates between respect to cooperation yet 
establishing its own presence. Within the EUGS Implementation Plan (2016:4) and the recent 
reaffirmation of its close cooperation with NATO (Council Conclusions, 15283/16, 
CSDP/PSDC 699, 6/12/2016), the particular balance between retaining close cooperation with 
international partners yet maintaining “strategic autonomy” and “being able to operate 
autonomously when and where necessary” (EUGS Implementation Plan 2016:4) becomes 
prominent.  
Understandably, successful socialisation of its norms within the Somali Government is 
a very long-term goal which demands continuous and effective engagement. Nevertheless, the 
fact that local governance is essentially divided between three zones of administration (with 
the EU interacting officially with one directly –FGS) and the subsequent separate identity of 
the populations of these areas, demonstrates the complexity of the case. Although the EU is 
playing according to its strengths- norm promotion- it fails to effectively encapsulate the 
complexity that derives from the path of norm diffusion in its quest to assert itself as a global 
normative power. Even though steps have been made to effectively structure a hybrid polity 
which combines a civilian identity with the use of military means, the EU has failed to yet 
formulate a potent external action aside from the creation of the EEAS.  
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8.4 Mechanisms of diffusion and multilateral engagement 
The rhetoric acknowledging primacy of African institutions (particularly the AU) on 
the subject of continent-to-continent cooperation with the EU began in 2007. Although this 
may be perceived as a move on behalf of the EU signalling its commitment to the partnership-
ownership binary it has also been questioned on its actual depth with regards to African 
regionalism (Khadiagala 2012). The issue can again be identified in the asymmetric use of 
diffusion forms and the absence of a realistic plan with long-term sustainable effect. Even 
though the EU has been engaging on multiple occasions in continent-to-continent dialogue, 
between the AU Commission and EU Commission, it commenced the process of JAES with 
regular revisiting and incorporated the RECs in the consultation. Simultaneously, it funded 
their coordination with the EU, thus showing that the EU has failed to acknowledge the impact 
on the ground, which can be attributed to the EEAS.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, this disjuncture stems from the divided responsibility of 
promoting development aid as intent (primarily within the purview of the Commission) while 
operationalising said intent with security-military means which are coordinated and overseen 
by the EEAS (see section 4.5.2). This is mainly due to the absence of the ‘cultural filter’, which 
has been highlighted in this analysis. Even though particular reference to the needs of the 
Somali population is made in the EUTM mandates (see section 6.5.2), it appears to have fallen 
short in reflecting them within its collaboration with the TFG and subsequently FGS. 
Furthermore, on a broader level, the JAES has been deemed as overambitious, both in its scope 
as well as its method of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Sicurelli, 2010: 174) resulting in its 
“hibernation” (Open Society Briefing Paper, 2010: 20). Although the EU appears to cover the 
bases of informational, procedural, transference and overt diffusion (see Textbox 1) within the 
aforementioned initiatives, it has also ignored the reality of the AU and its member states (Open 
Society Briefing Paper, 2010: 20). This becomes more apparent when viewing the case of 
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Somalia which adds the multiple administrative and cultural elements that are related to its 
internal division. Therefore, the result has been seen as an augmentation of the tensions 
between the AU framework and African member states, together with regional organisations 
such as the RECs (Helly, 2013:145). This leads to challenging the depth of the EU’s 
commitment. Therefore, the mode of governance set by the JAES appears to have failed in its 
efficiency since it has mostly been managed by EU and AU bureaucracy, ultimately leaving 
the relationship of the two continents stagnant (Helly, 2013:145). 
With respect to the multilateral collaboration of the EU with Africa on the issue of 
peace and security, the subject can be seen as one of ‘pragmatic multilateralism’. Within the 
agenda set out since 2007 the element of crisis prevention and management has featured 
dominantly, particularly in view of the persistent security concerns in the Horn of Africa. This 
is demonstrated explicitly in the JAES initiative and throughout the Roadmaps in subsequent 
years. Particularly the first partnership was based on peace and security and provided the 
framework for funding through the APF predominantly as well as intense working relations 
(Pirozzi 2010, 2010b; Vines and Middleton 2008; Haastrup 2013, 2013b). Although the 
partnership on this level has been characterised as successful, it has been stipulated that there 
have been discrepancies between allocated and actually transferred paid funds (Helly, 
2013:149). Nevertheless, the substantial objectives that genuinely corresponded to African 
needs were attributed to the partnership from the outset, particularly with reference to political 
dialogue, support to regional peacekeeping operations, support to the African Peace and 
Security Architecture and sustainable funding to peace and security in action. The partnership 
was broadly supported internally in the EU especially in the need to move from the ‘C2C’ level 
bilaterally to the multilateral level. Furthermore, the encouragement for ownership of African 
authorities to provide solutions and undertake the mass of the action on the ground, has met 
the inability or unwillingness of the African states and institutions themselves. Therefore, 
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although the intent to create a transfer of power from the EU unto the local actors (in essence 
the promotion of ‘ownership’) has been operationalised in theory, in fact this creates a further 
vacuum between the action itself and the impact it accomplishes, as opposed to the one it 
aspires.  
What can be concluded from the aforementioned fragmented approach to the 
progression of the partnership-ownership binary is that the EU has progressed in promoting its 
own aspirations without in fact taking into consideration the need for the interventions it has 
carried out (see EUTM section 6.5.2). From a formal point of view, the EU has adequately kept 
the avenues of cooperation open but only pertaining to the overt and institutional forms of 
normative diffusion (see Textbox 1). The increased reference to normative rhetoric is apparent. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to accomplishing the intended impact and long-term result of its 
engagement with Africa as a whole, two issues stand out as highly problematic. Firstly, it has 
not taken into consideration the actual abilities of the organisations it has constructed a 
partnership with (most prominently the AU) and secondly, the EU has not tailored its 
provisions according to the diverse needs on the ground. This indicate that the political issues 
it claims to be concerned with in Africa cannot be addressed within a vague overarching 
strategic framework but only on a focused case-by-case basis. This failure becomes even more 
apparent when dealing with countries such as Somalia that not only face security concerns but 
are also characterised by internal division. On the one hand the EU as an institutional actor can 
formally enter binding cooperation with state actors it acknowledges, in this case the FGS. On 
the other hand, this commitment does not go as far as the intents it promotes if it does not 
account for the particular needs of the population on the ground which are excluded in the 
negotiations or the effective provisions, in this case Puntland and Somaliland.  
Therefore, the EU, as a normative actor, can be held accountable for not effectively 
reflecting the complexity of the political situations it is engaging in and the particular needs 
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entailed from the normative assertions it is promoting. In the case of Somalia, the most basic 
disparity lies between the prognosis and diagnosis of the issues it is dealing with on the ground. 
Although presenting the security of development aid as the intent which triggered the need for 
its engagement, it is addressing the case on the ground as one of direct security threat – piracy- 
as well as a more longstanding situation stemming from the democratic deficit in the selection 
of government. Both operations appear to be functioning on two different timeframes with 
respect to security while the core issue that has been dealt with goes beyond its operations and 
relates to the election of the government of Somalia. The EU launched EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
to tackle the phenomenon of piracy which, although admittedly the most apparent symptom of 
the political failure in the country, is not the root of the problem the international community 
is focusing on. Securing the WFP vessels in their transfer of development aid has been the 
nexus for the international community’s efforts in the region. The mandate of Atalanta after its 
multiple amendments, has resulted in including elements that would justify it being 
characterised as resembling to a policing mission which safeguards international law rather 
than a military operation (see section 6.5.1). After the successful advent of the multilateral 
effort in addressing piracy, the state instability is still visible. It could be argued that the 
democratic deficit and clan-based structure of the government has been the root cause of this 
symptom (Cordano, 2015:3). Even though the EU has supported the electoral process which 
came to fruition only in the beginning of 2017 and resulted in the democratic choice of the 
current Federal Government, the humanitarian challenges -which were also core issues that 
contributed to the illegal practice of piracy- such as famine are reappearing.  
What appears to be the case is that the EU is attempting to eradicate the political 
problems in Somalia from a western-centric approach. The fact that beyond the efforts it made 
to provide security, both short-term (EUNAVFOR) as well as long-term (EUTM- training local 
authorities), have failed due to the forms of intervention it has been engaging in. The military 
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operations were created to address the perennial criticism the EU has been facing as a soft-
power oriented actor (see section 2.4). The fact that its military operations have been infused 
with civilian powers are testament to that. Therefore, in an attempt to bridge these two tangents 
into a newly formulated hybrid polity within external action, the EU has resorted to a highly 
normative, yet quite vague set of strategic intents within CSDP, thus transforming it into an 
international normative power, at least in appearance. Nevertheless, although managing to 
establish its presence and remain consistent with its promoted intents, it has failed to account 
for the particular needs on the ground. The result is the creation of a very visible yet ineffective 
global actor.  
 
8.5 Cultural filter: the missing link 
The case of Somalia is also important in identifying the shortcomings of normative 
diffusion in the EU’s attempts to promote itself as such. As mentioned in section 7.2.3, on 
certain levels the EU has to a relatively large extent accomplished to operationalise 
informational and institutional diffusion within the strategic frameworks it has agreed upon in 
Africa. Within Manners’ (2013) (see Textbox 1) typology of norm diffusion, ‘cultural filter’ 
becomes particularly challenging in its identification as well as its practical employment. In 
the case of Somalia, this filter is multifaceted not only given the disparity of internal identities 
between the three administrative areas – FGS, Somaliland and Puntland- but also in their 
representation as international actors itself. While the central FGS is the recognised state entity 
which cooperates and contracts international agreements, Somaliland and Puntland still make 
up an extensive part of the country’s territory, represent a significant amount of its population 
and self-identify as separate administrations but also as cultures. Therefore, the frameworks 
within which the international actors function is quite limited in the scope of engaging the 
counterparts they are supposedly trying to aid. Furthermore, the concerns of what defines a 
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normative power argued by Diez (2009, 2010) and Kavalski (2013) resurge as pivotal in this 
discussion. According to the two academics one of the most important elements in evaluating 
the success of an actor as a normative one is the receptive side of the diffusion, which is whether 
this actor is also recognised as a power by the recipients of the norms. In the case of Somalia 
this element cannot be accomplished given the disparity of the people on the ground, which the 
EU itself does not take into account within the delineation of its engagement in Somalia. 
Therefore, the unsuccessful normative impact the EU seeks to accomplish in this case is 
hindered by the cultural filter-blind approach it takes. 
The aforementioned omission of the EU is indirectly highlighted within Hills’ (2013) 
research concerning governance in Somalia regarding development-related challenges. As she 
asserts, the incorporation of development-oriented governance -which was the main focal point 
of the aid provided by the international community since the very beginning of its engagement 
in the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.1) - is hindered by the inability of international actors “to 
influence local power brokers or mitigate the distrust and insecurity affecting daily life in a city 
such as Mogadishu” (Hills, 317:2013). In normative terms, this indicates successful normative 
diffusion through ‘cultural filter’. As she goes on to support, the issue with the international 
partners’ provision of aid is based on a Western policy promotion of the overall transfer of 
procedural and normative goals developed in particular cultural fields which are in tune with 
liberal democracies without taking into account the context provided by the particular nature 
of the interventions at hand (Hills, 2013: 319). This in turn points towards the existing disparity 
of the norm diffuser and the norm receiver. Due to the lack of adequate understanding of the 
cultural particularity on the ground, norm diffusion cannot accomplish the final stage of its 
incorporation, namely socialisation.  
As confirmed by academics (Menkhaus 2006-2007, Lund 2006, Hagmann and Höhne 
2009) Somalia is not actually the ground upon which only one recognised entity – the FGS- 
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acts singularly. It is rather an arena which is managed by a number of security and 
administrative actors that are linked ethnically and economically but simultaneously 
characterised by different levels of stability and style of governance. While the regions of 
Somaliland and Puntland have a more longstanding independence (the former declared itself 
an independent republic in 1991 while the later claimed autonomy in 1998), the recognised –
now federal- government has survived mainly due to the support of the international 
community (Hills, 2013: 321). Its existence is predicated on the presence of AU troops and the 
humanitarian as well as financial support of the international actors, mainly the UN and the 
EU. Direct initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution 
initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the mainstreaming of 
conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes in the areas of development and trade 
(Bagayoko, 2010:233). It is therefore unsurprising that the local communities have created an 
attitude of disbelief towards the international donors in view of the perennial issue of corruption 
of consecutive governments which are predicated on traditional clan construction and personal 
militias (see Chapter 5).  
Therefore, the element of cultural filter when coming to international norm diffusion, 
and even more so EU, would become pivotal in accomplishing a longstanding effect on the 
recipient country. The issue on behalf of the EU was falsely identified on the democratic deficit 
surrounding the selection of government while it should have been in taking heed to the 
regional needs within the country and tailoring its provisions to mitigating the disparity of 
means distributed throughout the fragmented territory. In turn this may have assured a level of 
understanding of the popular needs and potentially created a shared sense of interest that would 
have translated into fairly distributed humanitarian aid, rather than witnessing a 
disproportionate distribution of aid towards the FGS while witnessing the bulk of casualties 
from the 2010 and 2017 droughts in Puntland. Therefore, the issue is identified in the 
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international contributors’ information on the needed variables that would in turn translate into 
establishing trustworthy officials in Mogadishu. This shortcoming is not restricted to the 
western actors but also includes regional ones, such as AMISOM, which act as executives of 
the international community’s engagement in the country due to “ownership” over the actions 
on the ground. As Hills (2013: 329) asserts: “International organisations and donors wish to 
transform the SPF into a national force capable of supporting a government that is staffed by 
inexperienced newcomers intent on securing foreign support. But Mogadishu’s governance is 
built on clan calculations, manoeuvre and entrepreneurial skills, and international advisers lack 
the contextual knowledge needed to map this, let alone change it”. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa” is one of the main texts that provides 
a clear view of the contextual support delivered for the operationalisation of the military 
operations. As previously mentioned, the elements of development policy and humanitarian 
aid have been fundamental in the initiatives undertaken in Somalia. Not only has the initial 
intent been focused and guided around these two pillars, but also the deployment of particular 
stages of the operations has been ensured to keep them as a “compass” in their delineation. 
Nevertheless, the intervention itself, as well as the underlying normative justification, appear 
to be oriented towards the provision of security, which ultimately renders the link between 
intent, action and impact quite blurred. Ultimately this hinders the ability to draw definitive 
conclusions on the overall normative actorness of the EU. While the humanitarian intent sets 
the field for civilian intervention, the choice of following a military operation highlights the 
instrumentality of respective means even though they are not employed in a coercive fashion. 
Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the EU retains a civilian guise and remains 
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true to it even though it employs military means. With a NPE-based evaluation, this can be 
explained on the basis of symbolic manifestation. 
The creation of the EEAS was the outcome of a long search to provide a unified and 
comprehensive actor in the provision and delineation of external action. Nevertheless, the 
division of areas of responsibility namely, DEVCO –humanitarian aid and development policy 
and EEAS – security and defence, perpetuates the pre-existing inconsistency and vague borders 
between intent and action. Although the intents of EUNAVFOR are purely in the realm of the 
former, the action is undertaken and prescribed by the latter. What makes things more 
interesting is that the eventual response combines the normative intent of development and 
transcribes it into the action taking place through the lens of security. Thereby security and 
defence abide by the rules that are set in a highly normative understanding and approach to the 
operations, while the deployment of the operation takes place only on the normative level of 
the initiative, while the action remains highly civilian/normative. 
The conflagration that is already existent in the function of the EU and the way it 
operationalises its intents, was attempted to be overcome with the creation of the EEAS. The 
initial idea behind the establishment of the Service was the centralisation and unification of the 
sundry components/concerns the EU had with concern to the initiatives it was setting up. This 
confusion appears to be repeated with the competences as well as the internal composition of 
the Service itself. On the one hand, continuity was not successful given a) the development-
humanitarian aid intents taken up by the Commission (DEVCO) with the actions security-
defence of the EEAS, whilst the latter refer to the intents themselves instead of following their 
own line that would accord more with military action; b) the presence of the EEAS and the 
apparent attachment of its role not clearly separate from the pre-existing structure; c) the 
aforementioned disjointed relationship between the intents and action was also replicated 
within the bureaucracy of the EEAS thus creating a potential re-emergence of the division 
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between the actors and roles. This is to say that without a uniform esprit de corps (Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2014), the unification under the EEAS of the Commission and Council employees 
as well as the seconded diplomats only leaves the root of a potential problem re-emerging 
between the importance of the institutions to come.  
The argument that was presented in the theoretical chapter of this thesis and that was 
examined throughout the elaboration of the two operations, is that the normativity of the EU is 
not a matter of its identity but rather a dynamic element constructed on the basis of its actions. 
In order to structure this, the three-part route, from intent to action and ultimately reception 
(impact) will demonstrate the ability of the EU to have normative power, whether it desires to 
do so or not (this will be seen in the intents it puts forth), by looking at the way it carries out 
its military operations. 
It appears that the normative underpinnings of the EU are incompatible, or even 
conflictual. Although what it seeks to do is highly based on informational, procedural and, 
through military operations, overt diffusion of power, the key element of cultural filter hinders 
their full evolution. This thesis focuses on the procedural explanation of the EU’s normative 
diffusion by examining its military operations. Of course, this presupposes an acknowledgment 
and understanding of the informational elements that are based within the mandates, 
agreements and ‘strategies’. When attempting to combine the two areas, the same conclusion 
is reached.  
Even though the EU itself is enacting upon its intents, thus highly demonstrating a focus 
on the normative elements of its actorness, it fails to account for the cultural filter. Especially 
in the case of Somalia, this is seen in the shortcomings of the EU in accomplishing long-term 
resolution even after attempting to increase its impact through the comprehensive approach 
and effective multilateralism. The fact the EUNAVFOR has been successful in tackling the 
initial intent presented in its mandate, that is the phenomenon of piracy, it still is unable to 
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foresee and account for the future resurgence of the criminality which created this issue to 
begin with. The understanding of the interconnectedness of issues was apparent since the very 
first mandate in 2008 which underlined the primary goal of securing WFP and AMISOM 
vessels transporting humanitarian aid. Tackling famine with an international concerted effort, 
would result in the alleviation of the root causes which would result in criminal activities (see 
Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the lack of efficiency on behalf of the EU became apparent once 
again in 2011 and 2013 with famine and drought striking again. This time, the corruption of 
the local powers in the distribution of the aid was highlighted. In turn, now with the added 
concern of Al Shabaab in reclaiming areas, interest now pivoted to the resolution of the 
democratic deficit within the country. Therefore, a goal for elections was initiated.  
Meanwhile, the distrust of the population was overlooked (Cordano 2015; Menkhaus 
2011). Having been subjected to corrupt governments which retained an elitist clan-based 
administration, the already divided population of Somalia considered the Western powers as 
bedfellows/supporters of the regimes, thereby reducing the credibility and trust in the EU 
initiatives (see Chapter 5). What this demonstrates is the importance of cultural filter but also 
of the key role of the receiving end in norm diffusion. While the EU attempted to address these 
concerns on an institutional level, such as instating an EUSR for the Horn of Africa who would 
account for the particular conditions on the case, as well as on a policy level -establishing a 
new rhetoric framework on partnership-ownership, it failed to change the impact on its efforts. 
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Chapter 9 
Concluding thoughts 
 
9.1 Hesitant Power Europe 
The indecision of the EU in the way it is willing to progress as a global actor still 
remains quite apparent. On the one hand its purported engagement in issues that have been 
presented as international concerns is quite vague in the means it is employing as well as the 
long-term plans it has in resolving them. The increased resort to normative commitment is 
evidence of the track the EU is on with concern to its own identity. While not progressing as a 
military actor, aside from its reliance on cooperation with NATO (EDA report 2016), it 
continues to construct long-term (strategic as it calls them) plans to demonstrate its ability to 
address in a more constructive way the challenges that it faces. Although the civilian nature of 
the actor is quite obvious, the means it employs still lack coherence, both internally as well as 
externally.  
Although steps have been taken towards establishing a democratically elected 
government (only to be accomplished in the beginning of 2017) the insecurity and fragmented 
nature of the territory remains. The main issue that was highlighted as the source of the 2010 
famine was not the lack of international interest but the distribution of that aid internally due 
to the corrupt nature of the government at the time (see Chapter 5). This concern was attempted 
to be tackled by the support for a TFG and then the FGS. Although it is still too soon to make 
a valid assessment at the time, this initiative appears to remain dysfunctional. Furthermore, the 
element of piracy which has remained the focus of the mandates for maritime security is 
currently considered as diminishing and presented as one of the successes of the EU and its 
effective multilateralism. To keep up with the international security trends at the time, the 
element of terrorism was introduced in the security aspect of the EU involvement in the case. 
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The incidents of attacks by Al Shabaab reduced for a few years only to resurface in late 2016-
2017. This demonstrates a connection of the core issue- humanitarian need- and the 
reappearance of security concerns – piracy and Al Shabaab. 
The aforementioned leads us to the following conclusions: a) the unsuccessful 
engagement of the EU in Somalia with reference to its long-term goals, b) the subsequent 
problematic diffusion of its normative assertions – which as demonstrated in this thesis are 
intrinsically linked to its long-term “strategy”. The former is the result of the gap between the 
humanitarian nature of the intents it has put forth and the security driven measures it has 
promoted. This is also reflected in the disconnection within the EEAS, particularly with 
concern to the security-development nexus (see section 4.4). The normative importance of this 
lies in the incoherence of the intents with its actions which subsequently affect the EU’s 
efficiency and impact. This can be attributed to either to the alignment of the three dominant 
frames which have been examined in this thesis together with the inconsistency of the types of 
normative diffusion which the EU appears to employ.  
 
9.2 Incoherence and the military means-civilian mandates gap 
Blair and Gya (2010:105) identify the disparity between the military and civilian 
missions carried out by the EU within their research of civilian crisis management (CCM). 
Their findings and insight within the ‘civilian’ element of the EU’s international interventions 
are particularly pertinent to the current research and verified by the findings of the critical 
framework analysis it is based on. As the two academics point out, the EU appears not to have 
an actual strategic plan for engagement with the local communities in implementing its 
initiatives, aside from the widespread rhetoric of local ownership and “consultations”, without 
in fact assessing the impact on the ground (Blair and Gya, 2010:105).  
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The disjuncture which is at the core of the EU’s fragmented intervention in Somalia, 
and of course lie at the epicentre of the tension which is the combination of military means and 
civilian power into a hybrid actorness, is that between the provision of humanitarian aid and 
the engagement in military operations. As asserted by Kobi and Ben-Ari (2011:658), military 
intervention is perceived as necessary to ensure stability in the operational arena and allow the 
civilian components to operate. According to Szayna et al (2009:16), a civilian mission that is 
introduced within a violent environment is doomed without the support of a professional 
military force. It is thus understandable that the two types of intervention have to be 
complementary in their operationalisation in order to maintain a short-term effect that will also 
yield a long-term effect. In the case of Somalia, the initial mandate justified the engagement of 
the EU for the following reasons: securing the vessels providing aid from piracy. Therefore, 
the elements of humanitarianism as well militarisation were incorporated within the same logic 
that make up the basis for the continuing military presence, autonomous and multilateral, in 
the Horn of Africa.  
 
9.3 Transposition of responsibility  
What can be seen throughout the EU’s engagement in Africa and even more vividly in 
the case of Somalia is the prevalence of a detachment-transposition of responsibility with 
purported intent. The transposition of action seems to underscore the new normative approach 
to external action that has been established since 2007 and further institutionalised after the 
Lisbon Treaty. This in turn can be seen as either a substantiation of the EU’s commitment to 
non-coercive actorness or the appearance of a new gap between the means at its disposal and 
its expectations. On the one hand, the promoted normative foundation of the EU’s involvement 
in Somalia can be supported by its non-coercive use of military means in both operations it is 
carrying out. The mandates that have been put forth call on AMISOM to effectively carry out 
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the EU’s demonstrated security-oriented actions in the region. This also agrees with the 
partnership-ownership binary it has set out within the JAES. It further underlines an even 
deeper commitment it this new frame it champions.  
Although the aforementioned understanding could be seen as a positive move towards 
arguing that the EU is evolving as a normative power, the fact that the prognoses and diagnoses 
of the issues it is tackling are incoherent poses more concerns. Throughout the mandates 
concerning Atalanta (as well as the EUMSS and the Strategy for the Horn of Africa) the EU 
presents humanitarian aid as the reason for its involvement while promoting action that is more 
akin to provision of security. On the one hand, this could be a demonstration of the 
comprehensive approach whereby the humanitarian aid is the long-term solution to the root 
causes while the short-term provision of security concerns the temporary eradication of the 
symptoms, thus allowing the strategy to be effective. On the other hand, it is quite confusing 
from a normative perspective when the EU employs military means and allocates them civilian 
tasks based on normative grounds. This complicated link between the intents and actions of the 
EU justify the concerns that have been raised around the overall actorness of the EU as well as 
the actual intents of the EU.  
Within a normative examination of the aforementioned inconsistencies the EU can 
either be seen as a comprehensive normative actor that maintains its normative commitments 
and non-coercive intervention, even though it employs military means. Conversely, the 
question becomes what the aim is for this choice and how it can be understood from a symbolic 
standpoint. The most persuasive explanation can be found in the concept of symbolic 
manifestation by Manners (2006), as it has been elaborated upon in Chapter 3. The EU is 
attempting to establish a potent normative actorness within its aspirations on a global scale. 
Stemming from its own identity, it promotes its normative power while assuring that it creates 
a visible presence within its interventions. EUNAVFOR quite effectively indicates the EU’s 
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ability to deploy in military operations on its own while being a part of a multilateral effort. 
This in turn proves that it is able to deploy military means while maintaining its soft-power 
core. It is also diplomatically significant in reasserting its commitment to its partners and 
maintaining a civilian actorness simultaneously. Therefore, it can be perceived as consistent 
with its normative assertions as well as dependable as a peacekeeper and partner. On the other 
hand, the impact it manages is evaluated as a failure, in view of the recurring issues that appear 
in Somalia. Therefore, this indicates a problem in the operationalisation of the EU’s strategy 
and highlights the problematic impact it has achieved. From a normative understanding, the 
mechanism of normative diffusion via cultural filter appears to be the weak point in its 
endeavours (see section 7.4). 
 
9.4 Limitations of research and suggestions for future projects 
 The EEAS is itself relatively newly-established and its work in Somalia is ongoing. 
This offers plenty of scope for original findings, especially within the areas of the EU’s external 
relations and foreign policy. Subsequently, the contributions of this thesis into a new area of 
enquiry, whether and how the EU can act as a normative power/norm diffuser, can generate 
useful material for policy makers and hypotheses to guide future research. In terms of the EU’s 
external actorness, and given the continuous international interest raised in the particular case 
Somalia, an examination of the civilian operations in the African continent can be explored 
through the lens of NPE to provide a more comprehensive account.  
Additionally, the internal dynamics which have not been explored in this research could 
open other avenues in deciphering the provenance of the EU’s normative standing. More 
specifically, an exploration of the most prominent Member States in the formulation of the 
EU’s external action initiatives with the employment of a principle actor approach could shed 
light on the mechanisms of normative identity formation and diffusion. Through process 
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tracing, either solely or in conjunction with critical frame analysis, a more nuanced account of 
the normative standing of the EU as an actor can be examined. 
In expanding the exploration of normative power as well as military operations, 
additional research on gender could provide interesting insights. Such an approach is needed 
to further feminist perspectives in EU scholarship and investigate the representation of gender 
on the basis of the EU’s normative standing as a security and defence actor. Continuing from  
the normative focal point of this thesis, such a project would engage with the concept of 
symbolic manifestation, as presented in the NPE literature, to demonstrate the impact of the 
provisions set within EUNAVFOR MED (operation Sophia) as well as their repercussions in 
the representation of particular migrant groups within the policy framing itself. Specifically, it 
would emphasize the representation of women as well as the silences which further support the 
biased gendered nature of CSDP as a whole and military operations even more so. It would 
therefore illustrate a feminist contribution to normative power theory within CSDP 
(particularly the EEAS) where the EU is perceived in accordance with gender regimes at 
multiple levels. The gender regime concept is not reserved for states but is also highly useful 
in a multi-level context. Therefore, the strength of feminist analysis lies in its understanding of 
how power hierarchies rooted in gender are operationalized in political practices, organized 
and embedded in institutions.  
Understandings of gender are thus constructed through EU relations to other states in 
the global context and in EU policy-making and institution-building. Simultaneously, whilst 
women appear to be central in the debate of peace, they are attributed an ambiguous position 
with reference to security (both as actors of providing it as well as targeted/referent objects). 
Although there is literature on migration and CSDP, research interweaving these issues remains 
nascent. My proposed research links to my thesis via the normative core, dominant in both 
projects. Feminist theory belongs to a critical theory tradition with theories that share an interest 
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in power, change and emancipation (Manners, 2007). The gender viewpoint provides the 
critical position, while it is normative in the sense that feminism seeks to eliminate gender 
inequalities  
Despite the EU CSDP masculinity being considered a civil-minded military one, a 
dominant EU hierarchical military masculinity is institutionalized, thereby leading to the CSDP 
embodying different types of military masculinities. The aforementioned is exemplified in the 
explicit articulation of the role of protector on behalf of the EU “to pay special attention to the 
needs of vulnerable groups, in particular to the rights of the child and violence against women” 
(Council of the European Union, 2008:13). Since 2008 the EU has committed to protect these 
rights through the UN Women Peace and Security agenda (EU Security and Defence, 
2009:292). The only form in which femininity is explicitly referred to as relevant in the CSDP 
is with references to women and children in places outside and away from the EU. 
For the aforementioned reasons, the examination of the gender journey in CSDP 
through the example of the refugee crisis (operation Sophia) is not only a multifaceted subject 
theoretically, but also one with extensive political, social and normative impact. 
 
9.5 Conclusions 
This thesis explored issues of normative power, from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. Specifically, the normative underpinnings of the NPE framework and the use of 
military means as a way of norm diffusion were examined in order to determine the importance 
of actorness as a constructive element of the EU’s normative identity in its external action. 
 In response to the main research question underpinning this project, the establishment 
of the EEAS in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) appears to have contributed to the 
evolution of the Union as a ‘normative power’. Judging from its external action overall, and 
the military operations carried out in Somalia more specifically, the EU exhibits the 
characteristics of a normative power according to NPE (Manners 2002). Departing from the 
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initial inception of the theory by Manners (2002), this thesis incorporates the main critiques 
suggesting what the defining element of ‘normative power’ is (see Chapter 2). Namely, it 
considers ‘normative interests’ together with ‘normative action/behaviour’ (Diez 2005, 
Merlingen 2007, Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007) and ‘normative impact’ (De Zutter 2010, Diez 
2005, Manners 2006, Youngs 2004) and combines them in accordance with De Zutter’s (2010) 
position, which claims that a normative power demonstrates continuity in its behaviour 
internally and externally.  
Simultaneously, the research tackles the inherent tension between military and 
normative power by exploring the military operations in Somalia. With due consideration of 
Stivachtis (2007) and Diez (2005), a separation is made between military means and the use of 
coercion. With this distinction, military means can act as ‘symbolic manifestation’ (Manners 
2006), thereby becoming compatible and even beneficial to normative diffusion. This last point 
responds directly to the second theoretical question underpinning this research. 
Therefore, this thesis’ theoretical contribution is two-fold: it provides theoretical 
innovation by expanding on the debate regarding the operationalization of normative power as 
well as empirical originality via the selected case study. The theoretical contribution lies in the 
examination of the compatibility between military means and normative power, thereby 
addressing one of the main theoretical tensions of NPE (see Chapter 2). This theoretical 
question is illustrated empirically within the case of Somalia (see Chapter 5, 6 and 7), more 
specifically, through the two military operations carried out by the EU. Therefore, the 
contribution to theory is incorporated within a case study that has not previously been explored 
through a normative lens whilst contributing to the literature on the case study itself. By 
identifying whether and how the EU has acted as a normative power/norm diffuser in the 
difficult case of Somalia, this thesis generates both useful material for policy makers and 
creates new routes of enquiry for future research. 
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The empirical element upon which the theoretical premise is explored is the EU’s 
normative actorness within CSDP. Most importantly, the establishment of the EEAS is argued 
to be a catalytic moment in the evolution of the EU as a normative actor. Following the 
theoretical elaboration in Chapter 2, the discussion of the changes that occurred as a result of 
the EEAS’ establishment as well as the unresolved issues that have been identified in the 
literature as far as its role and function are concerned are portrayed in Chapter 4. The 
operationalisation of the EU’s normative standing within its military operations is achieved 
through a content analysis of EU primary documentation (see Appendix 1) and a subsequent 
critical frame analysis (see Chapters 3), thus completing the portrait of its normative identity 
and ‘power’. The critical frames of the ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’ 
and ‘partnership-ownership’ are employed to allow the interpretation of the EU’s initiatives 
from a normative perspective. 
To provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of EUNAVFOR and EUTM’s 
normative importance emerging from the content and critical frame analyses, the following 
structure is followed throughout Chapters 6 and 7. Initially the content analysis of the critical 
frames appearing in the key EU strategic documents – European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), 
EU Global Strategy (EUGS 2016) and their respective Implementation plans as well as the 
Comprehensive Approach (CA 2013) and its Action Plan (2015)- are presented in the light of 
the employed analytical apparatuses to provide a broader context to the EU’s actions within 
CSDP. Building on discussions concerning the EEAS’ importance as well as shortcomings (see 
Chapter 4), what becomes apparent is how the vision of the Lisbon Treaty is echoed by the 
intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The EUGS and its Implementation Plan 
demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the EU’s normative basis with reference to 
the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution of the EEAS into a pivotal actor bearing 
most of this normative actorness. 
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The EU sub-strategies – Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security 
Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – dealing with particular 
geographical regions and areas of action, further narrow the focus of this analysis adding to the 
evaluation in normative terms, providing more specified insight into the employment of the 
critical frames and identifying their pertinence within this thesis (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, 
the relevant chapter demonstrated how the EU’s general strategic concerns are operationalised 
in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly with reference to its military 
initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature.  
The EU’s documents relating to Somalia follow (see Chapter 7). Although they may 
not be strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these documents have 
elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis further honed down to the use 
of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, building on its introduction 
in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) adds the perspective of the Somali 
side in the dynamic diffusion of normative power (see Chapter 2). Therefore, both sides to the 
normative process are accounted for thus completing the conceptualisation of NPE and, more 
specifically, how it is reflected in the impact of the EU’s relations with Somalia. 
Finally, the documentation relating to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta and EUTM, conclude this chapter (Chapter 7), thereby completing the illustration of 
the EU’s actorness within a normative setting. This section focuses on the fluctuations (or lack 
thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the operations’ 
mandates, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, 
the emerging comparison between the two operations contributes to the construction of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall 
actorness in normative terms. Thereby the element of ‘action’ completes the conceptual 
framework proposed in Chapter 3. 
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The conclusions drawn from the coding indicates the continuity of the EU’s normative 
commitments within the design and execution of its initiatives in the area of external action. 
The comprehensive approach, as the linking element between military and civilian means but 
also between the internal and external practices of the EU, has consistently been employed and 
evolved throughout the levels of EU engagement. In this respect, the EU can be characterised 
as a normative actor according to De Zutter’s (2010) definition, given that the Union has 
demonstrated the centrality of norms both in its internal as well as its external practices. With 
reference to the means employed, the critical frame analysis supported Whitman’s (2002) view 
of the Union’s military power as a residual tool whilst also reflecting Larsen (2002) in that the 
EU did not resort to military force to the detriment of non-coercive means but also that it relies 
more on its rhetoric rather than its action. The military operations in Somalia are testament to 
these last points, seeing that they both rely on the use of non-forceful means and are rather 
concerned with the diffusion of core normative principles (see Manners 2002). As illustrated 
in Chapter 2 and supported throughout this thesis, normative power is seen as a separate type 
of power which can also include military presence if that is not complemented by coercive 
action. 
In promoting its norms within a framework of generally accepted values (through 
referral to international law or to generally acknowledged systems such as the UN) the EU has 
increased the value of its norms whilst highlighting them in its external action (see Manners 
2008). Lastly, with reference to the symbolic element of military power (Manners 2006), within 
its initiatives, particularly EUNAVFOR, the EU has capitalised on Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis 
on the recognition of presence of a normative power, by focusing on it on a strategic (EUGS), 
institutional (EEAS) as well as an operational level (EUNAVFOR). Although remaining 
committed to its promotion of effective multilateralism, the Union has also focused in its most 
recent strategic documents (EUGS and Implementation Plan) on the construction of autonomy, 
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or representation of self. What the frame analysis has demonstrated, particularly in the sub-
strategies prescribing its relations with Africa as well as Somalia, is that again it fulfils, 
theoretically, the requirements of being characterised as a normative power. Speaking to 
Tocci’s (2008) definition of a normative power as ‘other empowering’, the EU has resorted 
heavily to the employment of the partnership and ownership frames, thus engaging with the 
procedural diffusion of its norms (see Textbox 1) throughout its engagement in Africa and even 
more so in Somalia.  
Within the scope of operations carried out in Somalia, the comprehensive approach as 
well as effective multilateralism are found at the core of the EU’s efforts to eradicate the threats 
faced within the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Strategies which directly affect and 
guide the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives were constructed in the light of the EEAS’s 
appearance within the framework of external action, underline the importance of the 
aforementioned frames not only in understanding the EU’s actorness but also subsequently the 
character attributed to the EEAS which appears at the crux of internal and external 
multilateralism.  
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Comprehensive 
approach 
implied 
Comprehensive 
approach 
explicit 
Comprehensive 
approach 
TOTAL 
Effective 
multilateralism 
implied 
Effective 
multilateralism 
explicit 
Effective 
multilateralism 
TOTAL 
Ownership 
implied 
Partnership 
implied 
Explicit 
ownership 
Explicit 
partnership 
Partnership-
ownership 
TOTAL 
European Security Strategy (ESS): A 
Secure Europe in a Better World 
(12/12/2003) 
29.6 0 29.6 51.9 3.7 55.6 0 0 0 14.8 14.8 
EU Strategy for Africa, COM (2005) 
489 final, 12.10.2005 
21.4 9.5 30.9 9.5 0 9.5 0 0 14.3 45.2 59.5 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
2007, 8-9/12/2007 
12.1 1.7 13.8 44.8 1.7 46.5 3.4 0 5.2 31 39.6 
JAES Action Plan 2011-2013, 8-
9/12/2007 
11.76 5.88 17.64 32.35 5.88 38.23 2.94 2.94 0 38.24 44.12 
Council Joint Action 2008/ 851/ 
CFSP, 10 November 2008 
0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
ESS Implementation Report 
(11/12/2008)  
27.3 4.5 31.8 38.6 6.8 45.4 0 0 2.3 20.5 22.8 
EUSOM, L.10/29, 15.1.2009 0 0 0 66.7 0 66.7 0 16.7 16.7 0 33.4 
Council Decision EUTM 
2010/96/CFSP, 15/2/2010 
0 16.7 16.7 50 0 50 0 0 0 33.3 33.3 
Commission Recommendation on 
measures for self-protection and 
the prevention of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, 
2010/159/EU, 11.3.2010  
25 0 25 75 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 
FAC Conclusion on piracy off the 
coast of Somalia 14 June 2010 
18.18 27.27 45.45 45.45 0 45.45 0 0 9.09 0 9.09 
Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, 
28/07/2011 
0 0 0 66.7 0 66.7 0 0 0 33.3 33.3 
Council Conclusions - Horn of 
Africa, 16858/11, 14.11.2011 
12.28 5.26 17.54 52.63 0 52.63 0 0 7.02 22.81 29.83 
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Comprehensive 
approach 
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Comprehensive 
approach 
explicit 
Comprehensive 
approach 
TOTAL 
Effective 
multilateralism 
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Effective 
multilateralism 
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Effective 
multilateralism 
TOTAL 
Ownership 
implied 
Partnership 
implied 
Explicit 
ownership 
Explicit 
partnership 
Partnership-
ownership 
TOTAL 
3124th FAC Conclusions on the 
Horn of Africa,  14/11/2011 
21.74 4.35 26.09 45.65 2.17 47.82 2.17 0 8.7 15.22 26.09 
Council Decision, appointing the 
EUSR for the Horn of Africa, 
2011/819/CFSP, 8/12/2011 
25 0 25 50 0 50 25 0 0 0 25 
Council PRESSE Fight against piracy: 
Council launches EU action to 
strengthen maritime capacities in 
the horn of Africa, 18321/2/11 REV 
3, 12/12/2011 
40 20 60 2 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 
Council Decision 2012 /174 /CFSP, 
23 March 2012 
0 33.3 33.3 66.7 0 66.7 0 0 0 0 0 
Press Release: EUTM Somalia 
Information Brief 8/5/2012 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 
FAC conclusions on Somalia 3166, 
14 May 2012 
0 14.29 14.29 42.86 0 42.86 21.43 0 21.43 0 42.86 
3183rd Foreign Affairs Council 
conclusions on CSDP, 23 July 2012 
33.33 11.11 44.44 44.44 0 44.44 0 0 0 11.11 11.11 
Factsheet: EUNAVFOR Somalia, 16 
Oct 2012, EUNAVFOR/42 
0 33.3 33.3 66.7 0 66.7 0 0 0 0 0 
PSC Decision ATALANTA/4/2012 
(2012/808/CFSP), 18.12.2012 
0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
Council Decision 2012/835/CFSP, 
21/12/2012 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Somali Compact, 2013 20 0 20 36 0 36 0 0 20 24 44 
Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP, 
22/1/2013 
33.3 0 33.3 50 0 50 8.3 0 0 8.3 16.6 
PSC Decision ATALANTA/1/2013, 
(2013/159/CFSP), 22.3.2013 
0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
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Comprehensive 
approach 
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Comprehensive 
approach 
explicit 
Comprehensive 
approach 
TOTAL 
Effective 
multilateralism 
implied 
Effective 
multilateralism 
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Effective 
multilateralism 
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Ownership 
implied 
Partnership 
implied 
Explicit 
ownership 
Explicit 
partnership 
Partnership-
ownership 
TOTAL 
Interim Report by the HR, 
"Preparing the December 2013 
European Council on Security and 
Defence", 24 July 2013 
22.58 19.35 41.93 35.48 0 35.48 0 0 6.45 16.13 22.58 
Statement by the EUHR Catherine 
Ashton, A436/13, 28 Aug 2013 
50 0 50 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 
Somalia New Deal Conference 
Communique, 16/9/2013 
20 0 20 53.33 0 53.33 6.67 0 13.33 6.67 26.67 
EUCOM, JOIN (2013)30 final, 
11.12.2013, EU Comprehensive 
Approach 
30 40 70 23.33 3.33 26.66 0 0 0 3.33 3.33 
Factsheet, EUTM Somalia, 
December 2013 
37.5 12.5 50 37.5 0 37.5 0 0 0 12.5 12.5 
Counter piracy efforts for 2014, 
EEAS PR, 131223/04, 23.12.2013 
0 0 0 50 0 50 0 50 0 0 50 
EEAS Press Release EU to lead 
international counter piracy efforts 
in 2014, 131223/04, 23/12/2013 
23.53 5.88 29.41 64.71 0 64.71 0 0 0 5.88 5.88 
HR COM, Join (2014) 9 final, Joint 
Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council, For an 
open and secure global maritime 
domain: elements for a EU 
maritime security strategy, 
6.3.2014 
30 5 35 45 5 50 0 0 2.5 12.5 15 
4th EU-Africa Summit Declaration, 
2-3/4/2014 
10.71 3.57 14.28 67.86 0 67.86 0 0 3.57 14.29 17.86 
4th EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 
2014-2017, 2-3/4/2014 
26.67 0 26.67 40 0 40 0 6.67 6.67 20 33.34 
EUMSS (Council, 11205/14, 24 June 
2014) 
30.56 22.22 52.78 36.11 2.78 38.89 0 2.78 0 5.56 8.34 
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Ownership 
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Partnership-
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FAC Council conclusions on Somalia 
20 October 2014 
26.67 6.67 33.34 9 0 60 0 0 0 6.67 6.67 
EUMSS Action Plan (17002/14) 
CSDP/PSDC 744 (16/12/2014) 
20.59 5.88 26.47 67.65 2.94 70.59 0 0 2.94 0 2.94 
EU Action Plan CA 2015 Council 
7913/15, 14/4/2015 
10.53 31.58 42.11 47.37 0 47.37 0 0 0 10.53 10.53 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 
16/3/2015 
33.3 0 33.3 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 33.3 0 33.3 
EU Parliament Report, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, A8-0069/2016, 
29.3.2016 
14.29 16.67 30.96 35.71 2.38 38.09 0 0 9.52 21.43 30.95 
Factsheet EUNAVFOR Somalia, 
EEAS 
0 50 50 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 
Factsheet: CSDP- EUTM Somalia 
April 2016 
0 33.3 33.3 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 33.3 33.3 
A Global Strategy for the European 
Union's Foreign And Security Policy 
(EUGS) (6/2016) 
33.3 4.2 37.5 29.2 16.7 45.9 0 0 0 16.7 16.7 
EUMSS Responding together to 
global challenges - A guide to 
stakeholders (17/08/2016)  
26.32 10.53 36.85 57.89 5.26 63.15 0 0 0 0 0 
Extension of Atalanta, 13274/16, 
25/10/2016 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUGS Implementation plan 
(14/11/2016), 14392/16 
32.8 0 32.8 15.5 3.4 18.9 0 1.7 0 46.6 48.3 
Council Conclusions, 14149/16, 
14/11/2016 
30.3 15.2 45.5 45.5 3 48.5 0 3 0 3 6 
Council Decision, 2014/827/ 
CFSP,Renewing ATALANTA, 
21/11/2014 
50 0 50 25 0 25 0 0 25 0 25 
EUNAVFOR: 12/2018, CEU 691/16, 
28/11/2016 
0 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Council Decision (CFSP), 2016/2239, 
12/12/2016 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The European Union in a changing 
global env. PR REL 
 
14.3 9.5 23.8 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 42.9 42.9 
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  Frequency of frame Total document pages 
European Security Strategy (ESS): A Secure Europe in a Better 
World (12/12/2003) 
6 14 
EU Strategy for Africa, COM (2005) 489 final, 12.10.2005 0 44 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 2007, 8-9/12/2007 6 24 
JAES Action Plan 2011-2013, 8-9/12/2007 0 75 
Council Joint Action 2008/ 851/ CFSP, 10 November 2008 0 5 
ESS Implementation Report (11/12/2008)  3 12 
EUSOM, L.10/29, 15.1.2009 0 6 
Council Decision EUTM 2010/96/CFSP, 15/2/2010 0 4 
Commission Recommendation on measures for self-protection and 
the prevention of piracy and armed robbery against ships, 
2010/159/EU, 17.3.2010  
0 13 
FAC Conclusion on piracy off the coast of Somalia 14 June 2010 0 2 
Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, 28/07/2011 0 2 
Council Conclusions - Horn of Africa, 16858/11, 14.11.2011 1 18 
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  Frequency of frame Total document pages 
3124th FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 14/11/2011 1 12 
Council Decision, appointing the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, 
2011/819/CFSP, 8/12/2011 
0 3 
Council PRESSE Fight against piracy: Council launches EU action to 
strengthen maritime capacities in the horn of Africa, 18321/2/11 
REV 3, 12/12/2011 
0 2 
Council Decision 2012 /174 /CFSP, 23 March 2012 0 3 
Press Release: EUTM Somalia Information Brief 8/5/2012 0 1 
FAC conclusions on Somalia 3166, 14 May 2012 0 3 
3183rd Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on CSDP, 23 July 2012 0 3 
Factsheet: EUNAVFOR Somalia, 16 Oct 2012, EUNAVFOR/42 0 5 
PSC Decision ATALANTA/4/2012 (2012/808/CFSP), 18.12.2012 0 1 
Council Decision 2012/835/CFSP, 21/12/2012 0 2 
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  Frequency of frame Total document pages 
Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP, 22/1/2013 0 3 
PSC Decision ATALANTA/1/2013, (2013/159/CFSP), 22.3.2013 0 1 
Interim Report by the HR, "Preparing the December 2013 European 
Council on Security and Defence", 24 July 2013 
2 18 
Statement by the EUHR Catherine Ashton, A436/13, 28 Aug 2013 0 1 
Somalia New Deal Conference Communique, 16/9/2013 0 4 
EUCOM, JOIN(2013)30 final, 11.12.2013, EU Comprehensive 
Approach 
4 12 
Factsheet, EUTM Somalia, December 2013 0 3 
Counter piracy efforts for 2014, EEAS PR, 131223/04, 23.12.2013 0 2 
EEAS Press Release EU to lead international counter piracy efforts 
in 2014, 131223/04, 23/12/2013 
0 7 
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  Frequency of frame Total document pages 
HR COM, Join(2014) 9 final, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council, For an open and secure global 
maritime domain: elements for a EU maritime security strategy, 
6.3.2014 
5 11 
4th EU-Africa Summit Declaration, 2-3/4/2014 0 10 
4th EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 2014-2017, 2-3/4/2014 3 13 
EUMSS (Council, 11205/14, 24 June 2014) 7 16 
FAC Council conclusions on Somalia 20 October 2014 0 4 
EUMSS Action Plan (17002/14) CSDP/PSDC 744 (16/12/2014) 0 8 
EU Action Plan CA 2015 Council 7913/15, 14/4/2015 0 14 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015 0 2 
EU Parliament Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, A8-
0069/2016, 29.3.2016 
13 23 
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  Frequency of frame Total document pages 
Factsheet EUNAVFOR Somalia, EEAS 0 2 
Factsheet: CSDP- EUTM Somalia April 2016 0 2 
A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security 
Policy (EUGS) (6/2016) 
5 56 
EUMSS Responding together to global challenges - A guide to 
stakeholders (17/08/2016)  
4 8 
Extension of Atalanta, 13274/16, 25/10/2016 0 3 
Council Conclusions, 14149/16, 14/11/2016 0 16 
EUGS Implementation plan (14/11/2016), 14392/16 0 31 
Council Decision, 2014/827/ CFSP, Renewing ATALANTA, 
21/11/2014 
0 3 
EUNAVFOR: 12/2018, CEU 691/16, 28/11/2016 0 1 
Council Decision (CFSP), 2016/2239, 12/12/2016 0 2 
The European Union in a changing global environment  
A more connected, contested and complex world 
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